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ABSTRACT 
 
MAXINE EICHNER:  Family Matters:  The Family-State Relationship And Our Liberal 
Democratic Ideals 
(Under the direction of Michael Lienesch and Pamela Conover) 
 
In this dissertation, I consider the stance that a liberal democratic state should take with 
respect to intimate relationships among citizens.   My basic argument is that an adequate 
vision of the family-state relationship must pay significant respect to the standard liberal 
goods of freedom and equality, and yet it must also recognize that a liberal society's respect 
for human dignity requires it to foster caretaking and human development.  The best way to 
harmonize these goods, I argue, is for the state to allow individuals a significant degree of 
freedom to pursue their own visions of the good life while requiring the state to support the 
institutional conditions that facilitate families' capacity for caretaking and human 
development.  I offer my "supportive state" model to illustrate how a liberal democratic 
polity should organize its family-state relations and reconcile the tensions among these 
important goods. 
In the first two chapters of the book, I consider the absence of families in contemporary 
liberal theory and engage a broad spectrum of liberalism’s critics—from communitarians, to 
civic liberal revisionists, feminists, and queer theorists—to consider alternative visions of the 
family-state relationship.  In the following three chapters, I argue for a “supportive state” 
model of the family-state relationship, in which families bear responsibility for caring for and 
organizing the care of family members, but the state bears a simultaneous responsibility to 
ensure that societal institutions support caretaking and human development.  I develop the 
 iv 
contours of this model in the context of discussing caretaker-dependent relationships, 
relationships among generally able adults, and relationships of political socialization and the 
transmission of civic norms and values.  In the final two chapters, I critique current law and 
public policy and the vision of the family-state relationship on which it rests.  I argue that 
both current child welfare law and work-and-family law and policy are built on unrealistic 
and unproductive assumptions that assign the state a peripheral role in supporting caretaking.  
These areas of law, I contend, would be better grounded on a supportive state model.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Most of us spend the majority of our lives in long-term (albeit not always permanent) 
relationships with others whom we consider “family.”   These relationships have a 
fundamental influence on our lives from our day of birth, and generally stand at the core of 
our emotional and moral commitments.  They profoundly affect the way we live our lives on 
a daily basis.  It is through these relationships that much of our identities are structured (I am 
“X’s parent,” “Y’s  spouse or partner,”  “Z’s child.”), that central emotional and physical 
needs are met, that the rearing of children is largely accomplished, and that other issues of 
dependency, including financial dependency, are generally managed.    
 What role should the state play with respect to these critical ties among citizens?  
Until recently, there had been little explicit consideration of this issue in political theory in 
the United States.  Instead, the liberal theory that dominated the academy tended to be 
focused on individual justice and framed in terms of individuals and their rights viewed apart 
from their relationships with others.  Families, when they were considered at all, tended to be 
seen as natural, pre-political, and largely benign associations that properly remained aloof 
from the scope of legal and political theory.   To the extent that families were considered, 
these theories largely posited that the basic posture of the state should be neutrality.    
In contrast to this academic theorizing, public discourse on families in the United 
States has taken a very different tack.  That discourse has prominently emphasized the 
importance of families, often conceiving them as the foundational unit of society.  To the 
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extent that the definitional issue of what constitutes a family has been raised, public 
discussion has sought to distinguish “real,” “natural,” and “good” families, which can 
properly serve their foundational functions (generally conceived as the raising of healthy, 
moral children), from deviant families, which cannot.  In this discussion, the heterosexual 
marital family has not only been construed as more natural and moral than alternative family 
forms, it has also been deemed better because it is believed to be more self-sufficient in 
performing the functions families are supposed to perform (again, generally associated with 
the raising of children).1  This discourse comports with a legal system that has granted 
hundreds, if not thousands, of privileges to the marital family as against other relationships 
(Fineman 2004, 104-05; Dougherty 2004).  Yet because of the view that families should 
properly be self-sufficient (Fineman 2004), state support for caretaking – even for caretaking 
that occurs within the marital family –  has been quite limited in comparison to that offered 
by other nations, and particularly limited compared with Western European democracies 
(Gornick and Meyers 2004, 58-83).2   
 Developments in the last few decades, however, have called into question the 
adequacy of both academic and public discourse regarding the family-state relationship.  
Some large part of this challenge has come from political and social developments, 
including, most prominently, the boom in diversity of family forms.  The rise of divorce 
rates,3 the increasing visibility of same-sex relationships,4 the mushrooming rates of single-
                                                 
1The state’s policy in this regard is ironic, Fineman points out, since it is precisely the view that the marital 
family is autonomous that causes it to receive this massive subsidization by the state (Fineman 2004, 57). 
  
2For example, according to a report released by a United Nations agency, of 152 industrialized countries, the 
United States ranks dead last in benefits and protections it offered to working parents (Grimsley 1998).   
 
3For graphs illustrating the increase in divorce rates since the 1860s, as well as an explanation of the difficulties 
in adequately assessing the changes in those rates, see Carbone 2000, 86-87; Cherlin 1995, 306. 
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parent families,5 and the growing number of couples who choose to remain childless,6 
challenge conventional understandings of what it means to be a family.  Fewer than one in 
four U.S. families is composed of a husband, wife and children today, compared with 45% in 
1960 (Sado and Bayer 2001).  That number drops to under 10% for families in which both 
parents live with their biological children and the wife does not work outside the home (Sado 
and Bayer 2001).  These vast changes in family form have called into question preconceived 
notions of what families look like, what functions they should perform, and have challenged 
the supposed naturalness and immutability of the traditional family structure.   
This transformation in family structure has contributed to political pressures that 
challenge the dominant academic and popular views.  For example, the rise in visibility of 
same-sex relationships along with an invigorated gay rights movement has helped to bring 
the issue of same-sex marriage to the fore.  In turn, this has shed a strong light on the state’s 
role in legally approving some family relationships and refusing to recognize others.  This 
attention to the state’s position with respect to creating families undercuts the view that 
families are somehow natural and pre-political, and that the state has and should remain 
neutral with respect to them. 
                                                                                                                                                       
4The 2000 U.S. Census counted 601,209 same-sex unmarried partner households.  This means that roughly 1% 
of all couples sharing a household are same-sex.  That is a 314% increase from the 1990 Census, although 
changes in the manner of coding these responses likely led to significant undercounting in the earlier census.   It 
is likely that actual numbers are higher than even the 2000 Census reveals due to underreporting of these 
relationships (Smith and Gates 2001). 
 
5In 1960, nine percent of children lived in single-parent homes.  By 1999, that figure rose to 27% (Sado and 
Bayer 2001). The rise in single-parent families is attributable not only to increased divorce rates, but to an 
increase in the number of families in which the parents were never married.  The percentage of children born 
out of wedlock increased at an accelerated pace beginning in the middle 1960s.   In 1970 there were about 
400,000  births (out of 3.7 million total births) to mothers who were unmarried; in 1990, that figure rose to 1.2 
million  (Akerlof, Yellen and Katz 1996, 285).  During the same period, married women’s fertility rate declined  
(Akerlof, Yellen and Katz 1996, 285).  Overall, almost one in every three families with children is headed by a 
woman who has never been married. (Luker 1996, 103).   
 
6See Regan 1993, 47. 
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At the same time, these changes contest the prevailing idea that the state’s proper role 
with respect to families should be one of benign detachment.  The combination of women’s 
increased labor force participation7  and the growing number of single-parent families means 
that 70% of families are now headed either by two working parents or an unmarried working 
parent (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1998).  As a consequence of this and the rising number of 
hours that Americans work,8 American parents now have fewer hours per week to spend with 
their children than they did in past decades (Kornbluh 2003; Crittenden 2001, 27 nn.25-26).9  
The conflict between work demands and childrearing in a culture that gives little public 
support to the latter has caused both the public and commentators to cite the “family time 
famine” as a major concern (Powell 2004; Galston 1997; Cummins 1996).10  This time 
crunch is exacerbated by the need of many adults to care for their aging parents.11  In all, 
these trends have caused most Americans to believe that the government should be doing 
more to aid families (Powell 2004; Megan 1996; Healy 1996; 1997).  
In addition, the feminist movement has contributed to the unsettling of the dominant 
                                                 
7Between 1950 and 1997, women’s participation in the work force shot up from 30% to 46% in the United 
States (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1998).  The current workforce includes 78% of all women with 6 to 17 year-
olds, and 65% of women with children younger than six years of age (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1998).   
 
8In 2002, men worked 49 paid and unpaid hours per week on average at all jobs or the only job they have, an 
average of 2 more hours than the 47 hours men worked in 1977.  Women’s increase in work has been even 
greater. Women now work an average of 43.5 paid and unpaid hours per week now at all jobs, compared with 
39 hours in 1977 (Families and Work Institute 2002, 27). Sociologist Juliet Schor calculated that U.S. workers 
now work an average of nine full work weeks more than European workers do (Schor 2002). 
 
9Recent studies suggest that working fathers are reducing the time gap by at least a small amount through 
spending more time with their children than working fathers did a generation ago –  from 1.8 hours to 2.7 hours 
on working days (Families and Work Institute 2002). 
 
10Ninety-five percent of fathers and 90% of mothers in the United States state that they wished to have more 
time with their children.  These are considerably higher rates than workers in other countries (Gornick and 
Meyers 2003, 79-80). 
 
11Some 22.4 million households, or 23%, currently provide some level of care to aging family members 
(Hammonds-Smith 2003). 
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academic and popular views on the role of families.  Feminist campaigns against domestic 
violence and support for no-fault divorce laws have increased awareness that not all families 
are benign for their participants (Schneider 2000; Ellman 1989, 81 n.15), as academic and 
popular conceptions often assume.  The feminist movement has also called attention to the 
continuing gender inequality associated with the heterosexual marital family, still the 
dominant family form (for example, Stacey 2003; Fineman 2004).   In addition, second-wave 
feminism encouraged many women, including those with young children, to work in the 
labor market, thereby putting under stress the idea that families could autonomously deal 
with caretaking issues.   The resulting feminist campaigns for day care and family leave have 
more directly contested the view that families are and should be autonomous from the state. 
Recent politics demonstrate the unsettled and complex nature of the American 
public’s view of the proper role of the state with respect to family.   While many 
conservatives continue to call for the state to recognize and support the heterosexual marital 
family exclusively (Gallagher 2004; Limbaugh 2004; Thomas 2003), a minority of 
conservatives favor state recognition of same-sex marriage (Safire 2003; Buckley 2003; 
Sullivan 2001).  Furthermore, recent legal attempts to strengthen the institution of marriage 
stand in uneasy counterpoint with the view of conservative libertarians that marriage is a pre-
political (to some, a religious) institution that should not require state recognition and 
support.12  
There is no greater consensus on the state’s proper relationship to families at the other 
end of the political spectrum.  Many on the left argue that the state should recognize some 
forms of families, albeit a broader category than conservatives.  Proponents of this position 
                                                 
12See, for example, Young 2003 (citing the Cato Institute's David Boaz argument for privatizing all marriages).   
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favor, for example, broadening marriage to include same-sex couples.  Yet others, including 
some gay rights advocates, believe the state has no business at all in adult relationships, and 
assert that the state should remove itself completely from sanctioning marriage (for example, 
Warner 2000).  And although those on the left generally believe that the state should have a 
larger role in the ongoing support of families than do conservatives, this is still accompanied 
by considerable dissension over how much support the state should give, the rationale for this 
support, and  how much to expect that families will do for themselves.13 
 These political and social developments, and the controversy that surrounds them, 
point to the need for a careful reconsideration of the state’s posture toward family 
relationships.   In this dissertation, I seek to engage in such a rethinking.  The account that I 
develop is unabashedly liberal, in the sense that it assumes the equal worth of all human 
beings, the importance of limits on government, and respect for individual rights.14  It takes 
seriously, however, the recent insights of political theorists who argue that liberalism cannot 
and should not be completely neutral with respect to different versions of the good life, and 
that a liberal polity must strive to further a broader range of goods than the individualistic 
versions of liberty and justice that have often been associated with it (Nussbaum 1999; 
Galston 1991; Guttman 1989; Macedo 1995; Spragens 1999).  And it seeks to combine those 
insights with those of feminist theorists who have pointed out that the inevitability of 
dependency, and the consequent need for caretaking, must be accounted for in structuring our 
                                                 
13Compare, for example, Galston 1996, Case 2001, and Fineman 2004.   
14I use the term “liberal” throughout this article to refer to the Anglo-American line of political thought 
stretching from John Locke through John Stuart Mill and on to such contemporary thinkers as John Rawls, 
whose work focuses on the importance of liberty, self-government, and equal rights for citizens.  This use of the 
term is therefore broader than the use of the term “liberal” in common parlance to refer to those who hold 
political beliefs at the opposite end of the political spectrum from conservatives.  Under my use of the term, 
both thinkers such as John Rawls, who might qualify as a liberal under common usage, and Robert Nozick, who 
might be considered a political conservative, are “liberals.” 
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common lives together (Fineman 2004; Kittay 1995, 1999; Tronto 1993).   
Put another way, although a liberal democracy should give significant pride of place 
to individual liberty and justice, it must also pay attention to an array of other goods and 
principles relating to human dependency and human development that are necessary to a 
vigorous democracy, and which have been too often read out of standard liberal accounts.15  
In my view, it is only by considering this broader range of goods and principles that the 
appropriate relationship between families and the state can be brought into focus.   
It is conceivable, of course that society could be structured in a way in which issues 
of dependency and human development issues were not primarily dealt with within families.  
That, however, is the work of some other project.  In this work, I assume, following the 
model of John Rawls,16 that at least some significant part of the work of caretaking for 
dependency needs and fostering human development will continue to occur within intimate 
caretaking relationships with those whom we consider “family.”  My aim is therefore to 
construct a theory of the relationship between families and the state that, while paying 
healthy respect to the values of individual freedom and justice, also supports the caretaking 
and human development functions, goods, and values that family relationships can provide.  
At the same time, I seek to do this without idealizing these relationships.  As advocates for 
domestic violence survivors would quickly point out (for example, Pleck 1987, 7-9), families 
are not always conducive to the welfare of their members.  Further, women’s familial 
                                                 
15As Charles Taylor says about modern thought generally, “[w]e have read so many goods out of our official 
story, we have buried their power so deep beneath layers of philosophical rationale, that they are in danger of 
stifling.  Or rather, since they are our goods, human goods, we are stifling” (Taylor 1989, 520). 
 
16See Rawls 1971, 462-63 (“I shall assume that the basic structure of a well-ordered society includes the family 
in some form, and therefore that children are at first subject to the legitimate authority of their parents.  Of 
course, in a broader inquiry the institution of the family might be questioned, and other arrangements might 
indeed prove to be preferable. . . .”). 
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relationships, at least within the institution of heterosexual marriage, have been a primary 
locus of sex inequality in our society (Fineman 2004; Stacey 2003).   
My basic thesis is that it is possible to construct a normatively attractive vision of the 
family-state relationship that pays significant respect to the standard liberal goods of liberty, 
equality, and justice, and yet also combines them with the recognition that a good society 
must also foster caretaking and human development.  Implementing such a vision, I contend, 
requires that the state pay specific attention to promoting conditions in which families will 
flourish, rather than just taking such conditions for granted.  In this regard, I contend, the 
state must be conceived to have a continual responsibility to support families’ capacity for 
caretaking and human development in the ordinary course of events, rather than simply when 
families are deemed to fail.   Healthy families, in this view, are an achievement to be pursued 
rather than an inevitability.  Yet these conditions can be achieved, I contend, without 
emptying the public fisc, ignoring principles of fairness to those who are not members of 
families, or undermining the responsibility and autonomy of the adults who head families.  
Doing so, however, requires more nuanced policies that are capable of harmonizing the 
tension among the more diverse array of goods for which a liberal state should strive.   
 To consider these issues, my plan is fairly simple.  Chapter 1 discusses the way that 
the family-state relationship has been constructed in mainstream liberal political theory.  As 
is somewhat obligatory in a work of liberal revisionism, I begin with the work of John Rawls 
to discuss the elements of the liberal tradition that have caused it to pay so little attention to 
families.  My basic argument is that specific features of the Rawlsian mode of theorizing 
make it very difficult to bring families into sharp focus.  However, these features, I contend, 
are not intrinsic to liberalism, itself.  While certain defining features of liberalism make it 
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somewhat less amenable to attending to families than was the political theory that preceded 
it, liberalism hardly precludes a sensitive treatment of families.   Indeed, early versions of 
liberalism better allowed consideration of the place of families, even if earlier liberals seldom 
took up the invitation.  And, as John Stuart Mill’s robust discussions of families demonstrate, 
once that invitation is taken up, rich theorizations of the family-state relationship are indeed 
possible.  
   Chapter 2 considers recent critiques of liberal theory that bear on the family-state 
relationship.  In it, I review the work of communitarians, recent liberal revisionists 
(sometimes called “civic liberals”), and feminists.  Particular aspects of these critiques, I 
contend, lay the groundwork for a more nuanced account of the family-state relationship that 
better takes into account both the goods to be realized and the dangers that might arise from 
the state’s relationship with families.  Thus far, however, there has been a dearth of work that 
seeks to reconstruct the project of the liberal state in this manner. 
The remaining five chapters take up this project of liberal reconstruction by 
examining different facets of the family-state relationship.  Chapter 3 considers the issue of 
how to conceptualize the state’s responsibility vis-à-vis families for caretaking for those who 
are substantially dependent on others, including children, the aged, and those with significant 
disabilities.  In it, I consider three possible models of the division of this responsibility 
between families and the state.  The first is Martha Fineman’s model, in which the state’s 
responsibility is characterized as a debt owed to parents and other caretakers of dependents.  
The second is the model of subsidiarity propounded by William Galston, which posits that 
the state’s responsibility to assist families in caring for dependency is triggered only after 
families have tried and exhausted their own resources.  In contrast to these two models, I 
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advocate a third, which I call the “supportive state” model, in which the state’s responsibility 
to dependents in society is conceived as requiring the state to construct institutions that 
support families in their caretaking efforts.  In doing so, I contend that the state should 
develop systems that enable all citizens to integrate both caregiving and breadwinning into 
their lives.   
Chapter 4 then moves on from the issue of the state’s responsibility to dependents  to 
consider what stance the state should take to relationships between able adults.  Again, I use 
Martha Fineman and William Galston as interlocutors.  Fineman argues that the state should 
have no role in formalizing relationships between adults and has no business according 
particular privileges to such relationships.  Galston, by contrast, argues that the state should 
privilege marital relationships over other forms of families.   I argue that the caretaking that 
even adults need gives the state an important role vis-à-vis adult-adult relationships.  I 
contend, however, that the state’s position with respect to these relationships is complicated 
by the fact that important principles that underlie liberalism stand in considerable tension 
when it comes the state’s position regarding such relationships.  I then develop an approach 
that seeks to ameliorate the tension among these principles, and to give each of them the 
respect that it is due them.  This gives the state a role, albeit a limited one, in formalizing and 
supporting relationships among adults. 
In chapter 5, I turn to the issue of civic education.  As both theorists and cultural 
commentators have recognized, preparing children for the task of citizenship in a liberal 
democracy is an important and demanding responsibility.  How should this responsibility be 
allocated between parents and the state?  And, in the event of disagreement between them 
about what this task entails, whose views should trump – parents’ or the state’s?  In this 
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chapter, I contend that a vibrant liberal democracy must seek a delicate balance of three types 
of interests in educating children for citizenship:  liberal, democratic, and civic.  As with the 
issue of relationships between adults, I argue that each of these interests should receive 
significant weight, but that none of the relevant interests should be allowed to dominate.  I 
then develop an approach that achieves such a balance. 
Finally, the last two chapters, 6 and 7, move away from straight political theorizing to 
a more applied analysis by performing close critiques and suggesting reconstructions of two 
areas of law involving the intersection of the family and the state.  Chapter 6 considers the 
way in which the intersection between parenting responsibilities and work is treated in 
United States law.  Chapter 7 considers the way in which the law treats foster care and child 
welfare issues.  Both chapters argue that current law provides inadequate support for families 
that a sound polity requires.  I therefore suggest the reformulation of the law in these areas to 
conform with the “supportive state” model in order to better foster the caretaking and related 
goods that a strong liberal democracy requires.  
 
On Terminology and Methodology 
 
Before I begin my discussion, let me clarify the key terms associated with this 
project, specifically my use of the terms “family” and “state” – neither of which is self-
explanatory.  With regard to the former, the issue of which intimate relationships are and 
should be considered “families” is deeply contested in our society.  Far from there being any 
clear, nonpolitical answer to the question, my project takes as a starting point that what 
counts as a “family” is inherently intertwined with politics and power.  My use of the term 
“family” here is not meant to elide this definitional issue, but rather to explore it.  Part of the 
function of my dissertation is to consider which relationships are now embedded in our legal 
 12 
understanding of the term “family” and which are excluded, to consider how these inclusions 
and exclusions affect the construction of the family-state relationship, and to think through 
which forms of associations should be recognized as families in a liberal democratic polity.   
On a related issue, in writing this work, I considered adopting the plural form of 
“families,” and thus “families-state relationship” to denominate the relationship between 
intimate associations and the state.   Using this somewhat more cumbersome plural 
terminology would avoid the mistaken impression that there is any unitary entity that can be 
identified as a family.  However, I have chosen to rely on the singular form, “family,” for the 
sake of simplicity and clarity.  In doing so, I ask the reader to keep in mind that, far from any 
singular entity, the critical caretaking relationships that sustain us, and on which a viable 
liberal democracy depends, come in a number of shapes and sizes.   
 My use of the term “state” also requires some elaboration.  As a number of theorists 
have pointed out,17 the term is often used, yet rarely pinned down.  Moreover, it runs the risk 
of oversimplifying a complex array of relations, structures, and institutions. That said, I use 
the term in the sense that it has generally been used in the liberal tradition, to invoke the 
array of institutions that have a monopoly on legal authority (in this project, specifically 
legislative and juridical authority), and which are presumed legitimately to have only a 
limited role in the lives of citizens.   This use of the term refers not only to the formal legal 
rules and procedures that comprise these institutions, but also the cultural meanings attached 
to and embedded within them.  My use of the term “polity” is broader, intended to cover not 
simply the state itself, but also encompass the political community and the citizens who 
comprise it, as well as civil society.  
                                                 
17See, for example, Peter Steinberger’s recent book (2004,12), in which he argues “that an on-going and 
recurrent failure on the part of political theorists to be clear about what they mean when they use the word 
‘state’ has led to an entire range of important theoretical confusions.” 
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 Turning briefly to an issue of methodology, this project seeks to consider how 
families relate to the complex of ideals and purposes that should motivate the liberal 
democratic project and to consider how these ideals and purposes might best be realized in 
the relationship between families and the state.  It probably goes without saying, but since 
my method is not to deduce conclusions from claimed fundamental moral principles as, for 
example, John Rawls sought to do in his earlier work, my arguments will succeed or fail to 
the extent I convince the reader of the normative attractiveness of my proposal.  As Thomas 
Spragens says of a similar project:  “It should be obvious, then, that no one can reasonably 
pretend to have any knock-down arguments in this particular universe of discourse (Spragens 
1999, xiii).”  My hope, of course, is still to convince the reader that the vision of the family-
state relationship that I propose is a better alternative than the existing academic and public 
visions or their current contenders.  At the very least, I hope to demonstrate that the issue is a 
far more complex one that warrants far more discussion than it has received thus far. 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE FAMILY-STATE LINK IN LIBERAL THEORY:  RAWLS 
AND THE FAMILY  
 
 
 
Despite the importance of families to a well-ordered polity, Anglo-American political 
theory took little notice of them from its renaissance in the 1970s through almost the turn of 
the twenty-first century.  Why is this?  The omission likely did not represent a deliberate 
attempt on the part of theorists to leave out women or concerns traditionally attributed to 
them: these theories were written during the second wave of feminism in the United States, 
and most of them gave at least a passing nod to sex equality.18  Perhaps it could be argued 
that the omission was an oversight:  the political theory of this era was still largely the 
province of men who tended to have less responsibility for domestic concerns than women, 
and who therefore might have been less likely to focus on these issues.  While there may be 
some truth to this explanation, 19  in my view there is more to it than that: particular features 
                                                 
18For example, although John Rawls did not explicitly state in A Theory of Justice (1971) [“ATOJ”] that sex is 
one of the characteristics that is morally irrelevant in the original position, in subsequent work, Rawls 
confirmed that he considers sex to be such a factor (Rawls 1975, 537). 
 
19In fact, John Rawls validated this explanation in an unpublished manuscript, saying: 
 
Except for the great John Stuart Mill, one serious fault of writers in the liberal line is that until recently none 
have discussed in any detail the urgent questions of the justice of the family, the equal justice of women and 
how these things are to be achieved.  Susan Okin’s contentions about this in Justice, Gender and the Family 
cannot be denied.  Liberal writers who are men should, with whatever grace they can muster, plead nolo 
contendere to her complaints. (Unpublished manuscript, quoted in Nussbaum 2003, 488). 
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of the way in which theories of this era were conceived made it difficult to properly 
conceptualize families and their role in a liberal democracy. 
In this chapter, I use the work of John Rawls to explore the features of late-twentieth 
century liberal theory that obscured attention to families.   I focus on Rawls’ work because of 
the immensely powerful influence it has had on liberal theory and because, as a result of this 
influence, it typifies much contemporary liberal theory.  I contend that particular features of 
A Theory of Justice that set the stage for later liberal theory –  the limited focus on the good 
of justice, to the exclusion of other goods such as human development, human virtue, and 
affection; the failure to conceptualize the dependency inevitable in the human condition, and 
therefore the need for caretaking; and the attempt to keep the state neutral with respect to 
citizens’ conceptions of the good – prevent an adequate theorization of the role of families in 
a liberal state.  Yet these features, I argue, are adventitious to Rawls’ work rather than 
necessary features of liberal theory.  To demonstrate this, I show that earlier versions of 
liberalism better accommodated a more nuanced discussion of the role of families, even if 
earlier liberals seldom engaged in such discussions.  I then use the work of John Stuart Mill 
to demonstrate the rich discussions of families possible in liberal theory.    
 
Families and the State in the Work of John Rawls 
A Theory of Justice 
Normative political theory was widely considered to be a dead subject during the 
middle of the twentieth century as a result of the firm grip that positivism had on the 
academy at that time (Nussbaum 2001).  John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, with its broad 
theorizing of what justice demanded in a liberal state, is widely credited with reinvigorating 
political theory.   As feminist theorists have pointed out, however, little attention was paid to 
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families in this work and in the considerable foment of liberal theory that followed in its 
wake.  In this section, I describe Rawls’ work and consider why A Theory of Justice focused 
so little on the family-state relationship.  
In his most famous work, Rawls made it clear that his theory was limited to 
describing principles of social justice, rather than alternative principles that might guide a 
polity, such as, for example, achieving happiness or virtue.20  Rawls justified this limited 
focus on the rationale that “[j]ustice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of 
systems of thought” (3).  Social justice is so fundamental, Rawls counseled, because “[e]ach 
person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a 
whole cannot override” (3).  With that said, according to Rawls,  “even though justice has a 
certain priority, being the most important virtue of institutions, it is still true that, other things 
being equal, one conception of justice is preferable to another when its broader consequences 
are more desirable” (6).   
In laying out his theory, Rawls explained that his principles of justice do not apply to 
every interaction between citizens.  Instead, they govern only “the basic structure of society, 
or more exactly the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights 
and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation” (7).  Among the 
institutions that compose the basic structure, Rawls lists competitive markets, private 
property in the means of production, and, most importantly for the subject at hand, families 
(7, 462-63). 
                                                 
20“This standard, however, is not to be confused with the principles defining the other virtues, for the basic 
structure, and social arrangements generally, may be efficient or inefficient, liberal or illiberal, and many other 
things, as well as just or unjust.  A complete conception defining principles for all the virtues of the basic 
structure, together with their respective weights when they conflict, is more than a conception of justice; it is a 
social ideal” (ATOJ, 9).  
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The majority of A Theory of Justice is then spent developing these principles of 
justice and applying them to the institutions that make up the basic structure of society.  Yet 
despite Rawls’ categorizing the family as part of the basic structure at the beginning of the 
book, throughout the rest of the book, as Susan Okin pointed out, he never scrutinized the 
internal justice of families (Okin 1989a, 97).   In fact, throughout the rest of A Theory of 
Justice, Rawls largely ignored families altogether, mentioning them only in a few contexts, 
and then generally only in passing.  For example, Rawls suggests that persons in the original 
position might be thought of as heads of household, and he states that he will generally 
follow this interpretation (128).  He made explicit that his goal in doing so, however, is 
simply to ensure that the decisional rules chosen in the original position will be fair to future 
generations (128-29); there is no indication that the “head of household” assumption alters 
any of the decisions that those in the original position would make aside from saving 
resources for future generations.   
Rawls also briefly touched on the problematic implications that families have for 
equality when he argued against the distribution of primary goods based on both individual 
capacities and efforts.  Both of these, he contended, are affected by the families in which 
children are raised. In Rawls’ words: 
[T]he principle of equality of opportunity can be only imperfectly carried out, 
at least as long as the institution of the family exists. The extent to which 
natural capacities develop and reach fruition is affected by all sorts of social 
conditions and class attitudes. Even the willingness to make an effort, to try, 
and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is itself dependent upon family 
and social circumstances (ATOJ, 74). 
 
Later in A Theory of Justice, Rawls extended this argument to character, as well.21   While 
these observations might invite an examination of the institution of families and even, 
                                                 
21He stated that “[t]he assertion that a man deserves the superior character that enables him to make the effort to 
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perhaps, consideration of how the state might support families to encourage the development 
of these capacities, Rawls never took up these subjects.  Instead he simply asserted that the 
differences caused by different family circumstances should be deemed politically irrelevant, 
and left it at that (104). 
The only time that Rawls discussed families at any length, in the less widely-read Part 
III of A Theory of Justice, is also the only time that Rawls recognizes any positive role that 
families play with respect to any virtue he deemed politically relevant – here, a sense of 
justice.  At this point, Rawls linked children’s development of a sense of justice to the 
existence of a particular kind of relationship between children and their parents that includes 
love and guidance.  Yet although Rawls treats families as crucial to children’s developing a 
sense of justice, and recognizes that the success of a liberal democracy depends on instilling 
this quality in each generation, he treated this development as if it were a black box –  as if 
families either will or will not develop this sense in their young regardless of their 
relationships with the state.   
Susan Okin has already insightfully argued that Rawls' account of the development of 
children’s sense of justice depends on the internal justice of the family but that, inexplicably, 
Rawls fails to consider whether the monogamous family is, in fact, just with respect to 
gender (Okin 1989a).  I want to consider Rawls' failure in A Theory of Justice to discuss 
families more generally.  Given that Rawls discusses other institutions crucial to an ongoing 
liberal democracy in some detail, why is such a central institution only barely mentioned in 
his theory?  In my view, the explanation lies not with a simple oversight on Rawls' part.  
Instead, I contend that three specific features of Rawls' mode of theorizing prevented him 
                                                                                                                                                       
cultivate his abilities is equally problematic; for his character depends in large part upon fortunate family and 
social circumstances for which he can claim no credit” (104).   
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from bringing families into focus.  First, Rawls limited his theory to focus on justice, 
therefore obscuring other goods and virtues essential to a liberal polity with which families 
are fundamentally linked.  Second, he conceptualized the human condition without 
recognizing the centrality of dependency, and therefore the centrality of the need for 
caretaking in any system of organizing how humans live together.  And third, his goal of 
state neutral with respect to citizens’ conceptions of the good prevented him from focusing 
on the goods that families might foster.  I discuss each feature in turn.   
 
Focus on justice 
First and foremost, by confining A Theory of Justice to the good of justice, without 
attending to other virtues relevant to a liberal democracy, Rawls obscures much of the 
relevance of families to the health of liberal democracies.   In this framing, families are 
relevant only insofar as they intersect with Rawls’ version of distributive justice, which 
Rawls defines with an emphasis on the good of equality.22  This narrow framing, however, 
misses many of the goods that families bring to a liberal polity.  Under Rawls’ lens, the 
important role that families play in raising young citizens, in providing care for older and 
disabled citizens, and in developing the capacities of all citizens is irrelevant insofar as it 
cannot be related to justice.  By the same token, the role of families in developing particular 
virtues that a liberal polity has an interest in furthering, such as tolerance, intelligence, and 
public spiritedness, is not considered in his account.   
                                                 
22Rawls defines justice in a distributive sense -- in terms of how the fruits of social cooperation, which he 
defines in terms of fundamental rights, duties, and goods, are distributed within society  (4, 7).  He then argues 
that a just society would give all equal political rights, while distributing resources equally unless an unequal 
distribution would reasonably be expected to advantage the least favored in society (303).   
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This framing not only misses the goods associated with families, it emphasizes their 
disadvantages.  While families are important to a healthy polity in many ways, they tend to 
be a problem for the value of equality since they often create unequal distributions of wealth, 
as well as of capacities, effort, and character (Fishkin 1983).  It is for this reason that Rawls 
considers the negative aspects of families, to the extent that he considers families at all:  
considering only families’ relationships to justice makes it easy to ignore families’ most 
important functions.   Susan Okin is therefore correct that a scrutiny of the internal justice of 
families should have been included within Rawls' framework as it is currently constructed 
(Okin 1989a).  Families’ critical relationship to other important goods, however, cannot be 
comprehended within that framework.   
Rawls’ narrow focus on justice also obscures attention to families by neglecting 
principles other than justice by which goods and resources might be distributed in society.  
For example, Rawls does not take account of how the application of principles based on care, 
birth, or blood might distribute goods and resources, or how such distributions should 
intersect with these principles of justice.   Raising these issues, though, would bring the 
issues associated with families into better focus.  Do we want family members to be able to 
distribute their wealth and their caretaking to family members, both because we value their 
expression of love and want to promote this type of relationship?  And, if so, how should we 
balance this against the principle that society should tax such a distribution to ensure some 
degree of economic equality in our society and the citizens’ responsibilities to society?   
Along similar lines, given that the polity has an interest in developing the capabilities of all 
of its citizens, how should principles of distribution to increase citizens’ capabilities be 
squared with distribution based on principles of justice? 
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Rawls recognizes that his focus on justice is limited. He states at one point that this 
limitation may mean that a theory of justice must be combined with theories relating to other 
virtues in order to produce a comprehensive vision of a good state.23  Yet the manner in 
which he applies his principles precludes any meaningful compromise between justice and 
other principles. As Thomas Spragens points out, Rawls does not define justice in terms of a 
basic institutional threshold that a well-ordered, free society should meet, for example, by 
ensuring that all citizens have voting rights, that the rule of law applies to all, and that all 
have fair access to courts.  Conceiving of justice in this way would allow the remaining 
societal resources to be used to pursue other goods and virtues once these prerequisites of 
justice had been satisfied (Spragens 1999, 59).  In contrast, Rawls’ scheme dictates the way 
in which all rights, responsibilities, and goods that are part of the basic structure are 
distributed.  It is therefore only in the situation in which alternative schemes are equal with 
respect to distributive justice, but produce different consequences for other goods, that such 
goods can be considered (Spragens 1999, 59-60).24     
Rawls' focus on distributive justice therefore not only prevents adequately conceptualizing 
and valuing important virtues associated with families, it could actively undercut these same virtues. 
In Thomas Spragens' words: 
[A] well-ordered society must . . . recognize that attempts to eliminate 
all sources of unfairness –  all undeserved inequalities –  will 
unfortunately impinge destructively upon other social practices and 
relationships that not only have great value to society but also have 
strong moral standing in their own right. Paramount among these 
                                                 
23"A complete conception defining principles for all the virtues of the basic structure, together with their 
respective weights when they conflict, is more than a conception of justice; it is a social ideal. The principles of 
justice are but a part, although perhaps the most important part, of such a conception" (ATOJ, 9). 
24“Even though justice has a certain priority, being the most important virtue of institutions, it is still true that, 
other things being equal, one conception of justice is preferable to another when its broader consequences are 
more desirable” (ATOJ, 9). 
 
 22 
practices and relationships are affiliations of blood and affection, 
including family ties (Spragens 1999,60; see also Fishkin 1983). 
 
In other words, a society that distributes goods based solely on Rawls’ criteria of distributive 
justice will harm those institutions, including families, that rely on distributive principles 
other than justice.  For example, Rawls’ focus solely on justice prevents the state from 
seeking to foster what Rawls refers to elsewhere as “supererogatory actions,” those “acts of 
benevolence and mercy, of heroism and self-sacrifice” which stem from “higher-order moral 
sentiments that serve to bind a community of persons together” (ATOJ, 117, 192).   However, 
as Thomas Spragens points out, "a society bereft of the enormous contributions to 
nurturance, socialization, and economic support made in the context of and as a consequence 
of these affiliations would be in deep trouble" (Spragens 1999, 60).   
Thus, while Rawls’ theory of justice may at first blush seem appealing because it 
provides a clear hierarchy of values that should govern the distribution of most of the basic 
resources in society, on closer scrutiny, it does so only by ignoring other, sometimes 
competing, goods besides justice that any healthy liberal democracy must also take account. 
In sum, Rawls' sole focus on justice, and his attempts to create a complete, determinative 
distribution scheme based solely on this value, diverts consideration from other social goods 
that families create that have an important role to play in a liberal democratic polity.  His 
narrow focus also precludes legitimate discussion about the hard choices that need to be 
made between competing ends.  Finally, by excluding principles of distribution aside from 
justice, application of his theory could be destructive of family groupings.  
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 Failing to conceptualize human dependency 
And it is not simply Rawls' focus on justice that renders families invisible; his 
conception of the human condition does so as well.  Certainly there is no problem with 
Rawls’ modeling his theory on the moral ideal of free and equal citizens who cooperate with 
one another on the basis of reciprocity and mutual respect (ATOJ, 546), yet Rawls seems to 
mistake this moral ideal for an account of human nature.25  In doing so, he frames a theory 
that largely ignores the dependency that is a part of the human condition, and ignoring 
dependency means that Rawls ignores the institution in which dependency is largely dealt 
with – families.  The inevitable dependency that characterizes children, many older adults, 
and others at varying points of their lives because of physical or mental illness receive 
startlingly little discussion, and is never considered by Rawls in any detail.  Indeed, Rawls’ 
framing of the central project of government as how to divide basic social goods among 
citizens (4), rather than how to bring citizens into existence and deal with the dependency 
that all humans face at various times in their lives, bespeaks a view of humanity in which 
dependency is a relatively minor concern (62).   Further, as Eva Feder Kittay points out, in 
setting out the list of those primary social goods that “a rational man wants whatever else he 
wants,” although Rawls includes only “rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income 
and wealth,” he notably neglects to include the good of care (92).  
Rawls’ framing of his theory on the model of able adults means that it cannot account 
for the importance of caretaking or nurture that families can offer, and provides no way to 
                                                 
25I am not making the claim that Rawls’ description of persons in the original position supports this view.  It is 
certainly true, as Rawls’ defenders have argued, that those who criticize Rawls’ original position on the ground 
that it conceives humans as autonomous and detached from others misunderstand Rawls’ construct: the original 
position is intended as a moral rather than an ontological construct that, indeed, models benevolence (see, for 
example, Nussbaum 1999, 55-80). With that said, other elements of his theory are vulnerable to that charge.   
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grapple with the issue of dependency with which all decent and humane societies must deal.   
Rawls’ failure to grasp the inevitability of dependency is evident in his response to the 
charge that he should have discussed the situations of dependent persons with severe mental 
and physical handicaps: according to Rawls, such difficult cases are better left to the later 
legislative stage (Rawls 2001, 171-76, 303, 332).  Yet it is only by seeing humans as 
generally able and independent, rather than as a combination of independent and dependent 
that varies over a lifetime, which could lead Rawls to see such dependent persons as special 
cases rather than one end of a continuum that represents the human condition.26   As Eva 
Feder Kittay states: 
Because dependency strongly affects our status as equal citizens (that is, as persons 
who, as equals, share the benefits and burdens of social cooperation), and because it 
affects all of us at one time or another, it is not an issue that can be set aside, much 
less avoided.  Its consequences for social organization cannot be deferred until other 
traditional questions about the structure of society have been settled without 
distorting the character of a just social order.  Dependency must be faced from the 
beginning of any project in egalitarian theory that hopes to include all persons within 
its scope (Kittay 1999, 77). 
 
And as relevant as dependency issues are with respect to goods aside from justice, 
dependency issues also have important implications for social justice that Rawls neglects.  
Without considering dependency’s relationship to justice, Eva Feder Kittay rightly points 
out, the dependency work necessary in any society can be accomplished only through the 
“exploitation of those who do dependency work or by the neglect of the concerns of the 
dependents” (Kittay 1999, 77; see also Okin 1989a).   It is only by recognizing the ways in 
                                                 
26In Martha Nussbaum’s words, this framing “makes us think of ourselves as atemporal.  We forget that the 
usual human life cycle brings with it periods of extreme dependency, in which our functioning is very similar to 
that enjoyed by the mentally or physically handicapped throughout their lives” (2002, 188).  See also Kittay 
1999, 88. 
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which humans are both dependent and independent that a state committed to justice as well 
as to other important goods can properly order its affairs (Kittay 1999, 101).   
 
 State neutrality  
At the same time, Rawls’ view that the liberal state should remain neutral on citizens’ 
views of the good life sharply curtails recognition of the value of families in a sound liberal 
polity.  In Rawls’ view, “the liberal state rests on a conception of equality between human 
beings as moral persons, as creatures having a conception of the good and capable of a sense 
of justice . . . .  Systems of ends are not ranked in value” (ATOJ, 19).  On this basis, Rawls 
generally treats the development of citizens’ preferences, traits, and qualities as exogenous to 
his theory and as irrelevant to the concerns of the liberal state.  What is more, his reluctance 
to identify virtues aside from those necessary to conceive his conception of justice (pt. III) 
means that the family's role in nurturing many qualities necessary to a thriving liberal 
democracy never makes it into the picture. 
To summarize, three features of the way in which Rawls constructs ATOJ eclipse the 
importance of the role of families in a liberal state.  First, Rawls’ narrow focus on distributive 
justice, framed with a heavy emphasis on equality, makes it easy to see the family only in 
terms of their disadvantages to equality, insofar as it calls attention to families at all.  Second, 
Rawls’ conceptualizing of the citizens who inhabit his theory as able adults also obscures the 
role of families.   Third and finally, Rawls’ goal of state neutrality excludes attention to the 
state’s need for the virtues that families foster. 
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Rawls’ Later Work 
 
Rawls' later work has not had the tremendous level of influence that ATOJ has had.  
Nevertheless, I want to briefly discuss one later article, “The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited” (1997), because in it, Rawls specifically addresses families’ relationship to his 
theory in some detail.  In doing so, Rawls sheds light on another feature of contemporary 
liberal theory that makes it hard to grapple with the family-state relationship – the view that 
families are properly pre-political in the sense that they have some “natural” way of 
functioning to which they should be left by the state.     
In his 1997 article, Rawls at last specifically addresses how principles of justice 
should apply to the family.   According to Rawls, although the family is part of the basic 
structure to which principles of justice might apply, these principles “do not apply directly to 
its internal life,” but instead guarantee the basic political “rights and liberties and the freedom 
and opportunity of all its members” (Rawls 1997, 789-90).   He likens the family to other 
voluntary associations such as private universities and churches which, he contends, need not 
be constrained by principles of political justice internally, so long as they do not hinder these 
principles from operating outside these associations.  For example, “[c]hurches cannot 
practice effective intolerance, since, as the principles of justice require, public law does not 
recognize heresy and apostasy as crimes, and members of churches are always at liberty to 
leave their faith.  Thus, although the principles of justice do not apply directly to the internal 
life of churches, they do protect the rights and liberties of their members by the constraints to 
which all churches and associations are subject” (789).  
Applying this approach to families, Rawls tells us: 
These principles [of justice] do not inform us how to raise our children, and 
we are not required to treat our children in accordance with political 
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principles.  Here those principles are out of place.  Surely parents must follow 
some conception of justice (or fairness) and due respect with regard to their 
children, but, within certain limits, this is not for political principles to 
prescribe.  Clearly the prohibition of abuse and neglect of children, and much 
else, will, as constraints, be a vital part of family law.  But at some point 
society has to rely on the natural affection and goodwill of the mature family 
members (790). 
 
Based on this internal-external dichotomy, Rawls counsels that principles of social 
justice should be applied at the end of a marriage to ensure that women are justly 
compensated for childrearing.  Intervention in the internal workings of an extant 
family to eliminate unequal sex roles, however, would be inappropriate if the 
childcare arrangements were “fully voluntary” between the spouses and did not stem 
from or lead to injustice (792).27  This means that  
the government would appear to have no interest in the particular form of 
family life, or of relations among the sexes, except insofar as that form or 
those relations in some way affect the orderly reproduction of society over 
time . . . for example, if monogamy were necessary for the equality of 
women, or same-sex marriages destructive to the raising and educating of 
children (799). 
 
Put another way, “[s]ince wives are equally citizens with their husbands, they have 
all the same basic rights, liberties, and opportunities as their husbands; and this, 
together with the correct application of other principles of justice, suffices to secure 
their equality and independence” (789-90). 
Susan Okin has already powerfully challenged Rawls’ claim that principles 
of justice should not regulate the internal lives of families, as well as demonstrated 
                                                 
27“Some want a society in which division of labor by gender is reduced to a minimum. But for political 
liberalism, this cannot mean that such division is forbidden. One cannot propose that equal division of labor in 
the family be simply mandated, or its absence in some way penalized at law for those who do not adopt it. This 
is ruled out because the division of labor in question is connected with basic liberties, including the freedom of 
religion. Thus, to try to minimize gendered division of labor means, in political liberalism, to try to reach a 
social condition in which the remaining division of labor is voluntary. This allows in principle that considerable 
gendered division of labor may persist.  It is only involuntary division of labor that is to be reduced to zero” 
(792). 
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the way in which the division of labor in the family creates inequalities for women in 
society (Okin 1989a).   Less noticed are the specific features of his theory that led 
Rawls, otherwise such a strong advocate of justice, to reject applying these principles 
to the internal lives of families.   One particular feature responsible for this is Rawls’ 
view of the family as functioning in some natural, prepolitical way that would be 
adulterated if the state were to intercede.   
To be fair, Rawls at times explicitly demonstrates his recognition that the 
family is a political rather than a natural entity.  For example, Rawls’ inclusion of the 
family as part of the basic structure of society indicates his awareness of the political 
nature of the family (ATOJ 7); likewise, his statement at the end of A Theory of 
Justice that he is simply assuming the existence of the family for purposes of 
considering the development children’s sense of justice and that “in a broader 
inquiry the institution of the family might be questioned, and other arrangements 
might indeed prove to be preferable” (463), also demonstrates a recognition that the 
nuclear family is not an inevitable or immutable feature of life, and is potentially 
subject to political control.   In addition, Rawls specifically disclaims the view that 
the private sphere is immune from the requirements of justice (1997, 789).   
Nevertheless, the distinction that Rawls seeks to draw between the internal 
and external workings of families still suggests his basic belief that some “internal” 
realm of the family exists that is and should be left immune from the operations of 
the state.   As Rawls depicts them, families are entities that exist apart from the state, 
and for whom state action should be limited to their point of intersection with the 
state.  This might be graphically depicted by drawing a circle on a sheet of paper: it 
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is only at the circumference of the circle – the interface between families and the 
state – that the state may regulate.  Everything within the circle, on this view (short 
of extreme cases, such as abuse), is the family's realm, that should be left to the 
families’ own “natural” functioning, and in which the state should play no part.  
Recall Rawls’ statement that “at some point society has to rely on the natural 
affection and goodwill of the mature family members” (Rawls 1997, 790).   
In theorizing the relationship in this manner, Rawls both misstates and 
oversimplifies the relationship between families and the state.  As a growing number 
of theorists point out, the contemporary family is not a natural, prepolitical structure, 
but an entity whose shape and function are shot through with political choices and 
state action (for example, Minow 1997; Nussbaum 2002, 199).  The link between 
politics and family is demonstrated most obviously by the fact that what constitutes a 
family is itself defined by law, rather than some structure that preexists it.28   
In addition, the ways in which families function are also deeply and 
inextricably intertwined with government policy.  For example, laws regulating child 
labor and education shape the lives of children and affected parents’ control over 
them (Nussbaum 1999, 262).  Equal employment legislation for women affected 
women’s movement into the labor market, which, in turn, influenced the availability 
                                                 
28In Martha Nussbaum’s words: 
 
People associate in many ways, live together, love each other, have children.  Which of these will get 
the name “family” is a legal and political matter, never one to be decided simply by the parties 
themselves.  The state constitutes the family structure through its laws, defining which groups of 
people can count as families, defining the privileges and rights of family members, defining what 
marriage and divorce are, what legitimacy and parental responsibility are, and so forth.  This difference 
makes a difference: The state is present in the family from the start, in a way that is less clearly the 
case with the religious body or the university; it is the state that says what this thing is and controls 
how one becomes a member of it (1997, 199). 
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of childcare within families.29  Equal employment laws also probably contributed to 
the increase in divorces, as greater numbers of women in unhappy marriages began 
to have the financial wherewithal to divorce their husbands (Mergenhagen 1992, 53).  
By the same token, the relaxation of divorce laws affected whether and which 
families stay together (see, for example, Brinig & F. H. Buckley 1998).  Laws 
governing the availability of health insurance for employees’ family members 
influence not only which family members work, but what kind of health care 
children and other family members receive. And United States welfare policy was, as 
Alice Kessler-Harris has demonstrated, constructed deliberately on a model that 
pitted work and family in mortal conflict (Kessler-Harris 2001).  In these 
circumstances, the family has no “natural” baseline of functioning that it can be left 
to “apart from” the state.  Yet Rawls’ views that families somehow retain a “natural” 
core that should remain untainted by the influence of the state leads him to adopt a 
hands-off attitude with respect to the functioning of families and provides no 
guidance to the state when its policies inevitably affect how families function. 
Rawls’ view that families are properly removed from the workings of 
political power is also related to his view that what happens within families is 
generally “voluntary,” in some relatively uncomplicated sense.  Rawls sees only two 
distinct possibilities with respect to the adoption of traditional gender roles: either 
they are voluntary, in which case he tells us that we should assume that the 
arrangement yields fair opportunities for the sexes, or they are involuntary.  In only 
                                                 
29See Gunderson 1989 (concluding that antidiscrimination laws had a positive, albeit modest, effect on women’s 
entry into the labor force); Ellman, Kurtz, and Scott 1991, 46-51 (discussing how women’s influx into the 
workplace created childcare issues at home. 
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the latter case may the state act.  In formulating this dichotomy, Rawls overlooks the 
complicated ways in which sex role preferences often come to reflect the conditions 
of inequality in which they were formed by adapting women’s (and men’s) sense of 
what is possible, normal, and desirable (Abrams 1999; Higgins 1997).  An 
appreciation of these dynamics makes it far more difficult to accept gender patterns 
as unproblematic because they are “voluntary”, and therefore properly immune from 
state action. 
 Finally, and also related to these earlier points, is Rawls’ apparent assumption 
that families, so long as they remain unimpeded by the state, will flourish.  In this 
conception, families need no economic, social, or political preconditions other than 
those that pertain to individuals to function well and to spit out happy, healthy future 
citizens into the larger society.   For Rawls, principles of justice may occasionally be 
necessary to constrain families and the inequalities they produce.  However, as 
evidenced by the complete lack of discussion about the issues, no resources are 
required for families to flourish, apart from those properly distributed to individual 
members of the family by the state based on principles of justice.    
 In conclusion, Rawls’ later work shows the vestiges of the belief that the 
family is somehow a natural, pre-political entity that should remain aloof from the 
state.  This view, in combination with those apparent in ATOJ – the limitation on 
political theorizing to the good of justice, the conceptualizing of the subjects of 
theory as able adults, and the position of the state to neutrality – act to keep families 
from the center of political theorizing.  But while these features are reproduced in 
much contemporary liberal theory, they are not intrinsic to liberal theory itself. 
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Early Liberal Treatment of the Family-State Relationship – John Stuart Mill 
  
 Early liberals 
 
John Rawls’ work is, of course, only a small part of the line of liberal political theory 
that extends back for more than three centuries, and an even smaller part of Western political 
thought generally.   But Rawls’ work is certainly not atypical of the line of Western political 
thought in paying little attention to the issue of families. To some extent, this might not be 
surprising given that most writers on political thought were white men who were less closely 
tied to family responsibilities and household work than their female and non-white 
counterparts.  Further, for the vast majority of the history of this thought, the women who 
were charged with family responsibilities were not only denied citizenship, they were often 
not even deemed fully human. Yet at the time liberal political theory emerged, discussion of 
families became even more submerged than in previous political thought.    
Some of the explanation for the absence of families from liberal theory is intrinsic to 
liberalism, itself.  One of the demarcations between earlier classical and medieval political 
thought, on the one hand, and the liberal tradition, on the other, is liberalism's adoption of 
methodological individualism, which embodied the view that individuals rather than 
communities or families are the relevant unit of political theory. Further, what was relevant 
about individuals for purposes of liberal theory was no longer their position in the social 
network, including their familial position, but each individual's basic equality in some shape 
or form.30 Liberalism’s emphasis on the individual as an individual didn't require ignoring 
individuals' social and familial ties, but it at least kept attention elsewhere.  Moreover, the 
                                                 
30As the English Leveller, John Wildman said at the time of the Putney Debates on October 29, 1647: "Every 
person in England hath as clear a right to elect his representative as the greatest person in England" 
(Woodhouse 1992, 66). 
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efforts of liberals to carve out a sphere of individual liberty for citizens also drew attention 
away from families, since families were perceived as quintessentially part of the private 
realm from which the state should be removed. 
This transformation at liberalism’s inception made early liberal theorists pay even 
less attention to families than the relatively scant attention families had received in earlier 
classical and medieval political theory. Even if Greeks seldom considered families, their 
ideal of politics as a well-ordered common life led far more easily to consideration of the role 
of families because of families’ role in molding citizens, than did the liberal conception of 
politics as largely based on the preservation of individual rights. It was achieving this goal of 
harmony that led Plato in The Republic to make the suggestion that some children should be 
separated from their biological families and reared by the class of people who most matched 
their basic natures. Doing so, Plato argued, was necessary for citizens to become the kind of 
people who could inhabit a state in which each person assumes his or her proper role in a 
harmonious polity (Plato, Bk. III, ll. 412-17).  Plato’s proposal sounds bizarre to the 
contemporary liberal ear because he conceives of no limits to the state’s power in citizens’ 
private lives, no issue of parents' right to raise their children as they see fit, and gives no 
weight to children's interest in choosing who they want to be. It is these characteristic 
concerns of liberalism that steered early liberals away from considering families to be a 
proper province of political theory. 
Because of these features of liberalism, although early liberal theorists like Locke 
sometimes referred to families, they did so precisely to distinguish political power from the 
familial power with which it had previously been associated. Arguing against the view that 
kings had a natural right of sovereignty over their subjects that had been passed down from 
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Adam's paternal authority over his children, Locke contended that "the power of a magistrate 
over a subject may be distinguished from that of a father over his children, a master over his 
servant, [and] a husband over his wife” (Locke, 7).  The intended (and achieved) result was 
to place political power on the table for debate in a manner it had not been previously by 
distinguishing it from the still-uncontested right of fathers and husbands.  Families, and the 
state’s relationship with them, were thereby even further removed from political debate. The 
result was that early liberal accounts often overlooked both these facts in much the same way 
that Rawls did three centuries later.   As the conservative critic of Hobbes, William Lucy, 
wrote more than three hundred years ago:  “Methinks that he discourses of men as they were 
terrigene, born out of the earth, come up like Sees, without any relation one to the other. . .  
[By nature a human is] made a poor helpless Child who confides and trusts in his Parents, 
and submits to them” (Salkever 1990, 211 n.13).31   
With that said, however, although these features intrinsic to liberalism tended to turn 
the attention away from families, they did not, in contrast to Rawls’ work centuries later, 
require completely eclipsing them.  Early liberalism’s conception of individuals as 
autonomous for the purposes of protecting their rights did not require ignoring how these 
individuals achieved autonomy.  Moreover, liberalism’s rejection of the view that individuals 
should take their status from their family did not require ignoring that presumptively equal 
individuals were reared by families.  Indeed, early-liberal political theory contained several 
features that allowed fuller consideration of families than later Rawlsian-era versions.  First, 
in contrast to Rawls’ work, early liberalism recognized the importance of a broader range of 
                                                 
31See also Filmer, at 241 (accusing Hobbes of “imagining a company of men at the very first to have been all 
created together without any dependency one of another, or as mushrooms . . . they all on a sudden were sprung 
out of the earth without any obligation one to another”); Okin 1989b (stating that liberalism pays “remarkably 
little attention to how we become the adults who form the subject matter of political theories.”). 
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goods than the value of liberty, equality, and justice that currently receive pride of place.  In 
this way, they invited attention to the importance of families.  Although the protection of 
rights and liberty was the primary focus of early liberalism, individual virtues still played a 
crucial role in them.  Thus, although the Federalist Papers is most often recognized for the 
authors' reliance on institutional checks to protect against tyranny and injustice, its authors 
recognized that these checks could never completely substitute for virtue, which they 
considered an integral element of the new republic's success. In Madison's words: 
As there is a degree of depravity in making which requires a certain degree of 
circumspection and distrust: So there are other qualities in human nature, which 
justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government 
presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form. 
Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us, 
faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would be that there is not 
sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that nothing less than the 
chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another 
(Federalist 55, 284; see also Spragens 1999, 217). 
 
Early liberals’ understanding of human institutions as tools that could be used to foster 
virtue in citizens also warranted focusing on the role that families might play in this process. 
While it is certainly true that early liberals saw human nature as less malleable than the line 
of continental European theorists stretching from Rousseau to Marx, they were still 
considerably more likely to view institutions in this way than contemporary liberals. For 
example, Locke saw the law not simply as a tool to arbitrate among individual rights: "for 
law, in its true notion, is not so much limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent agent 
to his proper interest, and prescribes no farther than is for the general good of those under 
that law”  (Locke, 32).  Law here does more than carve out zones of individual liberties – it 
actively attempts to move citizens toward a virtuous community.  
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Further, although early liberal theorists, as with Rawls, didn’t adequately take into 
account the inevitable dependency of the human condition, in contrast to him, they at least 
still tended to see individuals as fundamentally social beings with ties to one another.  As 
Locke describes it, "God having made man such a creature, that in his own judgment, it was 
not good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and 
inclination to drive him into society, as well as fitted him with understanding and language to 
continue and enjoy it” (42).  Men keep company, in Locke’s view, not only to increase 
personal goods but because they have an innate "desire . . . to be loved of my equals in 
nature" (Locke, 9 (quoting Hooker)).  This desire to be loved creates toward other men "a 
natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection" (Locke, 9).  This description 
stands in contrast to Rawls’ picture of essentially able adults who have no necessary 
connection to one another.   
 
John Stuart Mill 
 
Although most early liberal authors did not accord families the scrutiny that I argue 
early versions of liberalism allowed, John Stuart Mill's work demonstrates that liberalism can 
engender rich theorizations of families and the family-state relationship.  Mill, despite 
penning what has remained the most avid defense of liberty in the liberal tradition, still 
recognized the important link between virtue and good polities. "[I]f we ask ourselves on 
what causes and conditions good government in all its senses depends, we find that the 
principal of them, the one which transcends all others, is the qualities of the human beings 
composing the society over which government is exercised" (Mill CRG, 225).  In fact, Mill’s 
Considerations on Representative Government is essentially a long discourse regarding how 
political institutions could be used to contribute to the human development of citizens.  
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This focus on virtue led to Mill’s recognition of the role of society in ensuring that 
children develop the necessary qualities to become citizens.  For example, Mill argues that 
the existing generation is master both of the training and the entire circumstances of 
the generation to come; it cannot indeed make them perfectly wise and good, because 
it is itself so lamentably deficient in goodness and wisdom; and its best efforts are not 
always, in individual cases, its most successful ones; but it is perfectly well able to 
make the rising generation, as a whole, as good as, and a little better than, itself. If 
society lets any considerable number of its members grow up mere children, 
incapable of being acted on by rational consideration of distant motives, society has 
itself to blame for the consequences (Mill OL, 91). 
 
Here, Mill's recognition of the inevitable fact of interdependence of citizens, combined with 
his recognition that good citizens do not simply spring up like mushrooms, led him to posit a 
societal responsibility for childraising.  In doing so, Mill argued for a broader responsibility 
on society's part than simply insuring basic human survival; the interdependence of citizens 
is so great, he says, that society must instead aim instead to foster “goodness and wisdom.”  
Mill’s version here has much in common with what is commonly identified with republican 
theorists:  an emphasis on virtue, and a focus on the way that institutions can instill it. Yet he 
recognized the limits to virtue, as well: he relies not on citizens’ virtue to ground their 
responsibility to the next generation, but rather, as Tocqueville would put it, on their “self 
interest, properly understood,” that is, the problems created for society if the next generation 
is not adequately raised. At the same time, Mill’s recognition of societal interdependence 
does not diminish his emphasis on individual liberty and responsibility: he expected that 
parents will assume primary responsibility for the task of childrearing, but recognized that 
society and the state also have some role to play.32  
                                                 
32“[T]o bring a child into existence without a fair prospect of being able, not only to provide food for its body, 
but instruction and training for its mind, is a moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and against 
society; and that if the parent does not fulfill this obligation, the State ought to see it fulfilled, at the charge, as 
far as possible, of the parent” (Mill OL, 117; see also 120-21). 
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To this mix, Mill also introduces the important liberal value of equality. By applying 
it to the sexes, however, and then using it to scrutinize families, Mill uses the tools and 
concepts of liberal theory to attain critical purchase on families as an institution that other 
liberal theorists, both then and now, have largely avoided. Specifically, because families are 
a training ground for democratic citizenship, Mill argued that they must reflect the principles 
of equality and justice on which a democracy is founded.  He therefore condemns the 
inequality of women in the current family structure as inhibiting the development of 
children’s democratic character. In Mill’s words: 
The family is a school of despotism, in which the virtues of despotism, but also its 
vices, are largely nourished. Citizenship, in free countries, is partly a school of 
society in equality; but citizenship fills only a small place in modern life, and does not 
come near the daily habits or inmost sentiment. The family, justly constituted, would 
be the real school of the virtues of freedom. It is sure to be a sufficient one of 
everything else. . . . What is needed is that it should be a school of sympathy in 
equality, of living together in love, without power on one side or obedience on the 
other . . . . The moral training of mankind will never be adapted to the conditions of 
the life for which all other human progress is a preparation, until they practice in the 
family the same moral rule which is adapted to the normal constitution of human 
society (Mill, SW, 519). 
 
Mill, in this passage, links the private and the public, recognizing that crucial goods 
for the polity are linked to goods inside the family.  In this respect, he pushes Jean Jacques 
Rousseau’s insights further than Rousseau did himself.  Rousseau recognized the strong link 
between the families and democracy in the context of reacting to Plato’s proposal to weaken 
the family structure. According to Rousseau, “Plato acts as though there were no need for a 
natural base on which to form conventional ties; as though the love of one’s nearest were not 
the principle of the love one owes the state; as though it were not by means of the small 
fatherland which is the family that the heart attaches itself to the large one” (Rousseau, 363).  
Rousseau therefore recognized that to be good citizens capable of participating effectively in 
self-government, the family must provide future citizens with certain tools in childhood. Mill 
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takes this one step further, by recognizing how injustice within the family can hinder the 
development of a larger sense of justice.33  In doing so, Mill takes into account a complex 
range of goods and values tied to family.  He argues that the issue of justice is implicated in 
the internal makeup of families, recognizes the important role of nurturing children both for 
themselves and for a good polity, and yet also gives strong (but not unlimited) respect to 
parents' and children's liberty to choose their own course in life. 
In sum, with the key exception of John Stuart Mill, early liberal political theorists 
paid little attention to the family, even compared to earlier Western political theory.  Some of 
the reasons for this were probably integral to characteristics of liberalism itself – most 
obviously, its focus on individuals rather than society. Some were the products of its time: 
the belief that women and their purview were irrelevant to politics. With that said, however, 
other features of early liberalism provided tools on which theorists might have grounded a 
rich picture of the family-state relationship. These include the recognition of the 
interdependence among individuals, and between individuals and society, including the belief 
that the individual is part of a larger moral whole, to which he or she is bound by a network 
of duties and responsibilities. They also include earlier liberalism’s focus on a broader range 
of goods than most contemporary versions’, including human dignity and individual 
development.  Finally, early liberalism’s recognition that good government requires 
particular virtues opens the door wide for consideration of the role that families play in 
fostering these qualities. 
                                                 
33This insight is one that Rousseau denies. He argues that the governance of the family, unlike the political 
society, need not be accountable to its members or regulated by principles of justice by appealing to the notion 
that the family, unlike the wider society, is founded upon love. Thus unlike a government, he says, the father of 
a family, “in order to act right . . . has only to consult his heart” (Rousseau, DPE 3, 241-42). For criticisms of 
this view see Mill SW; Olsen 1983; Okin 1989a. 
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Conclusion 
 Rawls’ failure to focus on families is continuous with a longer trend of neglecting 
families in liberal political theory.  Part of this neglect was directly related to the liberal 
mission: the founders of liberalism rejected the idea that people’s place in the polity was 
dependent on their families or position in the social network, and instead sought to focus on 
the essential equality, in some shape or form, of all individuals, regardless of which families 
they came from.  Although this shift in perspective didn’t require ignoring that it was 
families who raised and sustained these individuals, this emerged as an unfortunate 
byproduct of liberalism.  Nothing intrinsic to liberalism, however, precludes a sensitive 
discussion of the family-state relationship.  To do so, however, requires departing from many 
of the features of liberal theory that Rawls introduced.    
 
  
CHAPTER 3 
 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE FAMILY-STATE RELATIONSHIP:  
COMMUNITARIANS, CIVIC LIBERALS, AND FEMINISTS 
 
 
 In the last few decades, specific features of Rawlsian liberal democratic theory that 
made it difficult to focus on the family-state relationship have been soundly criticized in 
several conversations.   To break down these rich and fluid conversations into particular 
categories of positions inevitably does damage to the complexity of the views expressed by 
their participants.   Nevertheless, with apologies to these authors, in this chapter, I do just this 
in order to describe the ways that they assist to more adequately theorize families.  
Specifically, I argue that three overlapping groups of critics34 contribute important pieces to 
the puzzle of theorizing families – a loose-knit group of critics of liberalism, sometimes 
identified as “communitarians;” liberal theorists who have sought to revise liberalism in 
response to communitarian critiques, who sometimes call themselves “civic liberals;” and 
feminist theorists.  These conversations set the stage for a more complex consideration of the 
relationship between the family and polity.   
 In this chapter, I discuss these critiques and their consequences for theorizing the 
relationship between families and the state.   I argue that several features of the 
communitarian critique, including its focus on the social constitution of individuals and its 
                                                 
34Because I am seeking to impose my conceptual framework on a conversation that is, in reality, far more 
complex, some of the authors that I discuss take positions that put them into more than one category in my 
schematization.  For example, Martha Nussbaum’s work has both strong feminist and civic liberal elements.  
Likewise, Thomas Spragens identifies himself as a civic liberal, but has also been referred to as a 
communitarian.   
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criticism of liberalism’s emphasis on freedom to the exclusion of other goods and values, 
open the door to a more complex account of the family-state relationship than Rawlsian-era 
liberal theory allowed.  Communitarians, however, have generally not sought to develop such 
accounts and have had difficulty presenting a credible alternative to liberalism.   
Recent civic liberal attempts to develop reworked versions of liberalism provide a 
more promising approach for rethinking the family-state relationship.  However, few such 
accounts have focused on families.   Moreover, those accounts that have done so have 
focused on too narrow a version of family, namely, the heterosexual marital family, without 
adequately considering its disadvantages or alternative forms of families. 
Finally, many features of recent feminist critiques of liberalism, including the 
criticism of liberalism’s narrow focus on autonomy and neutrality, dovetail with 
communitarian critics and civic liberal accounts.  Feminists, however, have been more 
attentive than communitarians to theorizing the family and the power dynamics within it.   
They have also devoted more attention to the condition of dependency in human lives, as 
well as the resulting need for caregiving.  As a result, they have produced the richest 
characterizations of the family-state relationship in contemporary political theory.  Yet more 
work needs to be done in thinking through the precise contours of the state’s responsibility 
vis-à-vis families to deal with dependency.  
In sum, each of these three positions – communitarian, civic liberal, and feminist – 
provide elements that help to conceptualize the family-state relationship more fully.  In the 
remainder of the chapter, I discuss each in turn. 
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The Communitarian Critique 
 
 Following the emergence of Rawlsian-era liberalism in the 1970s and 1980s, a 
number of critics in the 1980s and 1990s contended that the range of liberal theories 
dominant in American life, law and political thought failed to give sufficient recognition to 
the role of community and shared civic life (Sandel 1982, 1984, 1996: MacIntyre 1981: 
Taylor 1989: Bellah 1985).  These critics contended that Rawlsian liberalism did not 
adequately address the way in which humans are socially constituted and their identities 
shaped through ties to specific communities (MacIntyre 1981: Sandel 1982, 1984, 1996: 
Glendon 1987, 1991: Bellah 1985: Etzioni 1995).  In Michael Sandel’s words, “I am situated 
from the start, embedded in a history which locates me among others, and implicates my 
good in the good of the communities whose stories I seek to share” (Sandel 1984, 9). 
 Communitarians also contested liberal theorists’ assertions that liberalism was 
distinctive from other political traditions in that it did not embody a theory of the good life.  
As Ronald Dworkin expressed this view of the liberal state: it “must be neutral on . . . the 
question of the good life [and] political decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent 
of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life” (Dworkin 1978, 
127).  According to the dominant view, as William Galston aptly summarizes it, the liberal 
state is supposed to “preside[] benignly over [different ways of life], intervening only to 
adjudicate conflict, to prevent any particular way of life from tyrannizing over others, and to 
ensure that all adhere to the principles that constitute society’s basic structure” (Galston 
1991, 80).  Communitarians demonstrated that what was taken by liberal theorists to be 
neutral actually embodies a particular conception of the good premised on autonomy and 
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individual choice (Sandel 1982, 1996; Walzer 1990; MacIntyre 1981; Taylor 1995; Bellah 
1985).    
 Further, some communitarians argued that the liberal emphasis on neutrality and free 
choice failed as a normative matter because it does not promote the culture necessary to 
sustain a liberal democracy.  As Michael Sandel states it, “despite its appeal, the liberal 
vision of freedom lacks the civic resources to sustain self-government. . . .  The public 
philosophy by which we live cannot secure the liberty it promises, because it cannot inspire 
the sense of community and civic engagement that liberty requires (1996, 6).  Because of 
this, Sandel calls for a state which is, at least over some part of the terrain of sovereignty, 
deliberately non-neutral, in that it “accord[s] the political community a stake in the character 
of its citizens” (1996, 321).  Similar calls were made by others, who argued that the liberal 
state must consciously foster the conditions that will allow citizens to participate in a 
vigorous liberal polity (for example, Glendon 1995). 
 In a related vein, communitarians criticized the emphasis on rights in liberal theory 
and public philosophy.  To them, the focus on rights, generally conceived as protecting an 
individual from the state’s incursions on their liberty or property, portrays individuals as 
fundamentally independent and autonomous.  This focus on rights misses the ways in which 
people are interdependent and need more than simply to be left alone.  Further, 
communitarians argued that this focus was destructive as a normative matter.  In Mary Ann 
Glendon’s words, the conception of rights as merely delineating zones of autonomy results in 
a “near aphasia” regarding the way that the law might aid individuals in meeting their 
responsibilities to other individuals and in leading full, dignified lives (Glendon 1991, 109). 
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This set of critiques opens the door to a more complex understanding of the role of 
human relationships and the social constitution of individuals than Rawlsian-era theories 
permit.  They also invite thinking about the ways in which the state can better support 
relationships that contribute to sound children who will someday be citizens of the polity.  
Both points would seem to lead ineluctably to consideration of the relationship between 
families and a thriving liberal democratic polity.  Yet despite the obvious role that families 
play in embedding individuals in their culture and in inculcating in them particular virtues 
and visions of the good life, early communitarian critics generally ignored them.  For 
example, Alisdair MacIntyre paid little attention to families in his defense of tradition-based 
thinking regarding conceptions of the good life (MacIntyre 1981).  As a consequence, he 
failed to consider who will rear the children in the society he envisions, in which public 
participation is the highest form of life for both men and women.  In doing so, as Susan Okin 
pointed out, he missed the fact that “if it were not for the childbearing, nurturance, and 
socialization that have taken place within the family, there would be no people to live the 
good life” (Okin 1989, 56).   
Similarly, other communitarians and like-minded scholars tended to focus on 
institutions in civic society conceived apart from families,35 such as bowling leagues, local 
city governments, and churches (for example, Putnam 1993, 2000; Elkin 1987).   The 
relatively few communitarians who considered families often adopted an overly-idealized 
view of them, seeing them as a place in which altruism prevails, a realm devoid of power 
relations and conflict (Okin 1989, 31, McClain  and Fleming 2000, 327-30).  For example, 
Bellah et al.’s (1985) nostalgic depiction of the altruistic family of the nineteenth century 
                                                 
35Some civic theorists use the term “civil society” to include families (for example. Hollenbach 1995, 147; 
McClain 2001, 1684); others use it to refer to mediating institutions between individuals and families, on the 
one hand, and government on the other (for example, Rosenblum 2000, 813-14: Gutmann 1989). 
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overlooked the extent to which the husband’s/father’s will both legally and morally 
determined the fate of other family members, as well as the extent to which the altruistic 
ethic the authors praise was specifically seen as the province of women (Bellah 1985).  
Michael Sandel’s treatment of issues relating to the family-state relationship in 
Democracy’s Discontent (1996) demonstrates both the strengths and weaknesses of 
communitarian accounts.  Sandel is certainly on the mark when he criticizes the effects of the 
shift in family law to “no-fault” divorce and to alimony and property divisions that do not 
reflect fault as a basis for determining distribution.  Sandel argues that these changes penalize 
those whose identities have been constituted by their family roles, particularly women who 
have devoted their lives to childrearing (114).  He also correctly points out that this law is not 
neutral with respect to its effects on the lives citizens lead.  “For . . . the ideals of 
independence and self-sufficiency embodied in the law do not simply enlarge the range of 
possible lives; they also make some ways of life more difficult, especially those like 
traditional marriage that involve a high degree of mutual dependency and obligation” (114).   
In doing so, Sandel’s account illuminates the way in which law has come to place great 
weight on the value of personal choice, and to screen out other relevant values.  He also 
demonstrates that a focus on choice without a correlative focus on responsibility can produce 
a system that treats human relationships, even close family relationships, as essentially 
disposable, and can therefore deter these relationships.   
Yet Sandel’s critique falls wide of the mark when he criticizes the law’s placing any 
weight at all on autonomy as a good.   While he sometimes claims to object only to the 
excessive weighting of choice and personal freedom as against other values, more often 
Sandel conceives liberalism’s valuing of personal choice itself as a problematic embodiment 
 47 
of the liberal view of persons as “unencumbered selves,” by which he means a conception of 
individuals who have ties with others only as matters of choice.   Thus, he criticizes the 
Supreme Court’s rationale for supporting abortion as a fundamental right in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey (1992).  In that case, the Court defended women’s right to abortion on 
the ground that “[f]ew decisions are . . . more properly private, or more basic to individual 
dignity and autonomy than a woman’s decision whether to end her pregnancy.  A woman’s 
right to make that choice freely is surely fundamental.”  Sandel argues that this rationale 
demonstrates the Supreme Court’s problematic view that what makes people human is their 
capacity to live autonomously, as defined through choosing their lives and relationships for 
themselves (92, 103).  In doing so, however, Sandel mistakenly conflates legitimate 
normative claims regarding individuals’ right to self-determination with the ontological claim 
that selves are radically unencumbered: although the two claims are intertwined in much 
liberal thought, they are by no means the same, and the former claim certainly does not 
require the latter (Spragens 1999, 134).   
Ironically, Sandel’s rejection of individual choice presents the mirror-image of the 
flaw that he criticizes in liberal accounts.  Whereas many liberal accounts too narrowly focus 
on autonomy, construed as the right to make all kinds of choices without interference, 
Sandel’s account unduly demonizes the value of choice, even with respect to those choices 
most basic for human dignity and self-determination.  To think that women should be able to 
make their own decisions about whether they should have abortions does not require the 
belief that persons are radically encumbered, so that the essence of their individuality is 
denied if they are deprived of the opportunity to choose.  All it requires is a normative belief 
that there is some value in persons being able to make certain important decisions for 
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themselves, and that this value outweighs others that may also be implicated.36   By rejecting 
considerations of free choice and self-determination, Sandel threatens the position of women, 
who have traditionally been subordinated by an emphasis on the community over the 
individual (McClain and Fleming 2000, 327-28).  His devaluation of autonomy also threatens 
to eclipse one of liberalism’s most appealing tenets -- that each person’s views about how to 
live their own life should be taken seriously, even if other values ultimately trump them. 
 
Civic Liberalism 
 
In recent years, many theorists sympathetic to the communitarian critique, rather than 
arguing against liberalism, have begun to adapt liberal theories to incorporate these critiques.   
This new generation of liberal theories redresses problems with Rawlsian-era liberalism in 
that it recognizes the impossibility of justifying any particular vision of the liberal state based 
solely on abstract principles that would apply to any society – Rawls’ later discarded hope of 
“moral geometry.”  Instead, these recent theories recognize that liberalism involves a non-
neutral conception of the good that places a high premium on individual liberty.  As Stephen 
Macedo sums up this shift, the “[p]olitical order should not be understood, at base, as the 
product of an invisible hand, but rather as a construction for discernible collective ends and 
purposes, including the preservation of a broad swath of liberty” (Macedo 2000, 5).37  
                                                 
  
36This belief, in turn, requires the ontological presupposition that people have some capacity to make decisions 
for themselves, but does not require a notion of complete agency. 
 
37Although civic liberals agree that the state must assume a more active role in promoting a well-functioning 
liberal democracy, they disagree about the exact role that the liberal state should assume.  A hallmark of 
liberalism is that the goals of politics at least to some extent are subordinated to the goals of private individuals.  
Further, liberalism is generally marked by a deep distrust of the power of the state (for example, Shklar 1989).  
The extent to which the government may act to further a vigorous polity is therefore a troubling issue for civic 
liberals.  Compare, for example, Macedo 2000;  Galston 1991; and Gutmann 1989.  
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In their reformulations of liberalism, these theorists, sometimes called “civic liberals” 
(Macedo 2000, Spragens 1999), contend that liberalism must do more than simply safeguard 
individuals’ right to noninterference by others.  They argue that liberal democracy should 
seek a broader range of goods than the individualistic versions of liberty that have become 
associated with it (for example, Nussbaum 1999; Galston 1991; Gutmann 1989; Macedo 
1995; Spragens 1999).  As Thomas Spragens explains his project: “[l]iberal democratic 
practice . . . should be guided by a complex idealism – differentiated from liberal realism by 
its higher reach and from the other liberalisms by its greater breadth of aspiration” (Spragens 
1999, xv).  While recognizing the value of individual liberty, these revisions of liberalism 
also recognize liberty’s limits.  They take account of the facts that individuals are never 
completely autonomous; that even autonomous individuals in this partial sense are made, not 
born; that for a liberal democratic society to flourish, its citizens must possess particular 
capabilities and virtues; and that a vigorous liberal democratic polity needs to foster these 
goods and virtues. 
At the same time, civic theorists have argued that it is both consistent with and 
incumbent on the liberal state to ensure the political and social conditions needed for the 
health of the polity by being decidedly non-neutral about developing certain civic goods and 
virtues in the polity (for example, Galston 1991; Gutmann 1989; Macedo 2000; Spragens 
1999).  In William Galston’s words, the liberal state must become “far more aware of, and 
far more actively involved in reproducing, the conditions necessary to its own health and 
perpetuation” (Galston 1991, 6).    
These accounts redress some of the difficulties of the communitarian critiques they 
incorporate.  While communitarian accounts center largely on critiques of liberalism without 
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developing a new positive program, civic liberals develop a positive account of the role of 
the state.    They reemphasize the importance of justice, liberty, and individual rights without 
believing that these goods should monopolize the field of political discourse, thereby at least 
responding to feminist concerns that women might again be subjugated based on 
communitarian notions of some shared good.  And they recognize the value of individual 
choice without believing that that choice could ever be completely unencumbered or 
unconstrained.  
 Yet, as with communitarians, despite the fertile ground that this new terrain contains 
for rethinking the family-state relationship, few civic liberals have taken on the job.  Neither 
have they adequately considered how conceiving of individuals as socially constituted 
through a process requiring considerable time, effort, and care should change liberal agendas 
on issues that affect families.  For example, Thomas Spragens, in contrast to many liberal 
theorists, attends to the limits of autonomy in his theoretical account by recognizing that 
citizens are not completely autonomous, and that the autonomy they do achieve must be 
nurtured through social institutions.  Spragens also distinguishes himself from Rawlsian-era 
liberal accounts through recognizing the importance of bonds between people in a 
functioning liberal polity.  Yet while this would seem to lead to a discussion of the role 
families in the liberal polity, Spragens never follows this road to its conclusion; instead, his 
agenda for civic liberalism largely overlooks the way that specific policies impact families 
and the goods realized through them.  For example, Spragens argues that the goal of welfare 
reform should be to include poor adults “within the institutions of economic production” so 
that the state can help them stand on their own two feet (250, 262).  The loss to children of 
having their parents away for long hours, the loss to parents’ sense of personal responsibility 
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for caring for their children, and the loss to the community of ensuring that children are cared 
for by loved ones is answered only by Spragens’ suggestion that the government should also 
provide child care subsidies (250).  
The relatively minor numbers of civic liberal proposals that have considered families 
have tended to valorize a single model of the family – the two-parent heterosexual family – 
without also factoring in the costs of this model or giving careful consideration to other 
models.  For example, William Galston argues for the importance of marriage based on data 
demonstrating the considerable poverty rates of children raised by single mothers, and the 
harm to boys caused by the absence of fathers as role models  (1995, 56; 1996; 1997, 300-
02).  In doing so, however, Galston fails to give adequate consideration to the costs 
associated with the heterosexual marital family form, including the profound gender 
inequality associated with it (Fineman 2004).38  Likewise, he fails to consider whether other 
family forms could serve the same societal objectives if they had the same support that 
married families have long received from the state.39   
 In sum, civic liberals have set the stage for the long-overdue consideration of 
families’ role in liberal-democratic polities.  By drawing attention to the relationship between 
the qualities of citizens in a democracy and the quality of that democracy, by recognizing that 
liberal states must actively develop the culture needed for a flourishing liberal democracy, by 
proclaiming the importance of a diverse range of goods, and by insisting on individuals’ 
connections to the community, they invite more nuanced conceptualizations of the family-
                                                 
38Ann Crittenden demonstrates that most of the difference in earnings between men and women comes from 
women’s assumption of childrearing responsibilities.  Because many more women than men take parenting 
leaves, work part-time, or assume less demanding full-time work, the average earnings of all female workers in 
1999 were 59% of men’s earnings.  In contrast, women who have never had children earn 98 cents to a man’s 
dollar (Crittenden 2001, 87). 
 
39I address these issues in further detail in Chapter 4. 
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state relationship.  They have seldom, however, taken up the project of thinking through how 
a revitalized conception of liberalism would approach the family-state relationship.  And on 
the rare occasions that they have considered families at all, they have tended to focus on the 
heterosexual nuclear family as the preferred form, without adequately considering its 
alternatives or its downsides to important public goods such as sex equality.   
 
Feminist Theory 
 The other group of theorists whose critiques of liberal theory have set the stage to 
rethink the family-state relationship are feminist theorists.  There is considerable overlap 
between the feminist and communitarian critiques.  Like communitarians, feminist theorists 
have criticized the conception of the autonomous individual that appears in law and political 
theory.  Feminists, for their part, have pointed out the gendered nature of this depiction of the 
individual (McClain 1992; Held 1990; Okin 1989b; Williams 1991).  They have also pointed 
out that the assumption of autonomy rests “on the often unstated assumption of women's 
unpaid reproductive and domestic work, their dependence and subordination within the 
family, and their exclusion from most spheres of life” (Okin 1989b, 41).   
Like communitarians, feminists have also criticized liberal theory's emphasis on free 
choice.  In feminist critiques, this emphasis, as well as liberal theory’s conceiving of ties 
between individuals as the product of voluntary choice, rests on a gendered view of the 
world. Communities have survived and flourished only because women attended to 
relationships and family responsibilities at a far more fundamental level than is accounted for 
by liberal conceptions of choice and the free pursuit of ends. Within almost all sexual 
divisions of labor in history, women have been encumbered by the bonds of necessity and 
have been bound to relationships they are assigned to tend (Brown, 154).  In Nancy 
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Hirschmann's words, "[t]he exaggerated emphasis on consent as the only legitimate way to 
establish relationships of obligation, and the assumption of innate human separateness on 
which it is based, reveal a masculinist conceptualization of the self, of 'individuals,' that runs 
contrary to women's historical experience and epistemology" (Hirschmann 1996, 162).40 
 Feminists also share with communitarians and civic liberals the conviction that the 
supposed neutrality of the liberal state isn’t neutral at all, but instead is premised on a 
particular world view that idealizes freedom, choice, and a particular detached, rational view 
of the self.  In many feminists’ view, all of this better describe men than women in their 
assigned cultural roles (MacKinnon 1989; West 1988; Tronto 1993; Held 1990).  In 
Catharine MacKinnon’s words, “[t]he foundation for the [liberal state’s] neutrality is the 
pervasive assumption that conditions that pertain among men on the basis of gender apply to 
women as well” (1989, 163). 
Yet while some feminists approve of communitarians’ emphasis on altruism, care, 
and the social dimension of human existences, not least because they are characteristics 
associated with women that have long been devalued,41 many have expressed concern that 
this emphasis will ultimately redound to women’s detriment.  These theorists have criticized 
communitarian theorists for being too quick to dismiss the value of justice, liberty, equality, 
                                                 
40As Virginia Held frames the issue: "To see contractual relations between self-interested or mutually interested 
individuals as constituting a paradigm of human relations is to take a certain historically specific conception of 
'economic man' as representative of humanity. And it is, many feminists are beginning to agree, to overlook or 
to discount in very fundamental ways the experience of women." (Held 1990, 288).   Joan Williams makes a 
similar point in noting that men could only conceive of themselves as having the capacity for free choice 
because they assigned caretaking responsibilities to women (Williams 1991, 1608).  
 
41As Eva Feder Kittay (2001) notes in the context of voicing caution about communitarian positions, the 
Responsive Communitarian Platform reads like a feminist tract: “A communitarian perspective . . . mandates 
attention to what is often ignored in contemporary politics: the social side of human nature; the responsibilities 
that must be borne by citizens, individually and collectively, in a regime of rights; the fragile ecology of 
families and their supporting communities; the ripple effects and long-term consequences of present decisions.” 
(The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities, “preamble,” in Etzioni, ed., p. xxv.) 
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and individual rights in favor of some more community-oriented conceptions of the good, in 
some accounts derived from “shared understandings.”  They point out that women were long 
subjugated based on the ideology that they should be self-sacrificing for the benefit of others 
(Lacy 1993; Okin 1989, 29).    
 In contrast to communitarians and civic liberals, feminists have paid close attention to 
families as an institution, and done so without the rose-colored lenses.  Theorists across the 
feminist spectrum, including Susan Moller Okin (1989a, 1989b), Catharine MacKinnon 
(1989), Martha Fineman (1995, 2004), and Martha Minow (1997), have concentrated on 
families.  Their accounts not only call attention to the important role of families, the 
necessity of the caretaking functions that women have largely performed, and the way in 
which the liberal state has failed to support families, but also to the power dynamics within 
families.  For example, Robin West argues that the state fails both “to protect and nurture the 
connections that sustain and enlarge us” and “to intervene in those private and intimate 
‘connections’ that damage and injure us” (West 1997, 14).  She also conceives marriage as 
an institution that neither benefits nor satisfies women (West 1997).  In this respect, feminist 
accounts of families have often been far less idealized than communitarian accounts.   
Among the most prominent and insightful of feminist critiques of the theoretical 
treatment of families is Susan Moller Okin’s.  Okin argued that the major theories of justice 
produced during the last generation have made a critical error in seeking to theorize a just 
society without considering the institution of the family.  She demonstrated how 
communitarians, libertarians, and liberal egalitarians all assume the existence of the 
“gendered family,” but treat it as outside the scope of a theory of justice.  In Okin’s words, 
these theorists “take mature, independent human beings as the subjects of their theories 
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without any mention of how they got to be that way” (9).  She argued that this omission 
ignores the way in which the conventionally-structured contemporary family involves 
women in a cycle of socially-caused vulnerability.  In her words, marriage and the family 
“constitute the pivot of a social system of gender that renders women vulnerable to 
dependency, exploitation, and abuse” (Okin 1989a, 136).  Justice, Okin contended, requires 
that the state intervene in this cycle of inequality rather than treat it as a private matter (173).  
Feminist theorists have also shown how the demarcation between the public and 
private realms as the boundary for state action has served to perpetuate women’s inequality 
in families and in society (Olsen 1983, MacKinnon 1989). These theorists contend that 
liberal theory, in walling off families from the reach of the state, fails to recognize the way in 
which families can be a locus of oppression, rather than an expression of individual 
autonomy.  As Martha Nussbaum counsels, the relatively recent liberal emphasis on the 
public/private split probably grew from an admirable concern for the protection of individual 
choice, yet it asks too few questions about whose choices are protected (Nussbaum 1999).   
  The power of feminist critiques of the relationship between families and the state is 
undeniable.  At the same time, many of these critiques have been limited: most feminist 
theory dealing this relationship has, perhaps understandably, limited the issue to achieving 
equality between women and men (for example, Okin 1989a).  Other goods and interests 
relevant to a liberal democracy, including the needs of children for care to develop soundly, 
the interests in women (and men) fulfilling their moral responsibilities, the polity’s interest in 
ensuring that children are raised to be good and productive citizens, and the need of all adults 
for care have been, if not completely neglected, at least peripheral in these discussions.  
Slightly less explicably, this literature has often equated the achievement of gender equality 
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with ensuring that women achieve economic equality in the workplace.  In Nancy Fraser’s 
words, “the vision implicit in the current political practice of most U.S. feminists” is that of 
“the Universal Breadwinner.”  She defines the point of this position as “enabl[ing] women to 
support themselves and their families through their own wage-earning.  The breadwinner role 
is to be universalized, in sum, so that women, too, can be citizen-workers” (Fraser 1997, 51).  
Based on this focus, some proposed feminist solutions have involved restructuring women’s 
family responsibilities to allow them to hold full-time jobs without considering the broader 
interests at stake.  In these accounts, the interests of men, children, and communities, and 
women’s own concern for their families and desire to participate in childrearing, generally 
have been taken into account in constructing these solutions only to the extent that they are 
relevant to achieving women’s economic equality.   
A recent article by Linda Hirshman in The American Prospect (2005) demonstrates 
such an analysis.  In it, Hirshman argues that those women who choose to stay at home with 
their children rather than work in the market economy are undercutting the feminist goal of 
equality.  The solution?  Women should treat work seriously by finding jobs that pay good 
money.  They should also avoid marrying men who are their peers: “If you both are going 
through the elite-job hazing rituals simultaneously while having children, someone is going 
to have to give.  Even the most devoted lawyers with the hardest-working nannies are going 
to have weeks when no one can get home other than to sleep.  The odds are that when this 
happens, the woman is going to give up her ambitions and professional potential” (25).  
Hirshman argues that women’s attaining an equal share of the powerful and high paying jobs 
in society is better for both society and for women individually:  
A good life for humans includes the classical standard of using one’s capacities for 
speech and reason in a prudent way, the liberal requirement of having enough 
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autonomy to direct one’s own life, and the utilitarian test of doing more good than 
harm in the world.  Measured against these time-tested standards, the expensive 
expensively educated upper-class moms will be leading lesser lives.   At feminism’s 
dawning, two theorists compared gender ideology to a caste system.  To borrow their 
insight, these daughters of the upper-classes will be bearing most of the burden of the 
work always associated with the lowest caste: sweeping and cleaning bodily waste” 
(26). 
 
While there can be no doubt that women’s interest in economic equality would be furthered 
by their choosing to attain high-paying jobs), Hirshman not only misses the import and 
potential dignity of carework (despite its societal devaluation), she also fails to consider the 
costs to children, society, and to women themselves of women (like many men) assuming 
jobs that provide no time to raise their families.     
A significant answer to the feminist theory that has focused on caretaking only 
instrumentally to ensure women’s equality in the workplace is the feminist work that has 
sought to promote care as an ethic.  Beginning in the 1980s, care theorists have focused on 
the necessary task of caretaking in our society, as well as its virtues.  For example, Robin 
West, in an essay that argues that jurisprudence should be transformed to accommodate 
virtues associated with women, states that:  
[w]e need to show . . . that a legal and economic system which values, protects and 
rewards nurturant labor in private life will make for a better community. We need to 
show that community, nurturance, responsibility, and the ethic of care are values at 
least as worthy of protection as autonomy, self-reliance, and individualism. We must 
do that, in part, by showing how those values have affected and enriched our own 
lives (West 1988, 65-66). 
 
Early work on care, however, presented its own difficulties that limited its usefulness in 
theorizing the family-state relationship. First, many of these theorists presented caretaking as 
an activity that women are better suited to perform than men because of either biological or 
cultural factors.  This group of care theorists, sometimes called “cultural” or “relational” 
feminists, often use Carol Gilligan’s important work in moral psychology as a springboard 
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for theory.  In privileging women’s position with respect to these qualities, however, they 
tended to overlook differences between individual women and between different social 
groups of women.42  In addition, this type of theorizing tended to valorize care and those who 
perform it without considering how women’s socially-assigned role as caretaker can be 
oppressive to women.   
 More useful treatments come from those feminist theorists who have begun to 
theorize issues surrounding care without intrinsically privileging women’s relationship to it.  
Joan Tronto is one of the scholars who took the lead in this work. In her important book, 
Moral Boundaries (1993), Tronto recognized that the conception of care, the low value 
accorded it, and its association with women are all culturally constructed, and seeks to 
challenge all three (124).43  Tronto asks “What would it mean in the late twentieth century 
American society to take seriously, as part of our definition of a good society, values of 
caring – attentiveness, responsibility, nurturance, compassion, meeting others’ needs – 
traditionally associated with women and traditionally excluded from public consideration?”  
(2-3).   Doing so, she argues, would require a radical rethinking of the nature and boundaries 
of morality and the structures of power and privilege within society (3).  It would contest the 
view that care is a moral rather than a political value, and move caretaking from a private to a 
political issue (6-10).   Moreover, although it would not require abandoning moral 
commitments, for example, to universalizability, it would require “that we recognize that 
                                                 
42See, for example, West (1988, 3) (“Indeed, perhaps the central insight of feminist theory of the last decade has 
been that woman are "essentially connected," not "essentially separate," from the rest of human life, both 
materially, through pregnancy, intercourse, and breast-feeding, and existentially, through the moral and 
practical life”). 
 
43“[I]f we look at questions of race, class, and gender, we notice that those who are least well off in society are 
disproportionately those who do the work of caring, and that the best off members of society often use their 
positions of superiority to pass caring work off to others” (113). 
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humans are not only autonomous and equal, but that they are also beings who require care” 
(152).  In this work, Tronto’s purpose is to show that a political ethic that incorporates care 
is, indeed, possible, and consistent with basic principles of liberal theory (albeit still requiring 
a radical revisionism of current liberal thought).  Accordingly, she does not articulate the 
specifics of such a political ethic or describe the institutions or public policies that 
incorporating such an ethic might require.   
Feminists since Tronto’s Moral Boundaries have sought to consider how 
incorporating care as a political ethic can be both reconciled with other liberal goods and 
principles.  Unsurprisingly, given the primacy of justice in liberal discussions, many of these 
treatments have sought to flesh out the relationship between principles of care and justice.  
As Tronto recognizes, care and justice are not mutually exclusive (166-67).  Martha 
Nussbaum (1999) points out, in fact, that an exclusive focus on the value of care of others 
that is not balanced by a focus on individual independence and caring for the self runs the 
risk of perpetuating women’s roles as the helper of others without independent claims to be 
subjects in their own right.  By the same token, a focus on care without an accompanying 
focus on justice may leave women’s subordination intact (Card 1990; Okin 1990; Tronto 
1993; Bubeck 1995; Kittay 2000).  With that said, recent care theorists have been somewhat 
vague in delineating the specifics of how the state’s responsibility with respect to care should 
be reconciled with other purposes of the liberal state.  This has led critics to argue that care 
theorists value care disproportionately to other contributions that individuals can make to 
society, call for virtually unlimited resources to support care as against other goods, and 
assign the state responsibility for supporting children that should be left to the parents who 
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decided to have the children in the first place (for example, Case, 2001; Franke, 2001; Wax 
2004). 
In summary, recent feminist theory considerably deepens the critique of dominant 
versions of liberalism.  The light this theory has cast on families has been especially 
illuminating, revealing not only the importance of families, but also its hazards.  Feminism 
has also contributed a richer theorization of individuals’ ties to others and the importance of 
care.   Much work remains, though, to think through the way in which human dependency 
creates an obligation on the part of the state, the contours and limits of this obligation, and 
how the state should fulfill its obligation given other goals, including sex equality.   
Furthermore, while feminist theory has properly restored to political theory the recognition of 
human neediness, it is still struggling to integrate this insight with the ways in which humans 
are and can be decisionmakers and the creators of their destinies in at least some shape or 
form.   
Conclusion 
 The conversation regarding liberal political theory has come a long way from 
the account presented in Rawls’ A Theory of Justice.  In the succeeding years, many 
of the features of liberal political theory that have made it so hard to bring families 
into focus have been  soundly criticized by communitarians, civic liberals, and 
feminists.  These critiques open a space to reconceive liberal theory in a manner that 
can better address both the possibilities and pitfalls of families.  My project in the 
remainder of this dissertation is to think through a conceptualization of the family-
state relationship that, while still coherent, is more true to the complexity of the 
goods at stake.  Is it possible to construct a theory that, while paying healthy respect 
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to the value of individual autonomy, also recognizes the importance of caretaking?  
And can this be done while recognizing and seeking to redress the fact that families 
are sometimes, perhaps often, the sites of oppression and a primary source of gender 
inequality?  And if such a theory is possible, what would it look like?  It is to these 
questions that I turn in the next chapter.  
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
FAMILIES, THE STATE, AND CARETAKER-DEPENDENT RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
 The standard Rawlsian model, in its single-minded concentration on distributive 
justice with respect to individuals, overlooks the goods and functions that families serve.  It 
is also based on the image of citizens as able adults, without considering the dependency that 
is inevitably a part of the human condition.  If we loosen the assumptions of the Rawlsian 
model and pay attention to the fact that humans don’t spring up like mushrooms, and are, 
instead, needy in varying amounts over the course of their lives, and also recognize that the 
goods that a liberal polity must pursue are broader than simply the (important) goods of 
individual justice and autonomy, how does this change the picture of what the state’s role 
should be with respect to families?  
In this chapter and the next, I consider this question by discussing the state’s role with 
respect to the function that families serve in dealing with dependency in our society.  I begin 
the discussion in this chapter with the type of dependency that Martha Fineman (2004) calls 
“inevitable dependency” – the biological dependency that occurs always in children, often in 
old age, and at other points in many citizens’ lives as a result of illness.  Inevitable 
dependency, by definition, involves what might be considered a “vertical” dependency, in 
which one person is the caregiver and the other the dependent.  This type of dependency 
stands in contrast with what might be called “horizontal” dependency between adults, in 
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which both are interdependent with one another and perform caretaking tasks for one 
another.  I address the issue of horizontal relationships in chapter 4.   
My discussion in this chapter is framed in two parts.  In Part I, I sketch out a 
normative vision of the state’s responsibility vis-à-vis families for inevitable dependency.  To 
develop this vision, I contrast my views with those of Martha Fineman, one of the foremost 
feminist theorists on issues of dependency.  Fineman contends that the inevitability of 
dependence, and the fact that caring for the inevitability dependent is required to reproduce 
society, means that the state owes families a debt to compensate them for resources expended 
in childrearing.  I argue, in contrast, that conceiving of the state’s responsibility in terms of 
its duty to protect society’s vulnerable members, which in turn derives from the liberal state’s 
respect for human dignity, better conforms with both the ideals of liberalism and our 
considered intuitions.   I then discuss the contours of this responsibility, a model that I call 
the “supportive state.”  In contrast with the civic liberal William Galston’s view that the 
state’s responsibility for dependents is triggered only after families fail to meet this 
responsibility, I contend that the inevitably intertwined relationship between families and the 
state means that the two should be seen as having concurrent, although not coextensive, 
responsibilities.  Conceiving of the state’s responsibility in this way, I argue, has the added 
advantages of both helping to define the outer limits of the state’s responsibility, and of 
clarifying the role that parents’ decision to have children (or to engage in sex) should play in 
discerning the state’s responsibility for caretaking. 
I move on, in Part II, to consider how the state’s responsibility for dependency 
intersects with the important good of sex equality.  To think through this issue, I contrast 
models like my own, which seek public support for caretaking, with two other feminist 
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approaches for dealing with the relationship between sex equality and caretaking.  The first 
of these seeks to have men assume an equal burden of caretaking; the second seeks to 
persuade women to choose other life courses besides having children.  Ultimately, I conclude 
that a public support model must be the centerpiece of state efforts to deal with dependency, 
but that elements of the other feminist approaches should play important roles.   
 
Conceptualizing the State’s Responsibility for Dependency 
 
Grounding the Responsibility—Martha Fineman 
 
 In her recent book, The Autonomy Myth (2004), Martha Fineman takes on what she 
calls “core myths” of American society, which center on “the desirability and attainability of 
autonomy for individuals and families” (xiii).  In Fineman’s view, the autonomy myth has 
produced institutional arrangements that fail to take account of the dependency inherent in 
the human condition.  As a biological matter, Fineman points out, all humans are dependent 
at some points in their lives.  The need for care that this inevitable dependency creates, 
Fineman counsels, gives rise to a secondary form of dependency experienced by caretakers.  
To the extent that caregiving precludes caretakers from engaging in activities such as wage 
labor, these caregivers develop a “derivative dependency” caused by their own need for 
goods and resources.  The dominant ideology of autonomy treats both types of dependency 
as private matters with which the state has no legitimate concern (36).  As a result, those who 
bear the caretaking burden – primarily women in our society – assume the costs of carework 
without compensation for their work or accommodation through access to societal goods (36-
37).  The result is a nation rife with economic and sex inequality that has no public 
philosophy that can redress these issues.44 
                                                 
44Fineman wryly observes that the state selectively applies its ideology of autonomy: “a society that imposed 
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 Fineman contends that the inevitability of dependency creates an obligation on the 
part of the state to support caretaking.  She charges that 
[i]ndividual dependency needs must be met if we, as individuals, are to survive, and 
our aggregate or collective dependency needs must be met if our society is to survive 
and perpetuate itself.  The mandate that the state (collective society) respond to 
dependency, therefore, is not a matter of altruism or empathy (which are individual 
responses often resulting in charity), but is a matter that is primary and essential 
because such a response is fundamentally society preserving” (48).   
 
The fact that caretaking is currently performed by families with little recompense from 
society therefore creates for Fineman a problem of justice.  The family, she asserts, should be 
seen as a dynamic public institution that has been assigned the task of caretaking for the 
benefit of society as a whole.45  Although families assume the vast bulk of the burdens of 
caretaking without compensation, “[c]aretaking labor provides the citizens, the workers, the 
voters, the consumers, the students, and others who populate society and its institutions” 
(xvii).46  Thus, the state and the market currently “free ride” on families’ labor by delegating 
the work of rearing future citizens and workers to families without compensating them for 
their efforts. This fact creates a collective debt on the part of society to caretakers which, in 
                                                                                                                                                       
the ideals of self-sufficiency and independence on all its citizens would certainly institute close to a 100 percent 
inheritance tax on all large estates. . . . People should not be deprived of the opportunity to rise above the 
mediocre masses, demonstrating their own inherent merit and worth, simply because they are burdened by the 
wealth of their fathers” (3-4). By the same token, those whom the state dubs “autonomous” ironically receive 
the greatest government largesse (witness the tax benefits awarded to married couples), whereas those dubbed 
“dependent,” such as welfare mothers, are denied state aid so as not to promote dysfunctional dependency (22, 
31-33).  
 
45“[T]he family in [the traditional ‘separate spheres’ understanding of society] is positioned as a unique and 
private arena.  I argue that this is an incorrect and unsustainable conception.  The family is contained within the 
larger society, and its contours are defined as an institution by law.  Far from being separate and private, the 
family interacts with and is acted upon by other societal institutions.  I suggest the very relationship is not one 
of separation, but of symbiosis.  It is very important to understand the roles assigned to the family in society – 
roles that otherwise might have to be played by other institutions, such as the market or the state.” (xviii).   
 
46“[W]hile the state provides what we think of as subsidies, such as those supplied by the tax code, caretakers 
provide a subsidy to the larger society and its institutions.  Far from being independent, the state and the market 
institutions that it protects and fosters are dependent on the caretaking labor that reproduces society and 
populates its institutions” (xvii). 
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Fineman’s words, “must be recognized, and payment accomplished, through policies and 
laws that provide both some economic compensation and structural accommodation to 
caretakers” (263).47 
Fineman’s account adds a considerable amount to the picture of the family-
state relationship that had been missing from liberal accounts.  In contrast to 
these accounts, she recognizes the ways in which humans are inherently needy 
beings, and that this need varies over the human life cycle, and she carefully 
works through how this recognition should change the state’s role with respect 
to citizens.   In doing so, she seeks to give care its rightful place in a good 
society in ways that comport with justice and sex equality.   
Yet Fineman’s account of how the state should respond to the fact of dependency is 
ultimately unsatisfactory.  Most prominently, her claim that the inevitability of dependency 
gives rise to collective responsibility raises conceptual difficulties.  The claim regarding the 
inevitability of dependency is a statement of ontological fact; the claim of state obligation is 
a normative conclusion.  So while the first claim certainly has a bearing on the latter, without 
more, it cannot prove it.48  If scientists discovered that all adult women had an undeniable 
need to pair off for life, this discovery alone would not tag the state with the responsibility 
for helping women find partners; some normative argument about why the state should help 
meet this need would still be required.  Likewise, Fineman’s assertion of the inevitability of 
dependency fails to answer the question of “why the state?” rather than, for example, parents 
or other family members.  
 Fineman’s contention that the state gets some benefit from parents’ caretaking efforts 
does not quite fill this bill. There are some numbers of instances in which the actions of 
private citizens produce benefits for society without accruing any legal or moral right to 
                                                 
47See also xvii (“Caretaking . . . creates a social debt . . . according to principles . . . that demand that those 
receiving social benefits also share the costs when they are able”). 
 
48See also Taylor 1989b, 159, 160 (presenting similar critique of communitarian arguments). 
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compensation. For example, if a violinist were moved to play a beautiful solo in a town 
square, few of us would believe that the town had an obligation to repay her for the value of 
the pleasure she created for the townspeople. Instead, we would conceive the benefit to be 
gratuitously conferred. We would likely believe the same even if the music were to draw 
people into the surrounding cafes, and give the area an economic boon. Some people might 
be moved to drop a tip into the violinist’s hat, but that does not create a debt by the café 
owners or the town at large. In the absence of an agreement between the violinist and others, 
more is required to support compensation on both a legal and an ethical level than the simple 
fact that one party received a benefit from the actions of another.49  A similar analogy comes 
from the officious intermeddler cases in contract law.  For example, a tenant cannot take it 
upon himself to paint his apartment without asking the landlord and later charge the landlord 
for the service.50 
 Similarly, the simple fact that society would fall into disrepair without caretaking is 
not sufficient to hold the state responsible for compensating the caretaking performed by 
families. As empirical political scientists have demonstrated, societies fall into disrepair and 
democracies become unmanageable when civil society lacks institutions that generate “social 
capital,” or goodwill among individuals.51  This makes it good policy for the state to 
encourage such institutions. It might even be said, somewhat loosely, that the state has the 
                                                 
49For example, a court may find a contract “implied-in-fact” if the recipient of valuable services had an 
opportunity to reject the services but chose not to do so with knowledge or reason to know that the other party 
expected to be paid. The failure to reject services in this circumstance operates as an acceptance. When 
acceptance cannot be inferred from the conduct of the parties, a court may still find a contract “implied-in-law” 
where one party has been unjustly enriched by the actions of another. Generally for the doctrine to apply, 
however, it must have been reasonable to perform such services with an expectation of payment in the absence 
of an agreement, such as the case of a surgeon performing emergency services on an unconscious patient.  
Neither doctrine is analogous to the case at hand, however. See generally Murray 2001, § 51(B). 
 
50See, for example, Tomko, 1. 
 
51See, for example, Putnam 2001. 
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responsibility to encourage such institutions. Yet this certainly doesn’t give those who 
participate in such institutions, including the now paradigmatic bowling leagues, a claim to 
compensation by the state, despite the fact that they are generating the social capital 
necessary for a flourishing liberal democracy. 
 Fineman’s use of the economic imagery of “debt” somewhat muddies the waters in 
characterizing the nature of the state’s responsibility.  Fineman suggests that the state and 
employers “owe” parents support for caretaking because  
caretakers provide a subsidy to the larger society and its institutions. Far from 
being independent, the state and the market institutions that it protects and 
fosters are dependent on the caretaking labor that reproduces society and 
populates its institutions. . . .  Caretaking thus creates a ‘social debt,’ a debt 
that must be paid according to principles of equality that demand that those 
receiving social benefits also share the costs when they are able. Far from 
exemplifying equal responsibility for dependency, however, our market 
institutions are ‘free-riders,’ appropriating the labor of the caretaker for their 
own purposes (xvii). 
 
Fineman’s framing of the state’s responsibility in terms of debt raises several issues.  
First, it suggests that caretakers deserve subsidies because of the net benefits that children 
will bring to society at a future point. Yet, even if we accept Fineman’s contention that 
children’s contributions to society should be credited to their parents, the conclusion that 
children are a net benefit to society does not necessarily follow. Determining whether 
children should indeed be considered a net benefit requires assessing whether children’s 
future contributions exceed their costs to society.  For example, opponents of state support 
might argue that the ecological, social, and psychic costs from overcrowding outweigh the 
benefits of children.  In addition, if debts are going to be paid off by the state, should there be 
a corresponding offset for the unique benefits to parents of having children — benefits so 
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substantial that a large proportion of children are deliberately conceived even without 
subsidies? 
Further, grounding public support on the assertion that children are a net 
future asset to society produces some unpalatable results.  For example, this 
line of reasoning opens the door for critics of public support, such as Mary 
Anne Case, to argue (somewhat disturbingly, as she herself acknowledges) 
that we could get the same benefits for less money if we imported immigrants 
rather than supported children. 52  Fineman’s argument also leads to other 
counterintuitive results.  To the extent that we are comfortable giving public 
support to parents of healthy children who will likely grow up to be 
productive citizens, would we therefore not support parents whose children 
had disorders like cystic fibrosis, because they would likely not reach 
adulthood and repay taxpayers’ investment? The reason that most of us would 
be horrified by this suggestion is that we intuitively conceive public 
responsibility for caretaking to spring from something other than the 
likelihood of society receiving a future economic return.53   
 
Triggering the Responsibility – William Galston 
 
In my view, Fineman’s insights about the inevitability of dependency and the need for 
caretaking support a stronger rationale for public support than the one she presents.  Few 
would disagree that the state has some responsibility to protect and defend the basic well-
being of its most vulnerable citizens – children, the elderly, and other dependents – when 
                                                 
52Case 2001, 1774 (“I realize that looking at childbearing and childrearing in cold-bloodedly economic terms 
may be disturbing, but it is some proponents of an increased shift of the burden of children to the state, not I, 
who introduce arguments sounding in economic rationality into the debate, for example, by insisting that 
children are a public good or that parents are entitled to compensation from the childless. All I am here urging 
we explore is what it might mean to take such arguments seriously. My sense is that such arguments are not 
only difficult to sustain, but they have nasty implications their proponents rarely face up to. Most notably, 
starting down the road of claims for compensation grounded in economic rationality invites case-by-case 
examination and analysis of precisely to what extent which children will produce positive externalities worthy 
of compensation.”); see also Franke 2001, 192-95. 
 
53See also Kittay 2001, 540 (criticizing attempts to support care based on future productivity of children 
“because it betrays an essentially instrumental attitude toward children and the ‘temporarily’ dependent, 
suggesting that the only reason to care for dependents is the usefulness they will provide once they are no 
longer dependent”). 
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they cannot do so for themselves.54  For example, most of us would agree that the state had 
some obligation to protect a child who was orphaned and starving in the streets.  By the same 
token, most would agree that the state has the responsibility to remove a child from his or her 
home if it learns of serious abuse inflicted by the child’s parents.  What is controversial, then, 
is not the fact of the state’s responsibility to children and others who are inevitably 
dependent, which stems from its obligation to respect human dignity.  Just as respect for 
human dignity requires respecting the autonomy of able adults, it requires support the well-
being of its vulnerable citizens.  Instead, what is controversial is the issue of when this 
responsibility for ensuring the welfare of dependents is triggered vis-à-vis the responsibility 
of families to ensure the same.  (The reason that the two examples given are uncontroversial 
is because, in the first, no family exists and, in the second, the family is clearly shown to 
have already failed.)  For this reason, opponents of state support for dependency do not argue 
that the state has no duty to support dependents, but rather that the state should act as a 
second-line of defense that comes into play only after families fail to meet their 
responsibilities.  William Galston makes this view explicit when he likens the state’s 
responsibility for children to “[t]he Catholic theory of subsidiarity, which holds that 
responsibility begins at the smallest units of society and expands to public institutions only 
when these units cannot solve their own problems” (Galston 1996).55  
The view espoused by Galston – that the state should step in only after parents have tried 
                                                 
54See also Goodin 1985 (discussing societal duty to protect the vulnerable).  Even Case, who opposes aid to 
parents for the purposes of facilitating caretaking, exhibits a grudging support for the state aiding children 
directly (Case 2001, 1785).   
 
55See also Case 2001, 1785. (“Once we acknowledge that there should be some ‘collective responsibility’ for 
child care, we might still conclude that forced extractions from the collective in aid of this responsibility should 
kick in only after those with an individual responsibility, notably fathers, are forced to kick in their fair share, 
financially or otherwise.”). 
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and failed – dominates public debate about state policy.  Yet it rests on too simplistic a view 
of the state’s relationship to families.  Feminists, including Fineman, have pointed out that 
this view of the family as a distinct entity that is removed from the state fails to recognize the 
complex interconnections that exist between the two.56  At the most basic level, the very 
determination of whether a group of citizens constitutes a family is determined by state 
action.  In Martha Nussbaum’s words: 
  People associate in many ways, live together, love each other, have children.  Which of 
these will get the name “family” is a legal and political matter, never one to be decided 
simply by the parties themselves.  The state constitutes the family structure through its 
laws, defining which groups of people can count as families, defining the privileges and 
rights of family members, defining what marriage and divorce are, what legitimacy and 
parental responsibility are, and so forth.  This difference makes a difference: The state 
is present in the family from the start, in a way that is less clearly the case with the 
religious body or the university; it is the state that says what this thing is and controls 
how one becomes a member of it (Nussbaum 2002, 199).   
 
Further, as I argued in chapter 1, the ways in which families function in contemporary 
society are also deeply and inextricably intertwined with government policy.57  The modern 
administrative state built on this foundation has no neutral, isolated position into which it can 
retreat to wait while families exhaust their responsibility to care for dependents “before” the 
state acts. 
 It would make far more sense to abandon the fallacy that the state both can and 
should wait for the family to act and to recognize that, insofar as the state has a responsibility 
to foster the well-being of its dependent citizens, that responsibility must be deemed to exist 
simultaneously with families’ responsibility to foster their well-being. And fostering the well-
being of dependents, as Fineman clearly shows, along with Joan Tronto (1993) before her, 
                                                 
56See, for example, Fineman 1999, 1207-09.   
 
57See, for example, Minow 1997; Woodhouse 1993, 500-02. 
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requires that they receive care.  This need not mean that the state’s responsibilities in this 
regard are identical to families’. Rather, consistent with the view that the state should expect 
citizens to perform those responsibilities that they can reasonably perform for themselves, the 
state should expect families to bear responsibility for the day-to-day caring for (or arranging 
the care for) children and other dependents. Meanwhile, the state should bear the 
responsibility for structuring institutions in ways that help families meet their caretaking 
responsibilities. In other words, the state should assume the responsibility for ensuring that 
the “rules of the game” facilitate caretaking.58  This division of responsibility recognizes the 
malleability and contingency of institutional structures. It does not artificially separate state 
action from the realm of families or presume that clear boundaries can even be drawn 
between them, but it does assume certain spheres of authority as between the two 
     The state’s responsibility to protect the well-being of those who are inevitably dependent 
has a special corollary when it comes to children: an intrinsic part of ensuring their well-
being involves insuring them adequate conditions in which to develop their capabilities.59  
Indeed, ensuring such conditions is not only a fundamental responsibility of the state, but is 
also central to the polity’s own self-interest.  Recall John Stuart Mills’ words, “If society lets 
any considerable number of its members grow up mere children, incapable of being acted on 
by rational consideration of distant motives, society has itself to blame for the consequences” 
(OL, 5, 91). As Linda McClain points out, in the absence of ensuring that the children who 
                                                 
58The division of responsibility I suggest here comports with Fineman’s view that when individuals assume the 
burdens of caretaking, the state should provide them with “the necessary tools to perform their assigned tasks 
and to guarantees that they will be protected by rules and policies that facilitate their performance” (Fineman 
2004, 49). 
 
59I am grateful to both Linda McClain and Mary Shanley for pointing this out to me in private conversations.  
See also Nussbaum 2000 (arguing that respect for human dignity requires that states provide conditions that 
enable citizens to develop a threshold level of central human capabilities). 
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will one day be citizens have an adequate capacity for self-government, which for children 
requires ensuring them adequate care, the future of a well-ordered society is dubious.60   
 The division of responsibility that I pose posits what might be called both “strong 
families” and a “supportive state.”  It expects that people should seek to meet the dependency 
needs of their family members, and therefore requires families that are up to the difficult task 
of caring for children and other dependents. Yet the “supportive state” model maintains that 
such caretaking should be done within institutional structures that facilitate caretaking, and 
that it is the state’s responsibility to secure such institutional structures. This approach, in 
contrast to the reigning autonomy myth, recognizes that the ability of families to nurture their 
members does not simply exist as a matter of fact, or spring up as a matter of spontaneous 
generation; instead, it is an achievement to be pursued jointly by both citizens and the state.61 
 
     Parameters of the “Supportive State” Model 
In the preceding section, I contended that the state’s responsibility to protect the 
vulnerable gives it a duty to structure societal institutions in ways that support caretaking. In 
this section, I want to explore the limits of this duty. How far does the polity’s obligation to 
support caretaking extend? And how should the state weigh this goal against other goods and 
principles?  Clearly the answer to these questions cannot be determined through a kind of 
                                                 
60See McClain, 2005 (forthcoming); see also McClain 2001, 1682-95.  
 
61As Eva Feder Kittay writes 
Even though the well-being of an individual may be the immediate duty of those who are 
closest, it is the obligation of the larger society to assure that care can be and is provided. The 
parallel to that other vulnerability to which the creation of the state is often attributed—
protection from the malfeasance of others—is fairly direct. For although the responsibility not 
to harm another falls on each of us individually, it is the role of the larger society to protect us 
against and to punish those who do violence. While a crime against an individual victim is the 
responsibility of the criminal, it is up to the wider society to protect against criminals and to 
punish crimes (Kittay 1999, 535). 
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“moral geometry,”62 in which a single, correct answer can be absolutely and firmly 
calculated once and for all.  Nevertheless, some guideposts can at least mark out the 
parameters of this duty.  
 At a minimum, the state should arrange institutions in such a way that family 
members may, through exercising diligent but not Herculean efforts, adequately meet the 
basic physical and emotional needs of dependents while avoiding impoverishment or 
immiseration themselves.  The state’s responsibility to meet this threshold level of support 
stems directly from its own obligation to vulnerable dependents. Translated into concrete 
government policies, this means that the welfare system would be structured in a way that 
those at the bottom of the economic ladder who have children, insofar as they are required by 
the state to work outside the home, have realistic access to good quality day care.  Further, 
government policies should also allow these parents enough time with their children to 
ensure that they are well-parented and supervised. The same holds true in terms of direct 
financial support:  those with dependents at the bottom of the income pyramid should receive 
enough financial subsidization so that they can provide the dependents with decent 
environments that promote basic capabilities. In this view, the state shirks its responsibility 
when it forces parents to choose between working to put food in their children’s mouths and 
ensuring that their children receive adequate care.  By the same token, the state must ensure 
institutional structures – such as family leave allowances, 63 flex-time provisions, and a living 
wage that does not require that parents work two or three jobs – that keep parents and other 
                                                 
62The term is Thomas Spragens’ (1999, 64).  
 
63See Gornick and Meyers 2003, 117 (“[O]ne of the most important weakness of the family leave system in the 
United States is the lack of any paid leave for a substantial share of the workforce.”). 
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caretakers from becoming so pressed for time or frazzled by time pressures that it interferes 
with adequate caretaking. 
  That is the minimum level necessary for the state to satisfy its obligations to protect 
the vulnerable.  Above this threshold level, the state’s support of caretaking is no longer an 
absolute obligation, but rather needs to be balanced against the other goods that the state 
might use its resources to support.  In this regard, while caretaking is not a good we normally 
think of as distributive, to the extent that the state must expend resources to support 
caretaking, it is in fact a distributive good that requires trade-offs against other goods.  In 
weighing this trade-off, the importance of citizens fulfilling moral responsibilities to the 
health of a liberal democracy, and the importance of the soundness of the future citizens to 
the polity’s future, are weighty reasons for the state to support carework as against other uses 
of the state’s resources.  With that said, under this rationale, supporting carework beyond the 
baseline level is good policy, but not, as in Fineman’s rationale, a debt that must be paid.  
 Under this principle, the state could legitimately support caretaking both below and 
above the threshold level over other pursuits of citizens that did not implicate the state’s 
responsibility to vulnerable citizens.  On this ground, for example, the state could subsidize 
caretaking without similarly subsidizing those who choose to drive expensive cars rather than 
to have children.64  Society has no basic obligation to support the purchase of a Porsche, in 
contrast to its obligation to protect dependents. This is not to say that a polity might not 
decide that all or some other endeavors should also be accommodated, just that there are 
particularly compelling reasons to accommodate caretaking responsibilities.  
                                                 
64Fineman refers to the argument that the state has no more duty to support a citizens’ decision to have a child 
than it does to subsidize any other preference of individual citizen, including the preference to own an 
expensive car, as the “Porsche preference” argument (Fineman 2004, 42-43). 
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 In assessing whether to subsidize over and above this threshold level, a liberal polity 
can find a common-sense median between, on the one hand, the most begrudging proponents 
of state support for dependency, such as Mary Anne Case, who argues that the state should 
only invest enough resources to keep the next generation out of prison (Case 2001, 1785), 
and, on the other hand, an approach in which the state should devote virtually unlimited 
funding to its children and other dependents. One such sensible midpoint can be found in the 
words that I referred to in chapter 1 of John Stuart Mill, who argued that the “existing 
generation,” is responsible for  
the training and the entire circumstances of the generation to come; it cannot 
indeed make them perfectly wise and good, because it is itself so lamentably 
deficient in goodness and wisdom; and its best efforts are not always, in 
individual cases, its most successful ones; but it is perfectly well able to make 
the rising generation, as a whole, as good as, and a little better than, itself 
(Mill OL, 91). 
 
Seeking to do a little better for the next generation of dependents is a realistic but still 
ambitious goal that recognizes the importance of caring for dependents yet also recognizes 
that there are other goods that a liberal democracy must and should pursue. 
 Finally, at some point towards the end of the spectrum marked by greater state 
support, and depending on competing priorities and available resources, it makes less sense 
for the state to subsidize higher marginal levels of caretaking as against other goods. At this 
upper end of the spectrum, subsidizing more caretaking may actually be counterproductive 
for both the recipients of care, who may not develop the level of autonomy needed to 
function in society (Baker 1997; Riylin 2004), and for the caregiver, who may never get to 
pursue other courses in life.  Although family members may still to decide to give this higher 
level of care to their dependents, they should do so without state subsidization. 
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The Choice To Have Children And The Limits Of State Responsibility 
 
 I have until this point been addressing inevitable dependency in all its forms—i.e., the 
dependency of children, and dependency that occurs because of old age, illness, or disability. 
There is one issue limited to the dependency of children that deserves special attention, 
however:  that is how parents’ decision to have children in the first place should factor into 
the state’s responsibility to support them. Some critics of state support for families argue that 
the state should not lighten parents’ load because it is parents, after all, who have chosen to 
have children (who will, inevitably, be dependent) in the first place.  As Mary Anne Case 
phrases the objection, those who choose to forego children have decided to invest their time, 
energy, and money in other projects: why then should they be required to subsidize and 
accommodate parents in their decision to have kids, when their non-childrearing projects are 
not similarly subsidized? (Case 2001: 1782-83)65   Amy Wax (2004) puts the point somewhat 
differently.  She argues that: 
[p]roviding public financial support for caretakers is in tension with the belief that 
parenthood is a choice for which people should be held responsible. The widespread 
availability of birth control and abortion reinforces the idea that childbearing should 
be regarded as a deliberate decision that is within a person's control. Many use 
contraception to limit the size of their families, and many delay or forgo childbearing 
because of a lack of resources, a reluctance to make tradeoffs, or concerns about 
giving their children the right start in life. Those who show restraint and prudence, 
often at great personal cost, understandably resent subsidizing those who show less. 
 
 Fineman thoughtfully responds to these contentions with the argument that even if 
individuals “choose” to have children, this should “not be the end of the matter if what we 
are seeking is social justice or fairness” (Fineman 2004, 42).  Some conditions, she contends, 
                                                 
65On a related note, Case discusses an incident in law school that occurred when she attended a panel on 
varieties of legal practice. When she asked the panelists what types of practice would leave her enough time to 
pursue other interests, the female lawyer on the panel answered that she needn’t worry – her employers would 
accommodate childrearing. Case, however, had been referring to her passion to study the history of feminism. 
She says:  “[w]hen I tried to make this clear, sympathy for my position and predictions of my ability to 
accommodate it within law practice quickly dissipated” (Case 2001, 1767).  
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may be “just too oppressive or unfair to be imposed by society even if and when an 
individual openly agrees to or chooses them” (42).  Fineman’s argument therefore 
underscores the point that the state’s failure to support childrearing on the ground of parental 
choice would consign women to inequality, since they disproportionately care for them.  
Fineman also forces us to recognize the limits of consent in this context, pointing out that 
those who choose to have children do not necessarily consent to the way in which societal 
structures penalize parents, even if they know what these penalties are ahead of time (42-3).66  
 However, Fineman moves to somewhat murkier territory when she argues that the 
concept of “choice” needs to be qualified when discussing women’s decision to bear children 
because they make this decision under considerable social pressure (Fineman 2004, 41).  As 
Mary Anne Case points out, in liberal polities that envision citizens as rational decision-
makers, we hold people accountable for many decisions they make under equally constrained 
circumstances.67  For example, courts enforce individuals’ promises to repay bank loans and 
mortgages even when they are executed under dire financial circumstances.  Moreover, 
despite considerable social pressure on couples to marry, courts still enforce marital 
obligations during marriage.  To refrain from holding those who decide to have children (or 
even those who unintentionally get pregnant as a result of consensual sex) responsible as a 
result of social pressures varies too far from the notion that liberal citizens should be treated 
as responsible agents (Wax 2004).  
 A better way for the state to respond to the social pressure to bear children would 
combine two types of policies. The first would seek to lessen this social pressure by, for 
                                                 
66See also Williams 2001: “[T]he decision to have a child does not mean that [parents] willingly gave up paid 
employment because it was structured in a manner inconsistent with caretaking.” 
 
67Mary Anne Case (personal conversation 2003); see also Higgins 1997; Wax 2004.   
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example, ensuring that citizens had access to alternative life paths.68   The second would not 
relieve parents of their responsibility as a result of this pressure, but it would limit the 
consequences of this decision. Parents do and should accept the responsibility for children 
whom they bear.  Yet the consequences that follow from this should, as Fineman argues, 
result from caretaking within institutions supportive of that activity, rather than institutions 
that refuse to accommodate caretaking and that impose heavy limitations on caretakers’ life 
prospects. Viewing the situation in this light provides a rationale for state support of 
childrearing that still sees citizens as strong, responsible decisionmakers, although it also 
recognizes the limits on their autonomy. This view does not deny that most of those who 
have children have made a choice—albeit a constrained choice—to which they must live up 
to the extent of their ability. Yet it asserts that the consequences of this choice should be 
limited by the state’s own obligations to dependents. 
 
Feminist Alternatives to Public Support 
 
I have argued that society’s responsibility to protect the vulnerable mandates public 
support for caretaking.  The issue of caretaking, however, also powerfully implicates the 
value of sex equality (Crittenden 2001).  As feminists have long pointed out, through a 
complex combination of societal processes and expectations, most women in our society 
continue to assume caretaking roles in families that leave them socially and financially 
unequal to men, while most men continue to assume the role of primary breadwinner and the 
status and economic power that this role provides (Okin 1989a; MacKinnon 1989; McClain 
                                                 
68Ensuring that school-aged children were exposed to role models, both in literature and in real life, who had 
happy and productive lives without having children would be a promising start.   See also infra at pp. 102-03.   
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1999 2005).  Consequently, no solution to the carework issue can be attempted without 
thinking through its implications for sex equality.      
How should the liberal state respond to the issues of gender inequality associated with 
inevitable dependency?  Feminists have discussed this issue many times in a conversation 
that dates back to the 1970s.   In the course of this conversation, they have proposed three 
very different types of solutions.  The first of is an approach in which the state, itself, 
facilitates caretaking, such as the “supportive state” approach that I advocated earlier in the 
chapter.69  The second—which I will call the “parental parity” model – advocates policies 
that would shift carework within families so that women no longer assume a disproportionate 
share relative to men.  The third of these models –  which I will call the “anti-
repronormativity” model70 —calls for policies that would encourage women to consider 
other life options beside bearing and rearing children, since these tasks are so closely linked 
with sex inequality.  These three positions suggest very different routes for dealing with the 
inequality caused by women’s performing a disproportionate share of carework.  In this part, 
I assess the promise of each of these approaches, individually and collectively, to further the 
goods with which a liberal polity should be concerned.   I conclude that the public support 
model is central to solving the carework issue, but that it must be supplemented by 
components of both other approaches.   
                                                 
69The schema that I set out here is composed of ideal-types for the purpose of conceptual clarification.  It is not 
meant to, and does not, capture the complexity and depth of thought in individual feminists’ proposals on this 
issue.  
 
70The term “repronormativity” was coined by Katherine Franke to refer to the system of social incentives and 
pressures that lead women to bear children and to mother, and which treat these activities as natural and 
inevitable for women (2001, 183). 
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 Parental parity model 
 The first of the positions to emerge in feminist theory, the parental parity model, 
sought to solve the carework issue by adopting policies that would equalize the caretaking 
performed by men and women within families.71  Susan Okin espoused this approach in 
Justice, Gender and The Family (1989), when she argued that “any just and fair solution to 
the urgent problem of women’s and children’s vulnerability must encourage and facilitate the 
equal sharing by men and women of paid and unpaid work, of productive and reproductive 
labor” (171).  Okin’s work seeks a world in which “it would be a cause for surprise, and no 
little concern, if men and women were not equally responsible for domestic life or if children 
were to spend much more time with one parent than the other” (171).72 
 The parental parity position has a number of advantages. Achieving true equal 
distribution of carework between men and women would, of course, go a long way toward 
achieving sex equality. It would eliminate a large portion of the wage gap between the sexes, 
since the overwhelming portion of that gap comes from women’s greater caretaking 
responsibilities. 73  In addition, it would largely eliminate the existing gap in leisure time 
                                                 
71A recent variant of this approach would require that husbands compensate wives for performing housework 
rather than seek to redistribute housework within the family. See, for example, Ertman 1998 (proposing that 
premarital security agreements be used to value women’s greater carework), and Silbaugh 1996 (arguing that 
law should treat housework the same as paid work). This “spousal compensation” strategy, like the parental 
parity strategy, seeks to solve the carework issue within the family itself. It also bears a resemblance to the 
public subsidy model, discussed infra, in that it would subsidize women for performing the carework that 
women have traditionally performed, rather than redistributing that burden. In the case of the public subsidy 
model, however, the state rather than the partner pays.  
 
72As mentioned in note 69, my typology consists of ideal types for analytical purposes. An individual theorist’s 
work may fit into more than one of these categories. For example, I am here excerpting the portion of Okin’s 
proposal that fits the parental parity model. Other parts of her work comport with the public support model. See, 
for example, Okin 2004, 176 (“The facilitation and encouragement of equally shared parenting would require 
substantial changes. It would mean major changes in the workplace, all of which could be provided on an 
entirely (and not falsely) gender neutral basis.”). 
 
73See, for example, Alstott 2004; Crittenden 2001; Folbre 2001; Williams 2001; Case 2001. 
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between women and men.74  Further, because this approach seeks to shift responsibilities 
within the family, it at least theoretically would not require changes to institutions outside of 
the family. To some who advocate parental parity, including Mary Anne Case, this is the 
primary virtue of the position.75 To Case, shifting the burdens of childcare to the state or the 
labor market unfairly relieves fathers from the responsibilities they assumed at the child’s 
birth. In her words, “Precisely because I do not think that children should be simply women’s 
responsibility, I worry about localizing more of the responsibility for children, at least as a 
matter of law, at the level of the individual employer” (Case 2004, 1756).  
 Yet while such a limited version of parental parity, which demands no 
accommodation of institutions other than the family, is possible on a theoretical level, it fails 
on a practical level.76  Measures to persuade men to take on more caretaking will have little 
success without removing the significant disincentives that exist for men to perform this 
activity:77 among the most potent of these is the substantial financial penalty that caregivers 
currently suffer in the labor market.  Put another way, an approach that seeks to persuade 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
74See generally Hochschild 1989 (discussing the leisure gap between men and women in the United States).   
 
75As discussed infra, Case is probably best viewed as an anti-repronormativity theorist, even though she also 
espouses some parental parity views. 
 
76Fineman criticizes parental parity proposals as fundamentally misguided, at least partly for this reason. In her 
words, “[w]e must reject the notion that the problem of work/family conflict should be cast as the problem of a 
lack of equal sharing between women and men of domestic burdens within the family. We have gone down that 
road and it is a dead end. Our arguments for reform must now acknowledge that the societally constructed role 
of mother continues to exact unique costs for women”(2004, 171). Because of this, she contends, “[u]ntil the 
structures that make it so difficult and costly to combine caretaking responsibilities with paid work are changed, 
the status quo of family dynamics and workplace demands will continue to place women in a relatively 
disadvantageous position” (165). 
 
77As Ann Crittenden shows, even if the state were able to get men to assume considerably more responsibility 
for carework than they do now, but still less than women, women would likely still be penalized significantly. 
See Crittenden 2001, 94-103 (citing studies showing that women who had only briefly left the workplace for 
maternity leaves and who worked only slightly fewer hours than men working full-time still had significantly 
lower salaries than men).  
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men to assume more carework within families will ultimately founder if performing 
carework continues to be tied to significant penalties outside of families.  Thus, the success 
of the parental parity model, in practice, requires adopting some measures of the public 
support approach. As Fineman notes in advocating the public support model, “[b]y making 
nurturing and caretaking a central responsibility of the nonfamily arenas of life, we structure 
an equal opportunity to engage in nurturing and caretaking. Under these circumstances, men 
may actually be more likely to take time and energy from their market careers to invest in 
nurturing their families” (Fineman 2004, 201-02). 
 Leaving aside the practical need to adjust other institutions in order to implement the 
model, how does the limited goal of parental parity fare in terms of achieving goods besides 
sex equality with which a liberal democracy should concern itself? Measured in terms of the 
welfare of children and others with significant dependency needs, its success is questionable. 
Even if men could be persuaded to assume half of the caretaking burden, they and their 
female counterparts would still work in a labor market whose standards are constructed 
without reference to the needs of dependents.  As a result, the value and prestige of 
caregiving and the extent to which it is pursued in society would continue to suffer. This 
model also leaves workers who have significant caregiving responsibilities to rely on the 
quality of whatever substitute caregivers their finances permit them to employ; these 
caregivers may or may not be adequate to meet their dependents’ needs.78 Parental parity, 
moreover, would not lighten the load for the considerable numbers of single-mother families 
in which there is no man available to share the workload. 
                                                 
78In a discussion of paid daycare for children, Clare Huntington reports, “Only one in seven centers provides 
care that promotes child development, while seven in ten provide care that could compromise a child’s future 
learning abilities, and one in eight provides care that threatens a child’s health and safety.”  She notes that this 
ratio is even worse for care provided to infants and toddlers (Huntingon 1996, 102). 
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 Further, this system would continue to penalize workers with caregiving 
responsibilities to the extent that they cannot meet existing job structures.  Those who have 
significant caretaking responsibilities will continue to be assigned to marginal positions in 
the workplace, putting them and their dependents in economic peril, or worse, consigning 
them to receiving means-tested welfare benefits which (in our work-oriented society) subject 
them to stigmatization and exclusion. Given the inevitability and unpredictability of 
dependency, the failure to adapt the labor market to accommodate this condition means that 
all workers are subjected to a system in which having a close family member become 
dependent means the sudden loss of many rights and privileges.  
 Supplementing the parental parity approach with the public support model, however, 
ameliorates these stark disadvantages.  Not only would the public support model restructure 
institutions like the workplace to ensure that children and other dependents get the care they 
need, but it would also reduce the disincentives for men to perform carework since it would 
help eliminate the penalties parents currently suffer in the labor market.  
 
  Anti-repronormativity model 
 In the last few years, a new position has been sounded in the carework conversation, 
most prominently by Mary Anne Case of the University of Chicago, and Katherine Franke of 
Columbia Law School (Case 2001; Franke 2001).  Both argue that past discussion on this 
issue has assumed a special relationship among women, caretaking, and motherhood without 
questioning the inevitability of this relationship. Instead of ensuring that women are not 
penalized for their carework, Case and Franke argue that feminists should seek to disrupt the 
perceived naturalness of the link between women, caretaking, and motherhood, and to 
promote other life paths for women.  
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 As Katherine Franke explains this view, recent feminist calls for public support of 
carework have collapsed women’s identity into their roles as mothers, thereby reinforcing the 
“repronormativity” of motherhood (Franke 2001).  Rather than “incentivizing” (in Franke’s 
words) women’s relationships with children by rewarding them for having and caring for 
children, she argues that feminists should challenge the forces that conceive of these 
activities as women’s highest calling.  Until now, she contends, feminists have been 
unwilling to take on this project:  “To suggest that we reconceptualize procreation as a 
cultural preference rather than a biological imperative, and then explore ways in which to 
lessen or at least modify the demand to conform to that preference, is to initiate a 
conversation within feminism that has been explicitly and curtly rejected by some legal 
feminists” (184-85). 79   In a similar vein, Mary Anne Case argues that women must be given 
“a wider range of options for productive work” so that they will have alternative life paths 
aside from raising children (Case 2001,1781). 
 These theorists’ calls to disrupt the persistent association of women with mothering 
add an important, heretofore missing piece to the carework conversation. Case and Franke 
are particularly on-target when they challenge the assumption underlying much feminist 
theory that the decision to bear children is a virtuous, community-enhancing one that the 
government therefore should privilege and support. Both authors point out that a woman’s 
decision to have children often has little to do with altruistic impulses.80  They also 
persuasively argue that there are many other activities that contribute at least as much to the 
                                                 
79See also Franke 2001, 184 (“Is there any principled reason why legal feminists might not want to devote some 
attention to exposing the complex ways in which reproduction is incentivized and subsidized in ways that may 
bear upon the life choices women face? To ask such a question is to risk being labeled unfeminist.”). 
 
80See, for example, Franke 2001, 190 (“I suspect that if polled, mothers would rank a species-regarding reason 
well behind more private and personal motivations for their decisions to reproduce”).  
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public good as the decision to bear children.  In addition, their concern with challenging the 
vast array of cultural messages that suggest to women that the only way to have satisfying 
and productive lives is through parenthood is vital to women’s struggle to attain both 
freedom and equality.  As Franke and Case both recognize, significant cultural forces in 
women’s lives normalize the prospect of children, and suggest that women’s lives are 
incomplete without them. Given the strong link between rearing children and women’s 
inequality, questioning the necessity of the link is an important feminist project.   
 However, insofar as the two authors argue against state subsidization of childcare on 
these grounds, they translate this valuable insight into flawed public policy. Both Franke and 
Case raise concerns about subsidizing and accommodating carework on the ground that to do 
so might encourage women to have children.81 From the perspective of furthering women’s 
equality, this policy is deeply troubling. Roughly eighty percent of women become mothers 
at some time during their lives (Franke 2001, 196) and confront the profound economic and 
social disadvantages that attend caretaking responsibilities (see Crittenden 2001).  Insofar as 
the anti-repronormativity position seeks to dissuade these women from having children by 
decreasing assistance for caretaking, the likely result would be a dismal failure. If having 
women bear large costs in terms of economic and social inequality would deter them from 
having children, humanity would already have been threatened with extinction.82  Women’s 
                                                 
81See Franke 2001, 184; Case 2001, 1780, 1751 (warning that family-friendly workplace initiatives and 
government support for parents may “inflate the demand for reproduction relative to other activities,” and could 
therefore distort the choices of women who might prefer “to write a book or start a business or get an advanced 
degree instead of raising a(nother) child.”). 
 
82These claims bear a strong similarity to those made by opponents of welfare, who contend that increasing 
subsidies for children will encourage welfare mothers to bear more children. As an empirical matter, there is not 
much support for this proposition. Researchers have found, at most, only a small positive correlation between 
welfare and childbearing, and only for particular groups of women without high-school degrees (for example, 
Robins & Fronstin 1996). The existence of even this correlation, however, is hotly contested because of the 
difficulty of separating out conflating factors (for example, Fairlie & London 1997). 
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desires to have children – whether social, biological, or some mix of the two – have proved 
incredibly tenacious (Becker 2002).  Given that, while it makes sense to adopt measures to 
increase women’s understanding of and ability to withstand these pressures, failing to adopt 
public policy measures that accommodate women’s childrearing responsibilities would far 
more likely hurt than help the cause of women’s equality. 
 Moreover, the anti-repronormativity position that the state and private employers 
should not support caregiving ignores a central reality to which feminists have long 
demanded attention be paid:  dependency is an unavoidable condition in human lives, rather 
than simply a product of women’s choices.83  In Joan Tronto’s words, “Care is not a 
parochial concern of women, a type of secondary moral question, or the work of the least 
well off in society.  Care is a central concern of human life.  It is time that we began to 
change our political and social institutions to reflect this truth” (1993:80).  Even if women 
could be convinced that they don’t want to become pregnant, sometimes dependency just 
happens. Parents or partners fall ill. Unplanned pregnancies occur.  Public policy and the 
labor market could ignore the inevitability of dependency only because they were developed 
on the assumption that men have wives at home to deal with caretaking (see, for example, 
Frug 1979; Fraser 1997; Williams 2001; Eichner 1988).  As Tronto points out, it is through 
the exclusion of care as a core political and social value that “those who are powerful are 
able to demand that others care for them, and they have been able to maintain their positions 
of power and privilege” (1993: 179).  While this model is now described in gender-neutral 
terms, the job structures premised on this exclusion remain unchanged.  And it is these 
structures that anti-repronormativity advocates would allow to remain intact. 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
83In addition to Fineman, see, for example, Tronto 1993; Held 1990; Kittay 1999.   
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 As problematic as its implications for sex equality are, the anti-repronormativity 
argument against accommodation of childrearing would also hurt dependents. Although 
Mary Anne Case distinguishes between the state providing benefits directly to children, 
which she would support to further children’s welfare, and the state providing benefits to the 
parents of children, which she would oppose on the ground that it sets up incentives for 
women to have children, the effect on children’s welfare cannot be so neatly delineated.84  
Children and other dependents need far more than direct subsidies; they need care. Care 
theorists have amply demonstrated the primacy of the dependency relation to the well-being 
of the dependent (see, for example, Kittay 2001, 542).  The labor-market accommodation 
opposed by Case, to the extent that it deprives children and other dependents of care, would 
redound to their detriment.  
 Indeed, in arguing against accommodation for caretaking, Case presents a straitened 
view of the principles that should guide a liberal polity. While she pays lip service to the 
notion that care could serve as a legitimate public value (Case 2001, 1786), her essay over 
and over again presumes that a narrow version of a principle requiring equal treatment for all 
should trump all other decision-making principles.85  She therefore rejects the notion that a 
                                                 
84See Case 2001, 1783-84 (“I have already expressed my own view that neither employers nor the state should 
be giving parents anything – from tax breaks to time off to parking spaces . . . to housing to flexible schedules – 
merely because of the fact that they are parents. . . .  On the other hand, I would be inclined to look more 
favorably on the state spending money in monitorable and controlled ways on the child and socially useful 
things for the child.  This spending would not be formulated as payback to the parents but as direct benefit to 
the children.”). 
 
85See Case 2001, 1767 (“The difficulty I have experienced goes beyond privileging certain kinds of family over 
others, and more broadly extends to a privileging of family matters over an employee’s other life concerns.”); 
1768-69 (“If there must be legislation on parental status discrimination, I agree with Elinor Burkett about its 
scope.   [According to] Burkett . . . [l]ast time I checked, discrimination law generally cut both ways.  We don’t 
bar discrimination against women; we bar discrimination on the basis of gender, and so on.  So why single out 
parents?  Why not bar discrimination on the basis of family status?  Why not make it illegal to presuppose that a 
nonparent is free to work the night shift or presuppose that nonparents are more able to work on Christmas than 
parents?”; 1769 (“I note that much that is complained of is not as a technical matter discrimination against 
parents, but rather a failure to discriminate in their favor.  Consider the oft-cited case of the mother fired for her 
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good polity might prioritize care for the vulnerable, accommodate citizens’ moral 
responsibilities,86 or seek to develop the capacities of its future citizens, without equally 
accommodating other activities in which citizens choose to engage.  Case’s description of the 
reasons that society should extend certain subsidies to children exemplifies the paucity of her 
view.  She would frame the reasons for support to children as “a stop-loss possibility, as a 
need to reduce negative externalities from (some) reproductive activities . . . .  Particularly 
convincing are, for example, statistics on the comparative costs of maintaining young people 
in school or in prison, and of good pre-natal care versus medical intervention to fix damage 
to children after birth” (Case 2001, 1785).  Absent from her account is any description of the 
more positive reasons for extending such subsidies or any thicker sense of collective purpose 
that would justify state support.87 
 
  Public support model 
 In contrast, the public support model is premised on the view that society has a 
responsibility to address dependency, and should therefore structure its institutions in ways 
that make caretaking possible. As Martha Fineman argues, there is little hope for achieving 
sex equality without public support for carework:  so long as women continue to bear an 
                                                                                                                                                       
inability to do required overtime because of childcare responsibilities.  There is no evidence that a worker with 
a different reason for being unavailable would have kept her job.  What is being sought on behalf of such 
parents really is something more like “special rights”. . . .).  See also Becker 2002, 96 (noting that Case “seems 
uncomfortable with values” and wants the state “to act in a value-neutral manner.”). 
 
86A sizeable contingent of political theorists have begun to make the case for the importance of fulfilling such 
responsibilities to a well-functioning democracy.  See, for example, Galston 1991; Taylor 1985; Spragens 2001; 
see also Berlin 1969.  
 
87In this regard, Case’s rationale for collective responsibility sounds much like Hobbes’ description of the 
reasons that men should join together in a commonwealth in the first place, “for their own preservation, and 
[for] a more contented life thereby; that is to say, [for] getting themselves out from that miserable condition of 
war, which is necessarily consequent . . . to the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep 
them in awe” (Hobbes, 106). 
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unequal share of caretaking responsibilities, they cannot attain equal status with men if 
societal prerogatives continue to be denied based on these responsibilities.  And, as discussed 
supra,88 getting men to assume more responsibility for caretaking is unlikely in the absence 
of public support to eliminate the significant penalties now incurred by caregivers.   
 Further, insofar as feminism seeks to transform society to truly accommodate both 
men and women, Fineman is right that it must transform those public institutions that remain 
premised on traditionally male life patterns and that award prerogatives to those who most 
closely enact these life patterns. This system, in Nancy Fraser’s words, “delivers the best 
outcomes to women whose lives most closely resemble the male half of the old family wage 
ideal couple.  It is especially good to childless women and to women without other major 
domestic responsibilities” (Fraser 1997, 53).  Because most women do not fall into this 
group, as a class they fare poorly.  This standard, moreover, subjects people to a 
“dependency lottery” in which those who manage to go through life without having to take 
on caretaking responsibilities win big and are awarded social prerogatives.  Correspondingly, 
those who lose – mostly women – lose big. Not only are those who find themselves in 
caretaking roles deprived of the salary and accompanying benefits of a job, they are also 
marginalized in a system that esteems the breadwinner role while it accords far less social 
value to the caretaker’s.89  
 The public support model not only contributes to sex equality, it also supports the 
needs of dependents.  In situations in which existing work standards do not accommodate 
family responsibilities, public support can mean the difference between adequate support and 
                                                 
88See supra at p. 2. 
 
89“An employment-centered model, even a feminist one, has a hard time constructing an honorable status for 
those it defines as ‘nonworkers’” (Fraser 1997, 54). 
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no support at all.  By the same token, it is only this model that would help the rising number 
of single parent families in which there is no other parent to provide support or to whom 
carework can be redistributed.  
 
  Methods of public support: direct subsidies versus public integration 
With that said, all public support is not similarly situated with respect to furthering 
sex equality.  In this regard, it is important to distinguish between two different kinds of 
support that the welfare state can provide.  In the first of these, which I will call the “direct 
subsidy” approach, the state directly subsidizes caretakers for performing carework in family 
settings.  In the second, which I will call the “public integration” approach, the state 
accommodates societal institutions, like the labor market, to the demands of caretaking.   
Although both approaches posit the need for public support, they envision very different 
roles for caretaking and for the role of the state with respect to carework.  Of these two 
approaches, I hope to persuade the reader that the public integration approach better furthers 
the normative purposes of a liberal polity.  
 As Nancy Fraser (1997, 41) points out, welfare systems are inevitably constructed on 
a particular normative vision of social organization.  The New Deal era introduced a model 
of the welfare state that dominated for more than three generations, and that was built on the 
presumption that citizens lived in families comprised of a breadwinner married to a caretaker 
and their biological or adopted children. Events in recent years have at least partially forced 
the demise of this breadwinner-married-to-caretaker model, as policymakers were confronted 
with the recognition that it did not conform to the far more varied groupings in which people 
lived their lives.90  Yet rather than moving toward a model that better accommodates 
                                                 
90In fact, Stephanie Coontz (2000) argues that the assumptions that this mode of family organization ever 
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citizens’ lived reality, recent revisions of welfare policy have turned to a model that 
presumes that everybody should be a breadwinner.  As Martha Fineman has demonstrated, in 
adopting this new “universal breadwinner” model, 91 current welfare policy fails to give 
caretaking the support it both requires and merits. 
Yet if both the traditional breadwinner-married-to-caretaker model and its successor, 
the universal breadwinner model, are predicated on problematic normative conceptions, on 
what alternative conception should the welfare state be premised?  The two variants of the 
public support model that I laid out above – the direct support and public integration 
approaches – although both versions of the public support model, answer this question very 
differently.  The direct subsidy approach is constructed on the view that caregivers should 
continue to provide care in much the same way that caregivers in the traditional breadwinner-
married-to-caretaker model did. This approach assumes that citizens who have significant 
caretaking responsibilities, like the housewives of yore, will either drop out of the paid labor 
market completely or at least become marginal figures in that market. In this approach, the 
labor market is not required to change, and caregiving is still to be performed largely by 
family members in private homes. The big difference between the traditional model and this 
approach is that now caregivers will receive money for their work from the state rather than 
from their husbands.  This approach might therefore be envisioned as taking the old family 
picture of the breadwinner-married-to-caregiver, and replacing the breadwinner’s picture 
with that of the state.   
                                                                                                                                                       
represented the norm in the United States is largely a myth:  the form was applicable only to a small class of 
people for a brief period of time. 
 
91This terminology is Nancy Fraser’s (1997, 41, 51). 
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 In contrast, the public integration approach, while it also envisions the state as an 
integral partner, calls for the state to structure societal institutions in ways that enable citizens 
to integrate both the roles of caregiver and breadwinner into their lives. This approach 
therefore requires significant changes to institutions beyond the family, including, most 
importantly, the labor market, in order to accommodate caretaking responsibilities. Put 
another way, it replaces the old picture of the breadwinner married to the caretaker with one 
in which citizens are each, individually, both breadwinners and caretakers.  
 Unlike the old breadwinner-married-to-caretaker model and the prevailing universal 
breadwinner model, both the direct subsidy and public integration models have the virtue of 
public support for caretaking. Both also have the advantage of providing this support to 
single-parent and other non-traditional families, an important feature given that most 
contemporary families do not comport with the traditional family model.92 Of these two 
models, however, the public integration model is a significantly better choice for several 
reasons.93  
 First, the public integration model has particular features that give it an edge in 
achieving sex equality.  Since the public integration model does not require caregivers to 
completely drop their work identities, it makes men more likely to engage in carework than 
does the public subsidy model.  Further, women are more likely to achieve financial equality 
under the public integration model. Even the most generous direct public subsidy proposals 
                                                 
92See supra, Introduction, at pp. 2-3. 
 
93Other scholars have also reached the conclusion that a welfare system that allows individuals to combine 
caretaking and breadwinning offers the best prospect for fostering both caretaking and equality. See, for 
example, McClain 2005 (forthcoming) ( (“A better resolution is to support and recognize care as a public value 
in a way that facilitates both women and men integrating family and employment.”); Gornick & Meyers,  84-
111 (seeking a “dual-earner-dual-career society”). 
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generally seek replacement only of wages and benefits for the period of caretaking.94 Under 
these proposals, the caretaker is not compensated for the considerable loss of opportunity to 
increase her skills and broaden her experiences during this time. As economists have shown, 
however, even small amounts of time taken out of the job market generally results in large 
financial losses for the mothers who take them, and considerably diminished financial 
prospects for the rest of their lifetimes.  Most of these losses would remain unredressed under 
direct support proposals (Crittenden 2001).  In addition, as Vicki Schultz (2000, 1883) 
eloquently discusses, structuring societal institutions in a manner that allows those with 
significant caretaking responsibilities to hold paid work would allow women opportunities 
for self-fulfillment, self-definition and to realize aspirations in the larger world that have 
largely been foreclosed to them until now. 95 
 Second, the public integration approach better combats the destructive complex of 
myths about care that pervade United States culture. As Martha Fineman persuasively argues, 
our society loudly trumpets the myth of autonomy. But her analysis focuses on only one – 
albeit the loudest – of the cultural messages that circulate regarding care.  The counterpoint 
to this message, sounded less loudly than the autonomy myth but still quite audibly, does 
more than proclaim the importance of caretaking – it announces it to be women’s highest 
calling.96  It is this strand of the cultural conversation that gives Case’s and Franke’s critique 
of heterorepronormativity such traction (Case 2001; Franke 2001).  In this narrative, children 
(in contrast to their complete disappearance in the narrative sounding in autonomy) are 
                                                 
94See infra note 2. 
 
95See also Becker 2002, 1505-11. 
 
96It is this strand that both Mary Anne Case and Katharine Franke tap into when they talk about the pressures of 
repronormativity, and which gives their critique such traction.  See also Hays 1996. 
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presented as society’s greatest treasure, deserving and requiring the complete attention of 
their caretakers to fulfill their potential. According to this view, women must sacrifice their 
careers as well as years of their lives to fulfill their role as mothers adequately. Those 
mothers who fail to give their children virtually unlimited care and attention are seen as 
selfish, and their children doomed to a life of failure.97  
 Any adequate prescription for dealing with the carework issue needs to grapple with 
the complexity and contradictions of these cultural messages, recognizing the dominance of 
the autonomy myth, but also the fetishization of care in other strands.  The public integration 
approach, in my view, accomplishes this better than its direct subsidy counterpart.  The 
former recognizes the importance of carework without presuming that women must withdraw 
from the rest of the world to be good mothers or caretakers. At the same time, in contrast to 
the direct subsidy model, it contests the ideology that work and family occupy separate and 
exclusive spheres.  Instead, the public integration model posits that paid work and caretaking 
are not fundamentally incompatible pursuits, given sufficient adjustments to the way in 
which both the labor market and families operate.98  Indeed, the view that work and 
                                                 
97See, for example, Suzanne Venker, Seven Myths of Working Mothers: Why Children and (Most) Careers Just 
Don’t Mix (2004) (arguing that motherhood is a full-time job that women should choose over a career; linking 
the problems of today’s children and the absence of mothers); Mary Eberstadt, Home-Alone America: The 
Hidden Toll of Day Care, Behavioral Drugs, and Other Parent Substitutes (2004) (arguing against day-care and 
working motherhood); Laura Schlessinger, Parenthood By Proxy: Don’t Have Them If You Won’t Raise Them 
(2000) (couples who both work should not have children; those who do are self-centered and contribute to the 
moral decline of society);  Robert Shaw, The Epidemic: The Rot of American Culture, Absentee and Permissive 
Parenting, and the Resultant Plague of Joyless, Selfish Children (2003) ( title speaks for itself). Judith Warner’s 
recent book, Perfect Madness: Motherhood in the Age of Anxiety (2005), critiques the costs to women of an 
intensive mothering model and interprets it as women’s  individualized responses to the lack of public support 
for childrearing.   
 
98Baker 1997, 1521-22 (“Supporting the idea of gendered caretaking, without striving to integrate the needs to 
caretake into the world of public work will do nothing to tear down the divide between caretakers and the 
noncaretakers. The caretakers, despite the support they may receive from the state, will not be able to compete 
with those that do not caretake . . . When the dependency has run its course or when the caretaker wants to 
choose a less caretaking-intensive lifestyle, her options are going to be severely limited. She opted out of the 
noncaretaking world, and by doing so she seriously compromised her ability to integrate herself back into a 
more public life.”). 
 96 
caretaking are mutually exclusive has largely been restricted by race and class:  minority and 
working-class women have historically not had the luxury of believing that they could not 
combine raising children and paid work.99  The public integration model dispels this view by 
asserting that mothering and breadwinning roles can coexist, thereby allowing women to 
assume places in the public realm. 
 Third, the public integration approach ensures that children’s needs are met, but not 
fetishized.  The approach supports the ability of parents to spend significant amounts of time 
with their children, but not every hour of the day, and not to the exclusion of all else. In this 
model, children would likely spend some time in group care arrangements, but significantly 
less time than if they had parents working full-time under the current system. This approach 
therefore has the virtue of recognizing the importance of parents’ relationships with their 
children and supporting that relationship, while also recognizing the value of children 
spending time with other adults and children.100 Children who regularly spend time in group 
care arrangements are more likely to form bonds with others and less likely to fall victim to 
the “over-appreciated child” syndrome in which they have difficulty functioning without the 
constant attention on which they come to rely.101   
   
                                                                                                                                                       
 
99For example, in the years between 1961 and 1965, 65.7% of white women quit their jobs on the birth of a 
child, compared to 39% of black women (Taeuber 1996, 110).  
 
100Hooks 1984, 144 (advocating childrearing as a community activity, in contrast to the “idea that parents, 
especially mothers, should be the only childrearers”);  see also Card 1990 (noting that community childrearing 
may take place more commonly than acknowledged, and  has yet to receive fair consideration as an alternative). 
 
101Baker 1997, 1518 (noting studies that show that children reared in community caretaking institutions are less 
demanding of parents, have strong moral development, and are able to navigate new environments); Riylin 
2004. 
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 Toward A Unified Approach to the Carework Issue 
 The public support approach, taken alone, however, creates some problems for the 
liberal state.   Even assuming that a public support model were completely implemented, the 
parental parity model’s goal of an equal division of caretaking between the sexes would still 
be important to achieving sex equality for several reasons. First, repeated experience shows 
that tasks performed by women tend to retain low status until men assume them (Baker 1997; 
Eichner 1988, 1401-02).  Until more men take on caretaking, it is therefore likely to continue 
to be seen as low status “women’s work.” Second, as a practical matter, it is difficult to 
imagine that even a state that adopts a public support model will subsidize caretaking to such 
an extent that caretakers will experience no societal penalties whatsoever.102  Because of this, 
even feminists who favor a public support approach should push for parental parity so that 
both sexes share this remaining burden equally. Third, equal sharing of carework is also 
important to allow women the same amount of leisure time that men have to enjoy 
themselves, to sustain themselves, and to develop their capabilities. The goal of parental 
parity therefore not only does not stand in tension with the public support model, it should be 
pursued as a complementary strategy.  
 The liberal state should adopt a more cautious stance toward the measures advocated 
by anti-repronormativity theorists – accepting some and rejecting others. The project of 
deconstructing the reflexive association of women with motherhood by making alternative 
life courses visible and viable is crucial to pursue in concert with the public support 
                                                 
102Even more ambitious proposals to subsidize family leave, for example, do not suggest compensation for 
caregivers’ opportunity loss in the market.  Anne Alstott’s work (2004) is a notable exception.  Alstott argues 
for a “caretaker resource account” to compensate parents for opportunities they lose as a consequence of 
caretaking.  Alstott proposes that the caretakers of children under age 13 be given annual grants of $5,000, 
which they may use for child care, education, or retirement savings.  Even she, however, proposes a level of 
compensation for caregivers’ opportunity costs that is well below most caregivers’ actual opportunity cost for 
caregiving.  See Crittenden (2001) for a discussion of those costs. 
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approach.  Without it, a public support approach runs the risk of further solidifying this 
association.  No doubt some tension exists between public initiatives that support caregiving, 
which emphasize the importance of caregiving, and anti-repronormativity proposals, which 
emphasize the value of other life paths. But this tension, in my view, is both healthy and 
necessary, and can be mitigated by a more nuanced account than is usually offered.  Such an 
account would make clear that neither childbearing nor childrearing is a woman’s necessary 
or highest calling. Yet once children exist, caring for them, and caring for other dependents, 
is a critical responsibility that must be taken seriously by parents, other family members, and 
society. This analysis does not fetishize children, motherhood, or childrearing, yet it still 
recognizes the importance and dignity of carework. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Acknowledging the fact of dependency in human lives requires recognizing that a 
sound liberal polity must do more than simply safeguard individual rights in order to respect 
the human dignity of its citizens.  This brings the state’s role with respect to families into 
focus.  Insofar as it is families who assume the day-to-day responsibility for caretaking (or 
arranging the caretaking) for dependents in our society, the state’s responsibility to these 
dependent citizens requires that it support families and facilitate this caretaking.  And as I 
discuss in the next chapter, it is not only dependents that need care: even able adults need 
care to some greater or lesser degree over the course of their lives.  How the liberal state 
should respond to relationships between adults as a result of these dependency needs is the 
subject of chapter 4.  
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
FAMILIES, THE STATE, AND RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ADULTS 
 
In the last chapter, I discussed the state’s position with respect to those relationships 
that might be called “vertical relationships,” in which one member is a caretaker and the 
other a dependent, such as the relationship between a parent and a young child, or an adult 
child and an aging parent.   In this chapter, I turn to intimate relationships between generally 
able adults, or what might be called “horizontal relationships.”  In these relationships, what 
role, if any, should the liberal state play?   Should the state distance itself from them on the 
rationale that adults should be left to order their own relationships?  Or, as with vertical 
relationships, should the state positively support such relationships?  And, assuming that the 
state should seek to support relationships between adults, should it treat all types of such 
relationships in the same way, or may it and should it favor some over others?  
 
 
Theoretical Positions 
To help think through these questions, I again use Martha Fineman and William 
Galston as interlocutors.  The two theorists have almost diametrically opposed perspectives 
on these issues.  Fineman argues that the state has no business with respect to relationships 
between able adults, and should instead invest its efforts in supporting caretaker-dependent 
relationships.  In arguing that the state should eliminate marriage as a legal status, she 
receives support from queer theorists, including Michael Warner.  Galston, meanwhile, 
argues that the liberal state should privilege marriage and two-parent families because they 
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provide the best environment in which to raise children and contribute to a stable, well-
ordered polity.  In doing so, his work bears some similarity to the work of social 
conservatives, including the Council on Family Law,103 an organization chaired by Mary Ann 
Glendon, a Harvard Law professor who has been associated with both communitarian and 
conservative perspectives. 
 
 Fineman and Warner—The Case Against Marriage 
 
No feminist theorist has taken a stronger stance against civil marriage than Martha 
Fineman.104  Fineman takes her insights regarding the inevitability of dependency to new and 
original places when she uses it to critique the privileges given to the marital family in the 
United States.  Current public policy privileges and subsidizes married couples, she argues, 
based on the autonomy myth—here applied to how families, rather than individuals, should 
function (Fineman 2004, 57). According to this myth, the marital family is seen as a strong 
and independent unit that does not need state support.  Because of this presumption of 
autonomy, Fineman points out with irony, married couples receive hundreds, if not 
thousands, of subsidies and privileges from the state that are unavailable to others (104-
05).105    
Fineman contends that this policy of supporting the marital family is misguided on 
several grounds.  First, she contends that all humans are inevitably needy.  As a result, 
complete autonomy is possible for no one, including married couples.  In contemporary 
                                                 
103The Council on Family Law is jointly sponsored by the Institute for American Values, the Institute for 
Marriage and Public Policy, and the Institute for the Study of Marriage, Law, and Culture.   
 
104Fineman’s views on this issue have received significant critical debate.  See, for example, Scott 2004; 
Shanley 2004.    
 
105See also Dougherty 2004 (listing marital benefits under federal and Massachusetts law).   
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society, everyone exists within a web of institutions that provide for at least some of his or 
her needs.  For this reason, she argues, the pursuit of autonomy should be abandoned in favor 
of insuring that human needs are humanely and justly met for all citizens, not just those in 
families (199, 285).   
Fineman also criticizes other justifications for the multitude of benefits currently 
awarded to married couples.  Insofar as the state focuses on the marital family to support 
childrearing, Fineman contends, it is sorely out-of-touch: large portions of the population 
raise children out of wedlock, while, at the same time, many married couples choose to 
remain childless (67, 110-112).  A state that truly seeks to support the welfare of children 
should therefore support childrearing in all the contexts in which it occurs, not just for 
children whose parents are married (xvii).  And insofar as the state subsidizes the marital 
family because it represents the majority’s views of how people should order their lives, 
Fineman contends, its actions are illegitimate:  In a diverse and secular society, the state 
should not privilege one form of affiliation over others simply because that affiliation better 
comports with the private morality of the majority of citizens (105).  On top of that, Fineman 
points out, the state’s current support for the institution of marriage overlooks significant 
problems with that institution, most obviously that it is an institution to which (at least until 
recently, and in most places still) only heterosexual couples are admitted, and that it is rife 
with sex inequality.  On this latter point, she argues that public policy that encourages 
marriage for the sake of children demonstrates the state’s willingness to sacrifice women’s 
interests for children’s (88).  
Fineman argues that instead of subsidizing a particular type of family, i.e., the marital 
family, the liberal state should subsidize the particular functions that it has a legitimate 
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interest in supporting, in whatever relationships these functions take place.106   This means, 
for Fineman, that the state should not seek to further its interest in childrearing through 
privileging the marital family grouping, as it currently does; instead, it should subsidize the 
caretaker-dependent relationship directly in whatever type of configuration in which it occurs 
(67).107  In contrast, Fineman argues that the state has no legitimate stake in furthering 
relationships between capable adults.  In her words, “Why create policies based on a 
seriously weakened family affiliation – the marital couple – when it is really caretaking that 
we as a society should want to ensure?  Society has a responsibility to adjust to these 
changing patterns of behavior by guaranteeing that the emerging family forms are supported 
in performing the tasks we would have them assume”(67).  As a result, Fineman asserts, the 
state should eliminate civil marriage as a legal institution (122).108  In the new regime she 
proposes, legal relationships between adults would be governed by private contracts 
negotiated between them.  This would leave marriage as a purely religious institution for 
those couples who choose to have religious ceremonies.   
Fineman’s view that the state should eliminate civil marriage bears a strong affinity to 
arguments made by queer theorists, including Michael Warner.  In arguing for the abolition 
of state-sponsored marriage, Warner contends that the purpose of marriage is to privilege and 
promote a particular, monogamous model of heterosexual sexuality, and to stigmatize all 
other models as morally tainted (1999).   According to Warner, this represents the blatant 
                                                 
106“It is time to build our family policy around these emerging norms, to focus not on form but on the function 
we want families to perform” (67). See also 68, 105, 107.  
 
107See also xix, 108, 138    
 
108“I argue that for all relevant and appropriate societal purposes, we do not need marriage and we should 
abolish it as a legal category.  I argue that we should transfer the social and economic subsidies and privilege 
that marriage now receives to a new family core connection – that of the caretaker-dependent” (122).  
 
 103 
imposition of the majority’s view of what is morally proper on the minority.  Warner resists 
the notion that the state should serve as an instrument of moral judgment, granting 
“legitimacy to some kinds of consensual sex but not others or to confer respectability on 
some people’s sexuality but not others” (123).  He argues that instead of calling for same-sex 
marriage, gays and others who perceive themselves as queer should be striving for “[t]he 
ability to imagine and cultivate forms of the good life that do not conform to the dominant 
pattern” (123). 
Galston and the Council on Family Law – The Case for Marriage 
Fineman’s and Warner’s arguments against marriage stand in stark contrast to 
arguments favoring marriage from civic liberal William Galston, as well as from the Council 
of Family Law.   In the context of condemning out-of-wedlock births for their negative 
consequences on children, Galston argues against the view that marriage is a failed social 
institution that the state should abandon as a means to redress societal problems.  In his 
words, marriage: 
is not a panacea, but it is a vital part of the solution. In at least a majority of cases, 
marriage can make a positive contribution, not only to the well-being of children, but 
also to the well-being of their parents. 
 
Does this represent nostalgia? Does it imply the reaffirmation of patriarchy? On the 
contrary: it means the simple recognition that for economic, emotional and 
developmental reasons, marriage is the most promising institution yet devised for 
raising children and forming caring, competent, responsible adults. . . .  I am deeply 
skeptical that the abolition of marriage, with all of its imperfections, can possibly 
yield better lives, or a better society for our children (1996, 323). 
 
Despite Galston’s having served as domestic policy advisor for the Clinton 
administration, his view that the state should promote the marital relationship bears a 
significant resemblance to the policies advocated by the socially conservative Council of 
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Family Law, although some of its rationales vary from Galston’s.  In its recent report, “The 
Future of Family Law” (2005), the Council argues that marriage should continue to be the 
state’s privileged institution for relationships between adults.  That report argues that “at its 
core marriage has always had something to do with societies’ recognition of the fundamental 
importance of the sexual ecology of human life: humanity is male and female, men and 
women often have sex, babies often result, and those babies, on average, seem to do better 
when their mother and father cooperate in their care” (13).  This understanding of marriage – 
the promotion of a stable framework for biological parents procreating and raising children – 
the report argues, should continue to be promoted by the state.   
The report therefore decries proposals like Fineman’s that argue for state 
disengagement from marriage.  To do so, the Council asserts, sounding a chord of Galston’s, 
“denies the state’s legitimate and serious interest in marriage as our most important child-
protecting social institution and as an institution that helps protect and sustain liberal 
democracy” (6).  The Council also argues against proposals that seek to expand the 
relationships eligible for state support beyond married couples.  According to the Council, 
expanding the category of relationships entitled to state recognition would unwisely 
“celebrate relationship diversity” to the exclusion of fostering the important goals that have 
traditionally been supported in marriage (40).  To treat relationships that have not been 
formalized as the equivalent of marriage, the Council argues, would not only undercut 
couples’ own intent regarding the effects of their relationships, it would also fail to 
encourage couples to enter into formal commitments, and would therefore miss an important 
opportunity for the state to encourage the stability of their relationships and the welfare of 
any children who result from them (24-25).   
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The Council also argues against expanding marriage to same-sex couples.109  To do 
so, the report contends, would “strip[] all remaining remnants of sex, gender, and 
procreativity from the public, shared meaning of marriage”(26).  It would therefore, 
according to the report, fail to recognize “the specificity of marriage as a form of life 
struggling with the unique challenges of bonding sexual difference and caring for children 
who are the products of unions” (21). 
 
Assessing the State’s Interest in Horizontal Relationships 
What should we make of these diametrically opposed arguments regarding 
the position that the state should take with respect to relationships between adults?  
How should we evaluate, on the one hand, Fineman and Warner’s claim that the 
state’s recognizing and privileging certain family forms over others constitutes an 
illegitimate attempt to impose the majority’s own morality on the minority, and, on 
the other hand, Galston’s and the Council of Family Law’s claim that the state’s 
privileging the marital family serves the important public end of promoting 
children’s welfare?  And how should we deal with the fact that marriage is still, as 
                                                 
109In doing so, they depart from Galston’s position.  In a recent article, Galston suggests that he supports states’ 
freedom to expand marriage beyond its current boundaries:    
  
It remains to be seen whether the evolving constitutional jurisprudence will ultimately strike down 
prohibitions on same-sex marriage. The push for a federal constitutional amendment defining marriage 
as the union of one man and one woman reflects social conservatives' fears about just such an outcome. 
By contrast, many advocates of gay marriage would be satisfied with a state-by-state approach, which 
would inevitably yield long-term differences among the states on this matter.  The debate over the right 
of public authorities to enforce uniformity on the institutions of civil society is far less settled. I agree 
with [Peter] Schuck when he insists that "the distinction between public and private morality, between 
the values laws should mandate and those it should leave to the disparate choices of a diverse civil 
society, lies at the core of a liberal society,"  and that "the diversity that flows from the[] exercise of 
individual freedom is presumptively valid." I also agree with Schuck's application of this principle to 
the freedom of association: “[I]f valuing diversity in a liberal society means anything, it means 
assuring people's freedom to form exclusive groups that embrace unpopular beliefs in ways permitted 
by the Constitution and without undue interference by the law" (2005, 19). 
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Fineman reminds us, both an exclusionary institution and one that is riddled with sex 
inequality? 
My view is that there are particular elements of each of these positions that a 
vigorous liberal democratic polity should seek to draw upon – although many that 
should be rejected, as well.  Fineman is certainly right that autonomy is possible for 
no one, adults as well as children, and that the state should abandon the quest for the 
pursuit of autonomy in favor of insuring that human needs are met with justice and 
dignity.  Yet, precisely contrary to Fineman, this gives the state an important stake in 
relationships between adults.110  As care theorists have made abundantly clear,111 it is 
not just children and others who are inevitably dependent who need care:112  All 
humans need care, even generally-healthy adults. And as our society is organized, 
some large portion of that care comes, if it comes at all, from other adults with whom 
we share close relationships.  In such “horizontal” relationships, neither person is 
always the caretaker or the dependent, as they are in vertical relationships.  Instead, 
adult-adult relationships are, at their best, marked by what might be called 
“reciprocal dependency,” in which each partner sometimes performs caretaking 
activities for the other and meets the other’s dependency needs; in turn, their partner 
does the same for them at other times.  These relationships, when they function well, 
involve countless small acts in which each adult takes care of the other: one partner 
                                                 
110McClain 2003 (“To do [otherwise] seems to undervalue adult-adult interdependency and to miss the 
important facilitative role government may play in supporting such forms of adult affiliation”); see also Becker 
2002, 62.  
 
111See, for example, Kittay 1999; Tronto 1993.   
 
112As discussed supra in chapter 3, Fineman uses the term “inevitable dependency” to refer to the biological 
dependency that occurs always in children, often in old age, and at other points in many citizens’ lives as a 
result of illness (Fineman 2004, xvii, 35-36). 
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makes the other a cup of coffee when they get up; the other drops off dry-cleaning on 
the way to work; one runs to the store for cold medicine when the other is sick; and 
so on.113   
This sort of caretaking, at its best, produces a society in which adults are knit 
into webs of care that help them to support one another.  In these webs, one partner’s 
cold doesn’t develop into something worse because the other partner insists on taking 
them to see a doctor.  Moreover, such caretaking helps keep families stable so that 
partners are there for one another at times when one of them has greater needs, such as 
periods of disability.  The state has an interest in these relationships because of its 
interest in the dignity of its citizens, not to mention their health and well-being of its 
citizens.  Because of this, although the state does not have the same threshold duty to 
ensure the welfare of able adults that it has to those who are dependent, it is still wise 
policy for the state to foster these relationships.   
By the same token, Warner, it seems to me, gets it only partly right:  He is on 
firm ground in arguing that the state should not be used as a vehicle to promote the 
majority’s own comprehensive views with respect to citizens’ private lives.  Yet while 
the liberal state should therefore seek to accord broad freedom to all types of consensual 
relationships, it can still recognize that stable caretaking relationships are important to 
the welfare of the polity.  On this ground, the state may legitimately seek to offer 
privileges to such relationships.   
                                                 
113This is not to say that in all, or even most, horizontal relationships between women and men the carework is 
evenly divided. Studies have repeatedly shown that women spend significantly more time caretaking than men, 
even when women work outside the home.  See, for example, Hochschild 1989, 271-78; see also Baker 1997, 
1512 n.63.  There is some suggestion, however, that the deficit between men and women has been decreasing 
slightly.  See, for example, Schultz 2000, 1906-07.  
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Turning to the other side of this debate, there is some validity to Galston and the 
Council on Family Law’s positions, in my view, although Galston comes significantly closer 
to the target than does the Council.  The liberal democratic state, as both Galston and the 
Council argue, should be able to privilege some relationships over others for public ends.  
And certainly creating a stable environment for children is such an end: all other things being 
equal, stable family relationships are better for children than unstable or nonexistent 
relationships.  Further, while many of the greater difficulties associated with single-parent 
families are attributable to lack of adequate legal and social supports,114 having the emotional 
and financial resources of two loving adults available to a child, again, all other things being 
equal,115 is better than having the resources of just one.  In my view, as well, both Galston 
and the Council make valuable points about the important role that the state can have through 
formalizing and privileging relationships such as marriage in creating an environment that 
fosters the caretaking of citizens generally, as well as children specifically.   
Yet, in focusing on the state’s promoting marriage (and, in the Council’s case, solely 
heterosexual marriage), they too narrowly define the relationships that should be accorded 
such privileges by the state.116  The Council argues that advocates who support the state’s 
awarding privileges to a broader category of relationships than marriage miss “the specificity 
                                                 
114See, for example, Dowd (1995). 
 
115The caveat of “all other things being equal” is a significant one.  I am not arguing that having two parents 
who are unhappy stay together is better for children than having them separate.  I am making the more modest 
claim that, for a child, having two happy parents living together is generally better than having one happy parent 
because of the extra emotional, caretaking, and financial resources they can contribute.  Moreover, having two 
parents who live together happily is, all other things being equal, generally better for a child than having two 
parents who live happily apart.  See, for example, studies cited in Galston 1997.   
 
116To be fair, while Galston argues in favor of shoring up marriage and discouraging divorce, he would extend 
other policy measures that he advocates such as making work and family more compatible, and offering tax 
breaks to anyone with children, to many types of families, not simply families headed by a married couple 
(Kamarck and Galston 1992, 153).  See also Galston 1996.        
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of marriage as a form of life struggling with the unique challenges of bonding sexual 
difference and caring for children who are the products of unions” (21).  Yet the Council 
gives no convincing reason why the disparate issues of “bonding sexual difference” and 
caring for children must be tied together into the package of marriage, and, indeed, why the 
state shouldn’t make available, as well, other packages that promote other legitimate public 
ends.117 
Indeed, the Council’s arguments against same-sex marriage miss the mark on several 
counts.  While the Council is certainly right that it is generally heterosexual relationships in 
which children will arrive unplanned, and the state therefore has a particular incentive to 
encourage heterosexual couples to enter into formalized commitments to promote the 
stability of the relationship in the event of unplanned children, this is not a reason to exclude 
same-sex couples from receiving state privileges.  Many same-sex couples, like many 
heterosexual couples, plan to have children.  And the children of these same-sex parents, like 
the children of opposite-sex parents, are benefited by the stability of their parents’ 
                                                 
117Indeed, while both heterosexuality and procreation were certainly conceived as central to traditional marriage 
(see, for example, Reynolds v. Reynolds (Mass. 1862), in which the court stated that “[t]he great object of 
marriage in a civilized and Christian community is to secure the existence and permanence of the family 
relation, and to insure the legitimacy of offspring”),  at least the procreative purpose of marriage has been, if not 
quite eclipsed, then at least demoted from its spot of sole star billing to costar alongside the companionate and 
caretaking aspects of marriage.  For example, older American cases restricted annulment for fraud in entering 
marriage to misrepresentations going to the “essentials” of marriage, conceived in terms of duties connected 
with consortium and fertility.  See, for example, Reynolds v. Reynolds (Mass. 1862).  However, more recently, 
courts have broadened the fraud for which annulment will be granted.  As stated in Kober v. Kober (N.Y. 1965): 
 
[T]he fraud [required for annulment] need no longer “necessarily concern what is commonly called the 
essential of the marriage relation – the rights and duties connected with cohabitation and consortium 
attached by law to the marital status.  Any fraud is adequate which is “material to that degree that, had 
it not been practiced, the party deceived would not have consented to the marriage” and is “of such 
nature as to deceive an ordinarily prudent person.”  Although it is not enough to show merely that one 
partner married for money and the other was disappointed . . ., and the decisions upon the subject of 
annulment have not always been uniform, there have been circumstances where misrepresentations of 
love and affection, with intention to make a home, were held sufficient . . . . 
 
See also Wolfe v. Wolfe (1979). 
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relationships.  Given this, it makes sense for the state to seek to stabilize these relationships 
with the same supports that the Council argues will work so well with opposite-sex couples.   
More than that, the state’s interest in ensuring that adults receive care also militates in 
favor of extending relationship privileges to same-sex couples.  Currently, many heterosexual 
couples who choose to remain childless benefit, as does the state, from the state’s privileging 
their relationship.  Doing so supports the state’s interest in caretaking for adults. While the 
Council criticizes those who seek to extend the state’s support beyond heterosexual marriage 
on the ground that these policy advocates too narrowly focus on “such values as 
commitment, mutual support and the rest” in the absence of childrearing (21), the importance 
of mutual support and related goods offer powerful incentives for the state to privilege 
relationships that promote these goods, whether or not they further all the other values that 
the Council believes are crucial to the state’s protecting marriage.   
Finally, although the Council is right that women have, for a variety of biological and 
social reasons, been more vulnerable than men historically with respect to both unplanned 
pregnancies and childrearing, limiting marriage to heterosexual couples for this reason would 
be unwise.  To the contrary, to the extent that homosexual relationships do not replicate these 
same patterns of vulnerability, the state has grounds to encourage same-sex relationships 
rather than deny them recognition and rights.118  Further, the Council’s insistence that 
marriage is an institution designed to protect vulnerable women flouts the Supreme Court’s 
counsel in cases such as Frontiero v. Richardson (U.S. 1973), that the state should not rely 
on overbroad or outmoded sex stereotypes.   
                                                 
118See McClain 1999, 510 (citing studies showing that generally lesbian couples do not organize their 
relationship on a provider-homemaker model).   
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Further, in advocating state support for marriage as against other relationships, both 
Galston and the Council too quickly dismiss other principles important to liberal democracy 
that militate against the state privileging such relationships.  The most important of these 
alternative principles of distribution is based on need.  Because of economies of scale, adults 
in live-in relationships generally have an easier time financially than those who live alone.119  
Distributing resources to adults in relationships therefore is a regressive measure, on the 
whole, based on need.  Further, insofar as two-parent families have particular advantages that 
make them more conducive to rearing healthy, stable children than single-parent families, 
distributing privileges to dual-parent families may also be regressive based on need.120  As 
Judith Stacey argues, “The more eggs and raiments our society chooses to place in the family 
baskets of the married, the hungrier and shabbier will be the lives of the vast numbers of 
adults and dependents who, whether by fate, misfortune or volition will remain outside the 
gates (Stacey 2003, 344).121   
Further, a clear recognition of the limits of both the state’s and individuals’ capacity 
to encourage marital relationships also cuts against privileging marital status, or should at 
least limit the extent to which the state seeks to put eggs into this basket.  Taking first 
limitations on the state’s capacity, it must be recognized that the state has only limited ability 
to help citizens acquire and sustain healthy caretaking relationships. While it can establish 
                                                 
119See, for example, Crittenden (2001).   
 
120The simple fact of distributing goods to families with children, however, is not regressive based on need.    
As Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi demonstrate, having a child is now the best indicator of whether 
someone will end up in financial collapse.  In their words, “Married couples with children are twice as likely as 
childless couples to file for bankruptcy.  They’re seventy-five percent more likely to be late paying their bills.  
And they’re also far more likely to face foreclosure on their homes” (Warren and Tyagi 2003). 
 
121Stacey adds: “In my view, this is an unacceptably steep and undemocratic social price for whatever marginal 
increases in marital stability might be achieved for those admitted to the charmed circle. .  . .”  (344). 
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certain institutional preconditions and incentives for couples to make relationships work,122 
ultimately whether or not healthy relationships will develop and be sustained has a great deal 
to do with characteristics of the individuals involved that are beyond the state’s reach to 
affect, and dumb luck – for example, who individuals happen to meet.  The state could, of 
course, still provide such sufficient financial incentives that people would enter into and 
remain in relationships in which they were miserable and in which little healthy caretaking 
occurred.  Doing so, however, would not further the goods that the state should seek to 
further.  With respect to the issue of individuals’ own capacity to enter into and maintain 
relationships, it must be recognized that personal attributes and behavior have some part to 
play in the success of an individual’s relationships, but many factors are simply beyond the 
individual’s control.  Accordingly, considerations of fairness militate against distributing 
privileges based on the success of a person’s relationships, when this success has little 
relation to merit and an inverse relation to need.   
In sum, the issue of how the state should treat relationships between adults is 
significantly more complex than either the Fineman-Warner positions or the Galston-Council 
positions recognize.  Some large part of this complexity comes from the fact that the goods 
and principles that a liberal democracy should seek take into account are manifold, and, in 
the case of adult-adult relationships, stand in tension with one another.  My hope in the 
                                                 
122It should be noted, however, that poverty is significantly correlated with divorce, as are problems associated 
with poverty, such as homelessness and drug addiction.   Social scientists who study the phenomenon believe 
that some of the correlation between poverty and divorce is actually a causal relationship – in other words, 
poverty leads to divorce. See generally Marsha Garrison, presentation at International Society of Family Law 
Conference, July 2005, Salt Lake City, Utah.  Given this, an effective way for the state to increase the stability 
of intimate relationships may be through antipoverty measures and other institutional supports for the poor 
rather than through direct measures to promote institutions such as marriage.  Such indirect measures would 
also harmonize rather than conflict with the principle of distributing resources based on need.   
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remainder of the chapter is to develop an approach that harmonizes important but competing 
principles implicated in the state’s position with respect to relationships between adults.   
A Liberal Democratic Approach to Horizontal Relationships 
To begin sorting out these matters, let me point out that there are actually two 
separate but related issues that must be considered with respect to the state’s approach to 
relationships.  The first issue is whether the state should recognize relationships between 
adults for the purpose of assigning rights and responsibilities within the relationship.  The 
second is whether the state should privilege relationships between adults, in the sense that 
those who participate in these relationships receive either benefits from or rights against the 
state or third parties that they would not otherwise receive.  Both of these issues should be 
answered in the affirmative, in my view, although the first issue is an easier one than the 
second.   
State Recognition Of Adult-Adult Relationships 
When it comes to whether the state should recognize relationships between adults for 
the purpose of assigning rights and responsibilities as between the two parties, the answer 
seems to me to be clearly “yes.”  The interdependent nature of intimate relationships between 
adults, particularly when they are long-term, creates a series of issues regarding rights and 
responsibilities that are best addressed through laws that, at a minimum, establish a fair 
default position in the absence of an express agreement between parties to the relationship.  
Without such default rules, this interdependence can create large inequities and injustices 
both during and, particularly, at the end of these relationships.  For the state to do otherwise, 
as Mary Shanley recognizes, would abandon the state’s interest in securing justice and 
equality in these relationships (Shanley 2004).   
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Martha Fineman completely disagrees.  According to Fineman: 
If people want their relationships to have consequences, they should bargain for them, 
and this is as true with sexual affiliates as with others who interact in complex, 
ongoing interrelationships, such as employers and employees.  This would mean that 
sexual affiliates (formerly labeled husband and wife) would be regulated by the terms 
of their individualized agreements, with no special rules governing fairness and no 
unique review or monitoring of the negotiation process. (Fineman 2004, 134).   
She asserts that the state’s withdrawal from regulating adult-adult relationships 
“would mean that we are taking gender equality seriously” (134).  In suggesting that a 
contractual regime will result in fair and equal agreements between parties involved in 
intimate relationships, however, Fineman glosses over serious difficulties.  First she fails to 
take into account the ways in which those entering into a relationship based on affective ties 
may not be looking out after their own interests rather than the other person’s (and that the 
state may not want to encourage them to be solely self-regarding).  As a result, “sexual 
affiliates” may agree to an unfair contract.  Furthermore, the course of lives and relationships 
are often so difficult to predict that contracts entered into ex ante may not fairly and justly 
resolve what occurs ex post.   In addition, in a regime of contract, those in a weaker 
bargaining position –  traditionally women – will likely negotiate less favorable terms for 
themselves that will lead to inequality both in the course of the relationship and also when 
and if it ends.    
And in this regime, even those who negotiate unfavorable contracts may be the lucky 
ones compared to those who negotiate no contracts.  For some, this will be because they 
cannot afford a lawyer; for others, this will be because the motivation to express one’s love 
publicly, which many would say is their motivation to enter marriage, would not similarly 
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impel them to enter into a contract with their partner.123  If and when these relationships end, 
the partners would have no contract claims against one another.  Existing, albeit imperfect, 
status-based protections that are currently available to those divorcing, such as the right to 
equitable distribution of property and alimony, would be nonexistent in such a regime.   This 
would particularly hurt those who devote more energy and care to the relationship than to 
financial pursuits – again, likely women – since they would have no automatic claim to 
income earned by their partners through the joint efforts of the family.124   
A regime in which the state recognized relationships among adults for the purpose of 
apportioning rights and obligations among them is therefore necessary for fairness and 
justice.  Of course, such rights and obligations could be assigned to couples based on the 
functional status of their relationship, without the state having to provide civil avenues to 
formalize these relationships ex ante.  For example, the rights and responsibilities that the 
American Law Institute’s Principles of Family Dissolution now seek to apply to unmarried 
cohabitants could, in an era in which civil marriage and other formalized commitments 
between adults were eliminated, be applied to all couples.  Under such an approach, what 
would matter in assigning such rights would be the couple’s functional characteristics – how 
                                                 
123See Goodridge v. Department of Public Health (Ma. 2003) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut (U.S. 1965) 
(“Civil marriage is at once a deeply personal commitment to another human being and a highly public 
celebration of the ideals of mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and family.  ‘It is an association that 
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial 
or social projects?’” ). 
  
124It might be argued, however, that although some individuals who enter into conjugal relationships may fare 
worse in the event of a break-up if status based marriages were eliminated, many other individuals would fare 
better because, in the absence of such recognition from the state, they would cease to enter into conjugal 
relationships.  And certainly Fineman and other commentators have suggested that most women would fare 
better if they avoided entering into marriage or marriage-like relationships with men altogether.  Whether or not 
this is the case, my strong hunch is that ending civil recognition will have little effect on the numbers of people 
who enter into conjugal relationships – they will simply do so without the imprimatur of the state, or its 
protections. 
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long they lived together, whether they had children together, etc. – rather than whether they 
had formalized their relationship.  Thus, more property sharing might be required of couples 
who lived together for longer periods of time than couples who lived together for shorter 
periods, regardless of whether the couple had made some formal commitment to stay 
together.   
In my view, eliminating a civil route for formalizing relationships would be a mistake 
for two reasons.  First, this formalization helps to identify the intent of its members and their 
own understandings with respect to the intended primacy and permanency of the relationship.  
And surely such understandings should be relevant to determining the default rules that apply 
to the particular relationship.  Thus, a commitment to a permanent relationship, such as the 
entry into marriage serves today, should be pertinent to the state’s determination of how long 
income should be redistributed between parties who have separated.  Second, as the Council 
of Families recognizes, and as I discuss later in this chapter, the state’s making available a 
route through which citizens can formally commit to the permanency and depth of their 
relationship serves the state’s goal of increasing the stability of adult caretaking relationships.  
Such commitments increase the likelihood that those participants who face tough times will 
make more efforts to stay together with their partners. 
State Privileging Of (Some) Adult-Adult Relationships 
I have argued that the state should recognize relationships between adults and impose, 
at the least, default rights and responsibilities among participants in such relationships for the 
purpose of seeking to ensure equality and fairness.  The issue of whether the state may and 
should seek to privilege such relationships over others is a much tougher issue for liberal 
theory.  As I suggested earlier in this chapter, I think the answer should be “yes,” but with 
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significant reservations, since such privileges raise tensions among important liberal goods 
and values.  Part of the challenge of a more robust liberalism that recognizes a richer 
diversity of goods must be to seek a course of action that ameliorates the tensions among 
these varied goods.  In what follows, I set out four principles that, together, seek to 
accomplish this purpose. 
1.  Freedom to enter into consensual relationships 
First, liberalism’s great respect for individuals’ forming and carrying out their own 
life plans requires that the liberal state allow individuals the freedom to engage – or not 
engage – in consensual relationships with others.  The right to determine one’s own personal 
relationships is central to liberalism’s respect for individual self-determination.  The fact that 
liberalism was born out of fear of tyranny, as Judith Shklar points out (1989), strongly 
militates against the state decreeing that some consensual relationships are permissible and 
others are not.  John Stuart Mill’s counsel that society benefits from allowing different 
"experiments of living" to flourish also supports the state’s ensuring that such freedom exists 
(OL, 54).  Under this principle, for example, a citizen whose vision of the good life is to have 
sexual relationships with as many other citizens as possible should be able to fulfill that 
vision without interference by the state (barring issues such as public health concerns), 
regardless of whether the majority’s own private views of morality condemn such action.    
2.  Encouragement of (a broad range of) long-term caretaking relationships 
Second, although the liberal state must tolerate all consensual relationships, it need 
not give all such relationships a level playing field.  It is true, as Fineman and Warner argue, 
that the liberal democratic state should not favor some relationships over others based on 
citizens’ private notions of morality.  It can and should, however, seek to support 
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relationships that further important public goods in which the liberal state has a legitimate 
interest.  Among the most important of these is caretaking.  Without minimizing the harm 
that can occur in relationships between adults, or ignoring the sex inequality that tends to 
mark heterosexual relationships, the crux of the matter is that dependency is an inevitable 
fact of life for adults as well as children, and a liberal state must contend with that fact.  
Because of its interest in the health, well-being, and dignity of its citizens, the liberal state 
has an interest in the success of long-term relationships, and should provide these 
relationships with the institutional support that will help them flourish.   
Given that the state’s interest is in caretaking, the category of relationships that the 
state has an interest in supporting is considerably broader than the set of couples who are 
now formally married.   The state has an interest in supporting all long-term horizontal 
relationships in which caretaking occurs, including relationships between couples who are 
not necessarily monogamous, or, at the opposite end of the spectrum, those whose 
relationships are not sexual.  By the same token, the state has an interest in supporting 
caretaking in family groupings that involve more than two adults.125  Thus, the state has valid 
reasons to support all of the following horizontal relationships involving caretaking: a couple 
of elderly sisters who live together and take care of one another, a non-monogamous 
homosexual couple, a commune of five adults who live together with their children, and a 
heterosexual married couple. 
 
 
                                                 
125There may be administrative rather than theoretical reasons to limit the number of persons that the state will 
recognize.  There is, however, no reason that two persons should necessarily be the limit. 
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3.  Limits on the privileges available to  long-term caretaking relationships 
Third, with all that said, promoting the health and stability of horizontal relationships 
is only one goal that a flourishing liberal democracy should pursue, and only one of many 
principles that should affect the state’s decision-making.  State distribution of privileges 
these relationships therefore has to be weighed against alternative principles of distribution, 
including distribution based on need, as well as the recognition of the limits on the state’s 
and individuals’ abilities to ensure the existence and stability of relationships. 
This recognition should cause the state to limit the privileges that support these 
relationships in two specific ways.  First, the state’s seeking to aid caretaking relationships 
between adults cannot undercut the state’s responsibility to ensure that all its citizens have 
the means and opportunity to pursue dignified lives.   This means, at a minimum, as Martha 
Fineman argues, that a just society should seek to deliver basic social goods such as health 
care to everyone in society, rather than based on family membership.   Insofar as the state 
distributes these goods based on marital status, it neglects its most basic responsibilities.   
 Second, the state should limit privileges for relationships to the specific area in 
which the state has a legitimate interest – for example, caretaking, or sex equality.126  
Singling out families for more generalized favorable treatment – while it might still further 
the goal of supporting families –  stands in tension with principles of fairness among all 
citizens, both those within and those not in such families, particularly insofar as it 
redistributes economic resources to those who are, on average, better off.  Under this third 
principle, the state could allow caretaking leaves from work or special immigration privileges 
for the partners of citizens, but not general tax breaks for those in caretaking relationships 
                                                 
126See also Law Commission of Canada (2004). 
 
 120 
that are unrelated to the extra expenses incurred in caretaking.  Thus the state would have 
little justification for funnelling general economic support to those in adult-adult 
relationships, given that these adults, on average, do better financially due to the economies 
of scale of living together.  In contrast, economic redistribution to caretaker-dependent 
relationships could be better justified by the consideration of the cost to caretakers of caring 
for dependents.   
One important way in which the state can legitimately foster such relationships is to 
provide a civil route through which adults can formalize their commitment to others.  As 
Bruce Hafen notes, formal commitments increase the likelihood that a relationship will last 
(Hafen 475-76).  They also serve as an expressive vehicle for the state to announce its 
support for stable caretaking relationships without redistributing tangible privileges in favor 
of such relationships and, hence, away from those who might need them more.  The state’s 
endorsing such civil commitments is still not, of course, without cost to those who do not 
enter them: to the extent that the state endorses such commitments, those who do not enter 
into them may feel societal disapprobation.  In my view, however, the benefits that such 
formalization yields in terms of the stability of these relationships, given the importance of 
such relationships, still outweighs the costs of this potential stigmatization. 
4.  Guarding against injury to other important goods  
Fourth, in privileging caretaking relationships among adults, the state must also seek 
to remedy the negative consequences to public goods associated with these relationships.  
Three of these possible consequences bear particular attention: 1) increased gender 
inequality, 2) increased economic inequality, and 3) the possibility that close caretaking 
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relationships will cause their participants to turn away from civic life, instead of serving as a 
springboard to healthy civic engagement.  I discuss each in turn. 
Sex inequality 
Any proposals that the state should promote intimate caretaking relationships must 
deal with the fact that heterosexual relationships are deeply intertwined with women’s 
continued gender inequality.  Leaving current political realities aside, the state might, of 
course, deal with this troubling association by privileging only those long-term caretaking 
relationships that do not involve heterosexual conjugal relationships.  Alternatively, and far 
more palatable politically, the state could privilege heterosexual relationships along with 
other relationships at the same time that it seeks to increase the equality within such 
relationships.   
One way to pursue this latter goal would be for the state to mandate that employers 
introduce rules that allow employees genuinely to combine work and family, since much 
gender inequality is associated with women’s assuming the greater portion of childrearing 
responsibilities (see Bartlett 1998).  To accomplish this goal, the state could, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, adopt models of public support for caretaking that encourage men to take an equal 
role.   For example, requiring that employers adopt family leave policies that can be taken by 
parents sharing childcare between them, rather than policies that are limited to full-time 
caregivers, would encourage shared caretaking, as would flex-time, and allowing both 
parents of very young children to work somewhat fewer hours without sacrificing their jobs.  
Schools, too, should play a role in this endeavor, teaching children that both fathers and 
mothers can have equal roles in nurturing their children, and helping them to understand the 
importance of these caretaking tasks.  In Anita Shreve’s words, “the old home-economics 
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courses that used to teach girls how to cook and sew might give way to the new home 
economics: teaching girls and boys how to combine work and parenting” (Shreve 1987, 237 
(quoted in Okin 1989a, 177)).   
Economic inequality 
Second, with respect to economic equality, the state’s encouraging tighter family ties 
runs an increased risk that wealth will be more tightly held within particular families’ hands, 
and, relatedly, that there will be more disparities of opportunity across families.  What this 
threat to equality calls for, however, is not the state’s attempt to loosen family ties, but rather 
its attempt to lessen the disparities of wealth and opportunity that result.  In other words, 
rather than the state’s seeking to weaken families, the state should seek to ensure that all 
citizens have the financial means and education to ensure (at the very least) some basic 
threshold of opportunity, even when their families cannot provide this without aid.  It also 
means, at the other end of the income spectrum, that the state should seek to reduce, although 
probably not eliminate, disparities in wealth continuing between generations.  As Michael 
Walzer argues, there are significant reasons to allow family members to express their love 
through bequests to family members, as well as significant reasons to tax these bequests for 
the state’s other purposes.127  The state should moderate between these goals by giving some 
weight to both when determining the extent of taxation of such gifts. 
 Families as a respite, not an island 
 The state should also seek to encourage familial relationships to serve as a 
source of support, but not be islands unto themselves.   Michelle Barrett and Mary McIntosh 
                                                 
127“But surely the gift is one of the finer expressions of ownership as we know it.  And so long as they act 
within their sphere, we have every reason to respect those men and women who give their money away to 
persons they love or to causes to which they are committed, even if they make distributive outcomes 
unpredictable and uneven” (Walzer 1990, 128). 
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point out that the nuclear family, with its ideal of self-sufficiency, can cause family members 
to turn inward to an extent not consistent with the vigorous public life that a healthy liberal 
democracy requires (Barrett & McIntosh 1982).  This inward turn may be due to the fact that 
nuclear families in our society are conceived and structured as private, self-sufficient entities.  
This means that tasks that could be shared, including cooking and childrearing, are generally 
accomplished within families, with a tremendous duplication of effort.   
To counter the tendency for family members to treat their families as an island, the 
state should simultaneously seek to support the caretaking relationships associated with the 
nuclear family at the same time that it seeks to de-privatize this form to some extent.  The 
pattern of childrearing in which parents have sole responsibility for childcare inside a private 
home isolates children and caretaking parents from the larger community.  In privileging 
caretaking relationships, the state should seek to construct institutional arrangements that 
incorporate parents and dependents into the life of the community and share caretaking 
responsibilities within the community.  Tax subsidies for co-housing developments, in which 
some cooking and childcare are performed cooperatively,  and supports for childcare 
cooperatives, are two measures by which the state can pursue this end. 
 
Civil Partnership or Proliferation of Families?  
 
The most difficult issue with respect to how the state should treat adult’s long-term 
caretaking relationships is not, in my view, whether or not the state should accord some civil 
status to these relationships, or even the issue of whether the state should provide subsidies to 
caretaking relationships.  As I have said, in my view the answer to all these questions is 
“yes,” in large part because of the importance of caretaking to society.  In my view, the most 
difficult issue is whether all such horizontal relationships should be categorized together for 
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purposes of public support under a banner such as “domestic partnership,” or whether they 
should be categorized separately according to the general type of relationship at issue.  In the 
latter case, the state would presumably retain a civil status for conjugal relationships such as 
marriage (which, out of justice and fairness, as well as for the goods associated with them, 
would need to be expanded to same-sex couples), but also recognize other forms of adult-
adult relationships, such as domestic partnerships between friends who cohabitate.   
Grouping all adult-adult relationships into a single legal status has the advantage of 
guarding against the possibility that any particular subcategory of relationship (specifically, 
marriage) would be unfairly privileged as against other horizontal relationships.  In addition, 
clustering different types of horizontal relationships together would send a strong message 
that marriage occupies no paramount place in the hierarchy.   
There are several downsides to this strategy, however.  First, treating these 
relationships as a single category would keep the state from tailoring the particular 
obligations and benefits assigned to that status to the type of caretaking relationship at issue.  
For example, when a child is born to or adopted by one of the parties within a conjugal 
relationship, it makes sense to accord a presumption of parenthood or right to adopt to the 
other partner.  There is far less reason to accord such a presumption in a non-conjugal 
caretaking relationship, however.  The same is true for inheritance rights: as a default matter, 
it makes sense to assign a presumption that conjugal partners intend their partner to inherit 
(in the absence of agreements to the contrary), since most individuals in such relationships 
leave their estates to their partners.  It may make less sense to apply this presumption to other 
types of long-term caretaking relationships. With that said, the state could choose to divide 
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relationships into categories for the purpose of delineating rights between the partners, but to 
use a single category for purposes of assigning state support. 
Second, although moving away from the category of marriage has the benefit of 
eliminating marriage as the privileged category, it has the related disadvantage that much of 
the positive cultural resonance associated with marriage – the notion that the institution is a 
serious, long-term bond of commitment based on love between two people who come 
together and take one another permanently as family – will also be lost.128 To the extent that 
laws have an expressive force, eliminating marriage may weaken the resolve of those in 
relationships to work through rough periods.  It could also dissuade those who would 
otherwise have married from entering into domestic partnerships, since such partnerships do 
not have the same cultural resonance that swearing one’s love through marriage does.  This 
could leave many of those made vulnerable by relationships to remain legally unprotected.   
At the level of theory, in my view, there is no clear winner between these two 
alternatives – each has its own set of benefits and costs.129  At the level of political reality, 
though, the popular ideology (not to mention the $50 billion wedding industry)130 is so 
invested in the value of marriage that eliminating civil marriage is well nigh impossible.   As 
a result, those who seek to topple marriage from its pedestal as the preferred form of family 
and to increase the equity among different forms of relationships would likely do better to 
                                                 
128Consider Justice Douglas’ opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut (U.S. 1965):  
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of 
being sacred.  It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not 
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.  Yet it is an association for as 
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.  
 
129As a result of the difficulty of this issue, Mary Shanley recently shifted positions, first arguing that the state 
should continue to support civil marriage, see Shanley 2004, and more recently arguing that the state should 
discard civil marriage and treat all horizontal relationships as domestic partnerships.  See ibid. 
 
130El Boghdady (2003, F1). 
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focus their attention on decentering marriage by proliferating other categories of status 
relationships among adults, rather than seeking to eliminate marriage as a civil status (see 
Stacey 1994, 344; McClain 2003, 391, 401-02).  This strategy of broadening the category of 
relationships that receive legal protections and support, and distributing a subset of the 
bundle of rights now received by marriage among these different relationships (see also 
Young 1996; DiFonzo 2003), is not only the most pragmatic course to take, given existing 
political realities, but a course that offers significant promise in furthering the goods that a 
liberal democracy needs to flourish.  Disaggregating the privileges awarded with respect to 
the good at issue also helps deconstruct the monolithic notion of “The Family,” and the 
orthodoxy surrounding it.  This approach makes it clear that there are many kinds of 
relationships that contribute to many different public goods, and that no one-size-fits-all 
family is the ideal.   
 
 Difficult Cases:  Supporting the Two-Parent Family and Supporting Marriage  
I have argued that the state has a legitimate interest in preferring two-parent (or more) 
families over single-parent families where children are involved.  However, the thorny issue 
of how the state should seek to promote two-parent families merits additional discussion.  I 
asserted in chapter 3 that the state has a duty to ensure that children have the caretaking and 
other resources necessary to support their well-being and develop their capabilities.  These 
duties pertain whether or not the state believes that parents made a wise choice about family 
form, and even if the state fears that it will send the wrong signals and therefore hurt future 
children if it meets its duties.  Accordingly, it is illegitimate for the state to deprive welfare 
benefits to low-income families based on the mother’s having additional children out if 
wedlock, if doing so would deprive the children in these families of necessary resources.   
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Above this required threshold of support, the state has legitimate reasons to adopt 
measures that foster two parent families.   In doing so, however, the state should seek to 
harmonize the important liberal goods at stake.  In other words, the state’s goal should be to 
construct policies that avoid zero-sum situations in which furthering some goods operates to 
the detriment of others.  Developing such policies will, however, require careful attention to 
the ways in which relevant goods may conflict.  By this criterion, the state’s seeking to 
further two-parent families by awarding them privileges not awarded to single-parent 
families is a peculiarly bad tool to harmonize these goods.  Not only would doing so deprive 
of resources the very families who need them most, it also risks stigmatizing the very 
children who are most vulnerable.  Far better would be measures that do not pose such a stark 
tradeoff among goods.   Thus the legislature would do better, for example, to adopt job 
training programs and educational subsidies for youths who are at risk of becoming parents, 
since studies show that increasing the prospects for young adults’ future makes it 
significantly less likely that they will bear children while they are young and single (Edelman 
1988).  Such programs do not pit the important interests of current children against the 
important interests of future children.   
The state should deal in a similar manner with proposals to shore up the institution of 
marriage (or whatever categories of adult-adult relationships that the state retains).  
Proponents of marriage in the past years have proposed a number of policies to strengthen 
marriage, including making divorce more difficult through returning to fault divorce laws, 
adopting covenant marriage provisions, premarital counseling, and even awarding bonuses 
for marriages where no pre-marital abortions occurred.131  In choosing policies to strengthen 
                                                 
131See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-901 to 25-906 (2000 & Supp. 2004), Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-11-801 to 9-11-
811 (2002 & Supp. 2003), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§. 9:272 to 9:276 (2000 & Supp. 2005) (covenant marriage 
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the health and permanency of horizontal relationships, the state should here too seek to avoid 
policies that require large tradeoffs between important goods.  In this light, tightening up 
divorce laws through a return to fault divorce, despite furthering the state’s interest in 
promoting marriage, severely infringes on citizens’ autonomy interests.132  The state would 
therefore do better to adopt proposals such as pre-marital counseling requirements, which 
would avoid this tradeoff of goods.  Further, given that women more often seek divorces than 
men, as Katharine Bartlett points out,133 the state could usefully support such relationships by 
encouraging men to be better partners through assuming an equal share of housework and 
carework.134   Such measures would infringe less on individual’s autonomy than stricter 
divorce laws and, at the same time, increase sex equality. 
It is important to keep in mind the limits of the state’s institutional competence to 
deal with the complexities of human relationships.  The state can make it more difficult for 
individuals to get out of marriage.  Just as it cannot arrange relationships for its citizens, 
however (at least, in a liberal polity), neither can it keep affection and caretaking alive within 
                                                                                                                                                       
provisions);  Missouri House Bill 1917, LR # 3769-01, effective date 01/0/1999 (proposing that couples who 
marry after attaining the age of 21, without having had any children or (in the woman’s case) any premarital 
abortions, and having tested negative for STD’s, be paid $1000 from a fund, which would be raised by 
assessing a $1000 fee against parties whose actions provided the grounds for a divorce).  
 
132Covenant marriage laws, in which individuals getting married can choose whether or not heightened 
standards will apply at divorce, pose less of a conflict among important goods (See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§25-901 to 
25-906 (2000 & Supp. 2004), Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-11-801 to 9-11-811 (2002 & Supp. 2003), La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 9:272 to 9:276 (2000 & Supp. 2005)).  Given the small number of couples who choose to enter into 
covenant marriage where it is available, though, as well as the problems with requiring parties to remain in a 
marriage that one party wants to exit, the state would be wise to seek alternative policies. (In Louisiana, 2%; in 
Arizona, 0.25%; and in Arkansas, only 71 out of approximately 38,000 marrying couples elected the covenant 
marriage (Drewianka 2003)).  
 
133Bartlett cites figures from a 1986 study which indicate that women initiate divorce in 62 to 67% of cases 
(Bartlett 1998: n.135).  A more recent study gives approximately the same result, placing the figure at 70% 
(Brinig & Allen 2000).  
 
134See Bartlett 1998: 842.  More recent data indicates that women still do an average of 17.5 hours of 
housework per week, while men do an average of 10 (Sweet & Bumpass 1996).   
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such relationships.135  As I argued before, this recognition of the state’s inherent lack of 
institutional capacity, as well as limits on citizens’ own capacities in this area, should cause 
the state to limit benefits awarded to families out of concern for individual fairness.  It should 
also cause the state to investigate means to encourage alternative caretaking networks for 
those who are not, either through chance or choice, members of intimate relationships, such 
as “mothers houses” where single parents can raise their children more communally, or the 
types of informal networks among friends that helped provide caretaking for men in the gay 
community stricken with AIDS in San Francisco at the height of the AIDS epidemic.   
 
 
Conclusion 
The appropriate stance of the state to relationships among adults is such a difficult 
issue because it implicates important goals and purposes of a liberal democracy that stand in 
considerable tension with one another.  In the next chapter, I argue that similar tensions exist 
with respect to civic education in public schools.  Here, too, a liberal democracy that seeks to 
attend to a more complex array of goods than did Rawlsian-era liberalism must seek 
solutions that harmonize, to the extent possible, this diverse array of goods. 
 
                                                 
135The difficulties associated with the state’s promotion of this marriage, for example, was made eminently clear 
in  President G.W. Bush’s recent plan to promote marriage for women on welfare.  Despite the administrations 
1.5 billion initiative, the administration had no clear plan for how states might successfully promote marriage 
once Wade Horn, the top official at Health and Human Services, withdrew his earlier proposal to award those 
who married with cash bonuses (see Ehrenreich 2004). 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
THE PLACE OF CIVIC EDUCATION IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC POLITY 
 
 
“A free society is free only to the degree that its citizens are informed and that 
communication among them is open and informed.” 
136 
 
 Until this point I have been discussing the state’s relationship to families with respect 
to the complex of goods surrounding caretaking.  In this chapter, I turn to consider another 
critical function relevant to the family-state relationship: that of preparing children to become 
citizens.  As both theorists and cultural commentators have recognized, preparing children 
for the task of citizenship in a liberal democracy is an important and demanding 
responsibility.  How should this responsibility be allocated between parents and the state?  
And, in the event of disagreement between parents and the state about what this task entails, 
whose views should trump?   
 The issue of children’s civic education is a thorny one for liberal democratic theory.  
A vigorous liberal democracy requires certain qualities of its citizens, including 
commitments to political equality among citizens, to the rule of law, to tolerance of different 
life plans, to resolving political differences through lawful procedures, and to protection of 
basic individual rights.  These qualities do not simply arise spontaneously, but require 
nurture.  Yet the deliberate promotion of these qualities stands in tension with the great 
weight that liberalism places on respecting citizens’ own views of the good life.  
                                                 
136Benjamin Barber, Three Scenarios for the Future of Technology and Strong Democracy, 113 Pol. Sci. Q. 580 
(1998-1999). 
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Furthermore, insofar as the state uses public education to promote these virtues, it raises 
liberalism’s suspicion of state despotism. As John Stuart Mill wrote in opposing public 
education,  
That the whole or any large part of the education of the people should be in State 
hands, I go as far as any one in deprecating.  All that has been said of the importance 
of individuality of character, and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, 
involves, as of the same unspeakable importance, diversity of education.  A general 
State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one 
another . . . it establishes a despotism over the mind.137 
 
A century and a half after Mill wrote, there is little debate about the existence of public 
education, itself, but a vigorous dispute remains regarding the appropriate scope the 
education that public schools and the state can require of its young citizens, particularly over 
the objection of their parents. 
In this chapter, I consider this controversy.  My discussion consists of three parts.  In 
Part I, I set up the basic framework of the problem by discussing the cases in which disputes 
over civic education have been raised in recent years.  I argue that these cases are so difficult 
for liberal democratic theory because of the conflicting claims to authority and the different 
goods implicated in civic education.  In Part II, I argue that several leading theories of civic 
education founder because they fail to attend to the complex of claims of authority and goods 
at stake.  Finally, in Part III, I contend that a more nuanced analysis of the goods at stake 
ameliorates some of the tension among them.  I then offer an alternative theory that, I hope, 
better balances the relevant goods. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
137John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays 130 (1991). 
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The Scope of the Civic Education Controversy 
 
The battleground regarding civic education has been fought in recent years over the 
issue of whether parents who possess beliefs outside of the mainstream must expose their 
children to education in public schools with which they disagree.  This issue is a particular 
problem for parents who are members of religious sects that possess illiberal beliefs.  In these 
parents’ eyes, the state’s attempts to inculcate their children with liberal democratic values 
violate deeply-held religious precepts that breach the parents’ duty to raise their child 
properly, as well as risk eternal damnation for their children.  Two difficult cases raising 
these issues that have come before the courts have served as touchstones for this debate.138  
In addition, several more recent cases demonstrate the complexity of the issues raised.   I 
describe them not for their legal analysis, but rather because the challenged educational 
programs provide factual scenarios that help to explore the normative complexity of civic 
education for liberal democratic theory. 
In the first of the cases that have served as the flashpoint for this debate, Yoder, 
Amish parents challenged a state law requiring that children attend high school until age 16 
on the ground that it violated their right to free exercise of religion.  The parents contended 
that requiring their children to attend school with non-Amish students past the age of primary 
education exposed their children to worldly attitudes that contradicted Amish religious 
beliefs.  Essentially, the Amish argued that exposure to education beyond that needed to run 
a simple farm, as well as exposure to other ways of life, undermined the children’s entry into 
the Amish community and threatened the continued existence of the community, as well as 
the parents’ and children’s salvation.  In response, the state of Wisconsin argued both that the 
                                                 
138See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th 
Cir. 1987). 
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education requirement was necessary to prepare the children to participate effectively in our 
liberal democratic system, and that this education was necessary to prepare the children to be 
self-sufficient participants in society.  Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court held that 
the state’s interest in preparing children to participate in our open political system did not rise 
to the compelling level necessary to justify interference with the parents’ religious beliefs.  
The Court held that because the children were being prepared for life in a separate agrarian 
community rather than in modern society, they did not need the more complex 
understandings of society and government that other children might need. 
In the second case, Mozert, plaintiffs, born-again Christian parents of children 
attending Hawkins County, Tennessee public schools, filed a free exercise challenge to the 
school system’s use of a particular series of basic reading texts, the Holt, Rinehart & Winston 
readers.  The parents objected to the readers on the ground that they exposed their children to 
cultures, values, and ways of life that were prohibited by their fundamentalist faith.  For 
example, the parents found objectionable a story depicting a young boy enjoying cooking and 
a story about the religious and social practices of an Indian settlement in New Mexico.  They 
contended that these and other portions of the readers prompted their children to think that 
ways of life and values other than those their parents supported could be acceptable, a view 
incompatible with their fundamentalist beliefs.  The District Court for the Eastern District of 
Tennessee held that the compulsory use of the textbooks violated the plaintiffs' free exercise 
of religion, and ordered the school to permit the students to "opt-out" of the school's reading 
program.139  On appeal the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and held that the 
school system's compulsory use of the textbooks did not unconstitutionally burden the 
                                                 
139Id. at 647 F. Supp. 1194, 1203. 
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plaintiffs' free exercise of religion.  According to the court, so long as students were not 
compelled to affirm or disaffirm any particular religious belief or practice, mere exposure to 
religiously objectionable material did not burden free exercise rights. 
 In addition to Yoder and Mozert, three more recent examples of clashes between 
parents and schools have moved through the courts that help to illustrate the issue.  In the 
first of these cases, Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions,140 the parents of fifteen-year 
old children in Chelmsford High School in Massachusetts objected to their children’s being 
required to attend a school-wide assembly without parental approval that consisted of a 
ninety-minute presentation intended to serve as an AIDS awareness program for students.141   
The presentation was staged by the owner of a private company, Suzi Landolphi.  In the 
course of the presentation, Landolphi, the parents charged, presented sexually explicit 
monologues and participated in sexually suggestive skits with several students chosen from 
the audience.  The parents asserted that Landolphi not only joked with students about 
premarital sexual activity (including encouraging one male student to display his “orgasm 
face” to the crowd), she also discussed approvingly oral sex, masturbation, homosexual 
sexual activity, and condom use.   
The First Circuit, in denying the parents claim, held that while the state did not have 
the power to foreclose parents from choosing a different path of education, this freedom does 
not encompass “a fundamental constitutional right to dictate the curriculum at the public 
school to which they have chosen to send their children.”142 
                                                 
14068 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995) 
 
141In that case, the students, themselves, also filed claims contending that their compelled attendance deprived 
them of their privacy rights and their rights to an education free from sexual harassment.   
 
142Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, 68 F.3d at 534 (1st Cir. 1995). 
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In the Court’s words, 
[i]f all parents had a fundamentally constitutional right to dictate individually what 
the schools teach their children, the school would be forced to cater a curriculum for 
each student whose parents had genuine moral disagreements with the school’s 
choice of subject matter.  We cannot see that the Constitution imposes such a burden 
on state educational systems, and accordingly find that the rights of parents . . . do not 
encompass a broad-based right to restrict the flow of information in the public 
schools.143   
 
 In the second of the recent cases,144 the parents of a high school student in the Rye 
Neck School District contested the district’s mandatory community service program.  Under 
the program, students had to complete 40 hours of community service work to earn their 
diplomas.  The plaintiffs objected to the school requiring their child to participate on the 
ground that it infringed on their right to direct his upbringing and education.  In reviewing 
the case, the Second Circuit applied only a rational basis level of scrutiny because the 
parents’ objection to the program was not based on religion.  It then found that the school 
district easily passed that test.  In the Court’s words,  
The state’s interest in education extends to teaching students the values and habits of 
good citizenship, and introducing them to their social responsibilities as citizens. . . . 
[T]he mandatory community service program rationally furthers this state objective.  
The District reasonably concluded that the mandatory community service program 
would expose students to the needs of their communities and to the various ways in 
which a democratic system of volunteerism can respond to those needs.  In doing so, 
the program helps students recognize their place in their communities, and, ideally, 
inspires them to introspection regarding their larger role in our political system.145 
 
 Finally, in the last of these newer cases,146 the father of a seventh-grader attending a 
Fairfield, Connecticut public school challenged a state regulation requiring his son to attend 
                                                 
143Id. at 535. 
 
144Immediato v. Rye Neck School District, 73 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 
145Id. at 461-62. 
146Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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health education classes at a public school that included information on health, character, 
citizenship, family planning, human sexuality, AIDS awareness, and social aspects of family 
life.  The school permitted parents to excuse their children from the six classes involving 
family-life instruction and AIDS education, but not the other sessions of the health program.  
The father argued that it was his Fourteenth Amendment right for his son “to be home 
schooled regarding health, morals, ethical and personal behavior.”147   
On appeal, the Leebaert plaintiff conceded that the challenged curriculum would pass 
rational basis review since the program would be a rational way of furthering the health and 
welfare of children. He contended, however, that strict scrutiny was appropriate, both 
because the case concerned a parent’s fundamental right to control their child’s upbringing, 
and because the curriculum implicated his free exercise rights.  The Court rejected the 
father’s claim that parents had a fundamental right to dictate public school curricula on the 
ground that recognizing such a right “would make it difficult or impossible for any public 
school authority to administer school curricula responsive to the overall educational needs of 
the community and its children”.148   
 
Liberal Democratic Goods and Justifications  
 
My purpose here is not to consider the constitutional appropriateness of the school 
programs contested in these cases, but their appropriateness in a liberal democracy as a 
normative and prudential matter.  These cases are such difficult cases because, as with the 
interests at stake in state support of relationships between adults, they implicate fault lines 
among important interests that go clear to the core of a liberal democracy.  One way to map 
                                                 
147Id. at 136. 
 
148Id. at 141. 
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out these tensions is to think of the relevant values as occupying the space of a triangle in 
which each corner represents a different source of goods, and hence a different source of 
justification, important to a liberal democracy: liberal, democratic, and civic. In this 
schematization, the liberal corner includes those goods relating to individual rights and self-
determination that have been given pride of place in the liberal tradition.  The democratic 
corner, by contrast, focuses on the moral legitimacy of majoritarian self-rule.  Finally, the 
civic corner focuses on those virtues that must be inculcated in citizens if the polity is to 
flourish.    
I do not want to make great claims for the congruence of these three categories:149   
obviously their status varies greatly – both the liberal and civic corners contain particular 
goods and virtues, while the democratic corner contains no definitive content, but instead 
gives justification to whatever the citizens decide.  With that said, each corner marks a 
legitimate source of justification in a liberal democracy to which attention should be paid.  It 
is the tensions among the interests associated within and among each of these corners that 
make the issue of civic education such a difficult one.  I discuss these interests in turn. 
 
  Liberal goods  
 Considering the liberal corner first, given the primacy of liberalism in the American 
world-view (Hartz 1955), it is unsurprising that liberal goods are most often discussed with 
                                                 
149There are a number of shortcomings to mapping the debate on civic education in this way.  Some qualities, 
such as children being able to make informed decisions about different ways of life, potentially fall into both the 
liberal (based on furthering the autonomy of children) and civic (based on the polity’s functioning better when 
citizens are able to deliberate) corners of the triangle.  In addition, it could be argued that liberalism itself both 
should and historically did incorporate the values associated with a strong civic realm (see, e.g., Stephen 
Macedo, Democracy and Distrust 2000; Thomas Spragens, Civic Liberalism: Reflections on Our Democratic 
Ideals 1999; William Galston, Liberal  Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State 1991).  With 
that said, it seems to me that thinking of the issue of civic education in terms of these three areas helps to 
highlight the tension among and within these different areas –  tensions that are too often glossed over in 
discussions of civic education.   
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reference to civic education.  In particular, it is the good of autonomy, traditionally accorded 
pride of place in liberal theory, on which theoretical analyses generally focus.  It is, 
moreover, the interest focused on by the parents in each of the cases described above, 
generally framed in terms of parents’ liberty interest to raise their children in accordance with 
their own religious beliefs and views of the good life.  Yet, as Thomas Spragens150 points 
out, analyzing civic education in terms of autonomy does not produce a clear direction for 
civic education.  The problem is that both parents and children have autonomy interests 
implicated in civic education that potentially point in different directions:  The parents’ 
interest involves raising children in accordance with parents’ views of the good life.  
Focusing on this interest suggests narrowly circumscribing the state’s authority to control the 
education of children.  Yet parents’ views of the good life may include teaching their 
children to reject a norm of autonomy for their own lives, or preventing children from 
developing the capacity to think and make decisions for themselves.151  In this case, the 
states’ deferring to parents’ autonomy interests can conflict with children’s own autonomy 
interests.  Thus, while the parents’ autonomy interests would favor a confined role for the 
state, the children’s autonomy interests can therefore favor state involvement to insure that 
children develop the capacity to choose their own course in life. 
 The Yoder and Mozert cases both raise these issues clearly.  In both, the parents’ 
objection to the schools’ programs was that they would expose their children to other ways of 
life besides that of their parents.  The parents’ concern was that this exposure might lead the 
children to believe that they had capacity to choose other ways of life, a belief that their 
                                                 
150Spragens, supra note 149, 31. 
 
151See Linda McClain, The Place of Families: Fostering Capacity, Equality, and Responsibility 
(2005). 
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parents found abhorrent.  By the same token, the health education curriculum challenged in 
Leebaert assumed that students should and would make their own decisions about whether to 
engage in sexual activity before marriage, and counseled them about their options if they 
chose to engage in sexual activity.  Turk Leebaert, in contrast, asserted that he had the right 
to foreclose this choice on the part of his son, and to teach him simply that premarital sexual 
activity was wrong and that the child was not permitted to engage in it. 
 
Democratic goods 
But we are not only a liberal polity, we are also a democracy.  The claim to 
legitimacy of collective self-rule therefore provides an alternative source of justification 
through which the issue of civic education must be analyzed.  Insofar as democracy is seen as 
a minimally objectionable form of government because each citizen has a say in the conduct 
of the collective affairs of the group,152 the determinations of the polity have a source of 
moral justification apart from whether they further the individual interests accorded value in 
the liberal tradition.  And the fact that children are not only members of their families but 
also citizens of the polity means that the polity, like their families, has a legitimate claim to 
direct the education of children.  Whereas the liberal goods at stake do not yield a clear 
direction regarding the scope of civic education, focusing on the moral authority of 
democracy argues for the state to have broad authority with respect to children’s education, 
although it does not determine the content of that education.   
This democratic justification is not explicitly mentioned in the opinions resolving the 
legitimacy of contested school programs.  It serves, nevertheless, as an ideological 
underpinning of the constitutional framework that courts use to assess the legitimacy of 
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contested school programs. Under this framework, enactments issued according to 
democratic mandates will generally be declared legitimate unless challengers can establish 
that they interfere with some fundamental interest of the challenger’s.   
 
  Civic virtues 
Finally, in the last corner of the triangle, are civic virtues – those virtues that citizens 
must possess if the polity is to function well.  In the civic republican tradition, in which 
participation in politics was seen as an end in itself, these virtues received considerable 
attention.  Likewise, in democratic theory, theorists gave significant attention to these virtues.  
Even Joseph Schumpeter, who presented a fairly unambitious account of democracy, argued 
that its success depends on “the human material of politics—the people who man the party 
machines, are elected to serve in parliament, rise to cabinet office -- . . . be[ing] of 
sufficiently high quality.”153  He added that politically relevant players in society must be 
willing and able to exercise “democratic self-control,” under which politicians abide by 
applicable laws, avoid miscarriages of justice, and support the integrity of the legislature and 
voters allow leaders to rule; all concerned, moreover, must have “a large measure of 
tolerance for different opinions” and must have the patience to allow others to sound their 
view.154   
In the cases in which parents have challenged school programs, civic interests have 
received some, albeit limited, attention when courts examine the schools’ justification for 
these programs.  Thus, in Yoder, the Court considered the importance of the state’s interests 
in preparing children to participate effectively in our liberal democratic system, as well as to 
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be self-sufficient participants in society.  Similarly, in Immediato, the Second Circuit, in 
upholding the challenged community service program, focused on the value of the civics 
education that the program would given the students, thus teaching them “the values and 
habits of good citizenship, and introducing them to their social responsibilities as citizens.”155  
In contrast, Rawlsian-era theorists, as I discussed in Chapter 1, paid less attention than either 
civic republican or democratic theory to the virtues needed for a liberal democracy to thrive.  
In recent years, however, the renewed focus on civic republicanism has acted as an important 
corrective on liberal theory, as liberal theorists have increasingly recognized the need for 
civic virtues in the citizenry for a well functioning liberal democracy.  As a consequence, 
preeminent proponents of liberalism have begun to argue that the state should foster the civic 
virtues necessary to the polity’s.156  They have differed with one another, however, regarding 
both the content of civic virtues and the extent to which the state may promote them when 
they interfere with citizens’ autonomy.   
  
Existing Theories of Civic Education 
There are strong claims to be made for each of the three types of interests implicated 
in civic education – liberal, democratic, and civic.  Many discussions of civic education, 
however, have tended to focus on only one of the three types of interests, or a subpart of one 
of these interests.  As a result, these theories have limited usefulness for helping to sort out 
the proper path for a polity committed to both liberal principles and democratic rule, and 
which recognizes that children are both members of their families and future citizens of the 
                                                 
155Immediato v. Rye Neck School District, 72 F.3d 461-62 (2d Cir. 1996). 
156See, e.g., Spragens, supra note 149; Stephen Macedo, Liberal Civic Education and Religious 
Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls, 105(3) Ethics 487 (1995); Galston, supra note 149; Amy 
Gutmann, Undemocratic Education, in Liberalism & the Moral Life (1989). 
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polity.  In this section, I consider discussions on civic education by four prominent theorists 
of civic education: Bruce Ackerman, Stephen Gilles, Amy Gutmann, and William Galston.  
Each of their analyses, I argue, fails to give adequate consideration to the important interests 
at stake and therefore fails to achieve an appropriate balance among these different interests.   
 
Bruce Ackerman: Emphasis on Children’s Autonomy 
 Ackerman’s theory -- The renaissance of liberal political theory in the United States 
that began in the 1970s with the publication of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice assumed that 
a distinctive feature of the liberal state is its neutrality among individuals’ conceptions of the 
good life.157  The liberal state, in this view, is a limited state whose purpose is to preserve as 
much autonomy of citizens as possible so that they can live out their own vision of the good 
life.  In Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980), Bruce Ackerman argued that this precept 
of state neutrality means that a liberal theory of education precludes both parents and the 
state from inculcating in children “an uncritical acceptance of any conception of the good 
life.”158   According to Ackerman, “We have no right to look upon future citizens as if we 
were master gardeners who can tell the difference between a pernicious weed and a beautiful 
flower.”159  Instead, it is the role of liberal education to “provide children with a sense of the 
very different lives that could be theirs – so that, as they approach maturity, they have the 
cultural materials available to build lives equal to their evolving conceptions of the good.”160    
                                                 
157See Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State, (1980); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 
(1978); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, (1974); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971); John 
Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical 14 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 223, (1985). 
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In his theory, Ackerman accorded parents broad rights to control the cultural 
diversity to which younger children are exposed during primary education on 
the ground that these children need significant cultural coherence in order to 
locate their own place in the world.161  Parents’ authority to control diversity, 
however, receded as a child grows older and can tolerate greater challenges to 
parental ideas. As children progress through secondary school, both society 
and their parents should therefore expose them to more diverse cultural 
materials to ensure that, as they approach adulthood, they have the raw 
materials to define who they want to be.162   
Analysis -- Ackerman’s broad affirmation of children’s autonomy is appealing in 
many respects.  Liberalism’s respect for each individual’s autonomy certainly means that 
children need to be given the resources and education that allow them the capacity for self-
determination.  Yet Ackerman’s view that this should be the extent of a child’s character 
education ultimately gives far too much weight to this value as against other values.  
Importantly, Ackerman gives no weight to the polity’s interest in insuring that citizens 
develop other civic virtues besides autonomy that are necessary to function in a liberal 
democracy.  Yet, as William Galston notes, many of the virtues essential to a flourishing 
democracy, such as a belief in the political equality of all citizens, are virtues specific to 
democracies, rather than the obvious choices that children would arrive at if left to their own 
devices.163  Because of this, Ackerman’s view that the state should merely present options of 
different ways of life to children makes his version of liberalism unlikely to produce the 
committed, responsible citizens needed for a liberal democracy to function well.  Instead, the 
array of choices presented to children is far more likely to produce a culture that would 
justify Stephen Macedo’s likening of liberal cultures to Californian culture – in which people 
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constantly try on new lifestyles and principles without buying wholeheartedly into any of 
them (besides that of personal freedom).164 
Further, in giving paramount weight to children’s autonomy, Ackerman ignores 
parents’ deeply-held interests in teaching children their own vision of the good life.  As 
Stephen Gilles argues, raising children is central to the life plan of many adults.  And part 
and parcel of raising children is imparting one’s own vision of the good life to them.  While 
this interest would seem to merit at least some weight, Ackerman’s view discounts it as 
illegitimate.  Similarly, he discounts the interests of the democracy in ensuring that the 
majority can pass on its way of life and its view of the good life to the next generation. 
In summary, Ackerman certainly gets it right when he focuses on the importance of 
developing children’s capacity for autonomy.  A liberal democracy that respects citizens’ 
choices because it believes that these choices reflect a capacity for (self and collective-self) 
determination , must indeed seek to assure that young citizens do, indeed, develop this 
capacity.  Yet Ackerman is wrong that children’s autonomy is the only good that has a 
legitimate role in civic education.   
 
Stephen Gilles:  A Parentalist Manifesto 
Gilles’ theory -- If Ackerman’s vision veers too heavily in the direction of children’s 
autonomy, however, Stephen Gilles’ veers too heavily in the direction of their parents’ 
autonomy.  In a 1996 Chicago Law Review article, Gilles vigorously defends parents’ rights 
to pass on their way of life to their children, and opposes civic education over parents’ 
objections.165  Gilles rests his contention that parents should control children’s civic 
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165Stephen Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 938 (1996). 
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education on two basic arguments.  First, given the lack of liberal consensus on what 
constitutes the good life and, consequently, the good education, and the absence of any 
standards to decide these issues authoritatively, Gilles contends that decision-making 
authority is properly vested in parents, who are “more likely to pursue the child’s best 
interest as they define it.”166   
Second, Gilles disputes the notion that the state has a paramount interest in 
controlling the education of children.  As against the state’s interest, he contends,  
individuals have an even more fundamental interest in nurturing their children and in 
being nurtured by their parents.  Contemporary liberal theory tends to assume not 
only that citizenship comes first, and individuality second, but also that – even within 
the realm of individuality – marriage, family, and child rearing are merely one 
prominent set of pursuits.  These assumptions invert the priorities by which  
most reasonable people live.  For the overwhelming majority, the loving relationships 
we share with our spouses, our children, our siblings, and the parents who educated 
us are at the heart of our individual conceptions of the good life.167  
 
According to Gilles, the human flourishing of both parents and children depends on parental 
nurturing and education, and parental control over the values children are taught is essential 
to that enterprise.  On the basis of these two rationales, Gilles argues that parents’ views 
regarding their children’s schooling must be respected so long as they are reasonable, in the 
sense that they “acknowledge the importance of normal human development, embrace civic 
toleration and respect for law, and acquiesce in our basic constitutional arrangements.”168  
Under this standard, “[b]ecause few parents in our society will choose to educate their 
children in ways that fail to satisfy these standards, states will only rarely be able to justify 
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overriding parents’ educational authority.”169 
Based on this framework of analysis, Gilles argues that the parents in both Yoder and 
Mozert properly had the right to decide their children’s educational fate.  In Yoder, Gilles 
argues, requiring children to go to public school beyond the eighth grade exceeds the societal 
consensus of the civic education required to support the polity.  After this point, he contends, 
parents properly had the right to choose the education for their children that was appropriate 
to their lives in the Amish community.  In Mozert, Gilles argues that the state’s effort to 
teach respect for other ways of life also exceeds the liberal consensus on this issue and hence 
should not have been imposed over their parents’ objection. 
Analysis - Gilles’ account, in contrast to Ackerman’s written a generation before, 
recognizes the validity of a number of different interests, including the state’s interest in 
instilling civic virtues as well as children’s interest in autonomy.  Based on an oddly-
constructed, formalistic argument, however, grounded on the fact that no consensus can ever 
be achieved on what constitutes the good life, Gilles winds up giving parental interests 
almost complete weight, with little weight given to the other interests.170   
That there are no definitive standards for sorting out what constitutes good civic character, 
however, does not mean that the polity’s interest in such character should be ignored, or that 
there are not better and worse arguments to be made with respect to civic character, any more 
than the recognition that there are no definitive standards for art should lead art museums to 
empty out their galleries.  Insofar as citizens’ need for civic virtues is taken seriously, the 
question Gilles should be asking is not “who has the best incentives to further the child’s best 
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interests?” but instead “who has the best incentives to further the polity’s interest in 
developing civic virtue in children?”  In answering this question, parents are disadvantaged 
compared to the state precisely because they are likely to be focused on their child’s 
individual interests rather than the polity’s long-term interests.   
This is not to argue, of course, that the child’s best interests should not be considered, 
but rather to recognize that the difficult enterprise of maintaining a vigorous liberal 
democracy requires that more than only the interests of children as individuals be considered.  
And this means that sometimes an expansive reading of individual interests – both parents’ 
and children’s – needs to be constrained to take into account the needs of the polity.  Gilles’ 
argument – that contemporary liberalism should take parents’ private interests in rearing their 
children more seriously than citizenship interests – therefore misses a critical point.  The 
point is that citizens must give up some portion of their freedom to secure the very freedom 
to raise their children that Gilles lauds. 
And while Gilles is certainly correct that complete consensus regarding the civic 
virtues required for a healthy liberal democracy will never be possible, and that the finer 
points of these virtues will always be debatable, one could also overstate the extent of this 
debate.  In contrast to the difficulty of knowing what a good life should be, the inquiry 
regarding what skills and traits are needed to support a liberal democracy is considerably 
more directed.   As William Galston counsels, “If sufficiently rigorous criteria are employed, 
we are of course forced to conclude that we ‘know’ nothing.  If, however, we adopt criteria 
appropriate to the subject matter, it turns out that we know a fair amount about what 
promotes our . . . collective wellbeing.”171  In this regard, it is clear that a vigorous liberal 
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democracy requires that children understand that deep differences in beliefs exist among 
citizens of the polity, come to learn to respect others’ rights, and to listen carefully to others’ 
opinions.  Children must learn to adopt a position of liberal humility in which they recognize 
that, even if they believe they are right about particular comprehensive views, they cannot 
prove this and should not seek to foist these views on others, and that politics should be more 
than a free-for-all in which the majority attempts to wield the coercive power of the state to 
defend its own contested vision of morality on others.  Finally, children must learn to support 
fundamental liberal institutions such as the separation of church and state.  While there is 
room for reasonable debate over the precise boundaries of some of these skills and virtues, 
such as the extent to which citizens need to be able to rationally weigh different courses of 
collective courses of action, there is at least considerable agreement around their core. 
Not only does Gilles’ proposal fail to safeguard the relevant civic interests, it also 
gives little weight to safeguarding children’s autonomy.  It is somewhat ironic that Gilles 
relies so firmly on autonomy in his defense of parental rights but would deny the 
preconditions of autonomy to their children insofar as he defers to parental views that their 
children should not be exposed to other ways of life or systems of thought or values. The bar 
of acceding to “normal human development” that Gilles requires that parents clear is so low 
that it would allow parents to deny their children the knowledge that they have basic choices 
about how to live their lives.  Liberalism’s respect for diverse ways of life is tied directly to 
the importance that it places on respect for an individual’s self-determination.  In placing so 
few safeguards on children’s right to self-determination, and so much power in parents’ 
hands to deprive children of opportunities necessary to achieve it, Gilles’ violates these 
fundamental liberal precepts.   
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Amy Gutmann: The Interests of the Democracy 
 Gutmann’s Theory -- In contrast to Gilles, Amy Gutmann presents a theory of civic 
education that places the lion’s share of authority to resolve controversies over public 
education with the democracy.  Gutmann points out that, in accord with Gilles, that although 
liberal theories often skirt the issue, reasonable people will inevitably disagree over what 
constitutes the best education for children.172  This means to Gutmann, as a practical matter, 
that any attempt to solve disputes regarding public education by advocating the substantive 
content of that education is incomplete unless it also reckons with how to solve reasonable 
disagreements.  Conservative theorists, such as Gilles, seek to deal with this inevitable 
disagreement by saying that parents are the appropriate parties to solve these disputes.  
Gutmann argues that this approach is unsatisfactory because it fails to recognize that children 
are not only members of their family, but also members of the polity, which has a strong 
interest in the qualities and capacities of its future citizens.  This means, in Gutmann’s view, 
that “ the educational authority of parents and of polities has to be partial to be justified.”173  
Gutmann therefore proposes a power-sharing agreement in which parents educate their 
children about their own conceptions of the good life at home; meanwhile, the democratic 
state has the task of educating students in accordance with its own principles at school.174  
Gutmann argues that the shared educational authority that she advocates “supports the core 
value of democracy: conscious social reproduction in its most inclusive form.”175  
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Gutmann grounds the moral justification for public control of children’s education on 
the moral claims of deliberative democracy.  She argues that “[t]he most justifiable way of 
making mutually binding decisions in a representative democracy – including decisions not 
to deliberate about some matters – is by deliberative decision making, where the decision 
makers are accountable to the people who are most affected by their decisions.”176  In 
determining the content of the public education that children will receive, Gutmann counsels, 
“[t]he policies that result from our democratic deliberations will not always be the right ones, 
but they will be more enlightened – by the values and concerns of the many communities that 
constitute a democracy.”177   
 This does not mean, for Gutmann, that the simple will of the majority that should 
guide a democracy’s decisions regarding the substantive content of education.  To the 
contrary, Gutmann argues that the same democratic principles that give moral weight to the 
deliberative decisions of the polity also “commit[] it to assuring children an education that 
makes those freedoms both possible and meaningful in the future.”178  Put another way, 
“[d]eliberative decision making and accountability presuppose a citizenry whose education 
prepares them to deliberate, and to evaluate the results of the deliberations of their 
representatives.  A primary aim of publicly mandated schooling is therefore to cultivate the 
skills and virtues of deliberation.”179 Gutmann argues that this deliberative mission not only 
gives schools a positive program to effectuate, it also constrains democratic authority in two 
specific ways.  First, education must conform to the principle of nonrepression – that is, it 
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may not exclude deliberation regarding any particular rational ideas.   Second, it must 
conform to the principle of nondiscrimination – meaning that neither parents nor a 
democracy may adopt practices that would keep some children or groups of children from 
developing the skills necessary to participate in democratic deliberation.  Under this scheme, 
communities are allowed to shape their children’s world, but they may not exercise this 
authority in ways that deprive these children of the same right to participate in deliberations 
about their collective fate at a later time.  
 For Gutmann, this means that in the Mozert case, the parents’ challenge to the 
school’s exposing their children to the readers was appropriately denied on the ground that 
the challenged readers were within the school system’s prerogative.  The fact that some 
parents opposed the content of these readers based on deeply-held religious beliefs should 
not serve as a ground for exempting the children or abandoning the curriculum.  “The right to 
free exercise of religion does not entail the right of parents to near-exclusive or 
comprehensive authority over their children’s schooling.”180  While fundamentalists have a 
right to teach their children their religious beliefs at home, parents do not have a right to 
withdraw their children from the school’s chosen curriculum unless the education violates the 
principles of nonrepression or nondiscrimination.  Otherwise, “democratic institutions are 
denied their legitimate role in shaping the character of citizens.”181  In Gutmann’s view, this 
means that civic education may exceed what scholars such as Galston refer to as the “civic 
minimum” necessary to ensure that a democracy runs smoothly.182   
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Analysis – At the time it was first published, in 1987, and through to the present, 
Gutmann’s argument has been the most eloquent and important defense of the democratic 
interests at stake in public education, and the importance of conscious social reproduction.  
And it is not only democratic interests, as measured by the deliberated will of the majority, 
that is served by her theory: Gutmann’s emphasis on the necessary preconditions to the 
exercise of that will, in the form of ensuring that children develop the qualities and skills that 
enable them to make deliberative decisions about their individual and collective lives, 
ensures that children develop what I have referred to as “civic goods.”  Further, when these 
qualities and skills are paired with Gutmann’s principles of nondiscrimination and 
nonrepression, although she derives these principles from democratic purposes, her theory 
both promotes and safeguards the liberal good of children’s autonomy.    
Despite these considerable accomplishments, Gutmann’s theory fails to give adequate 
weight to one important set of goods: the interests of parents in transmitting their ways of life 
to their children.  Gutmann contends that public education does not need to be limited to 
protect this parental interest because parents still have the opportunity to pass along their 
ways of life through their contact with their children at home.  Yet the broad scope that she 
accords the state to educate within public schools would allow parents little area immune 
from the contestation of the state.  Take, for example, Gutmann’s discussion of sex education 
in schools.  Gutmann acknowledges the thorniness of this issue but argues that, ultimately, 
democratic deliberation and decisionmaking should determine whether the subject should be 
taught.  She would therefore accept the conservative position to avoid teaching sex 
education, or the liberal position that all children should be taught sex education even over 
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the objection of their parents, so long as the determination arrived at was democratically 
sanctioned.183  She argues, however, that although any such decision reached through 
democratic processes would be legitimate, and should be instituted; either such decision 
would be unwise policy.  Failing to teach sex education, she argues, will not, as 
conservatives believe, restore the sanctity of sex; while, contrary to liberal beliefs, mandatory 
sex education would also be unwise because it is as “offensive to parents who believe it the 
sanctity of sex as mandatory prayer is to parents who do not believe in God.”184  As a result, 
such policies could “lead conservative parents to flee the public schools.”  Taking this into 
account, Gutmann argues that a wiser policy would allow schools to offer such programs but 
allow parents to exempt their children from such courses.185   
While it seems to me that Gutmann likely reaches the right result in advocating an 
opt-out policy with respect to sensitive issues of sex education, her rationale for allowing the 
opt-out – that sex education is legitimate but, as a prudential matter, not wise since 
conservative parents might otherwise leave the schools – seems to me inadequately to 
safeguard the parental interests at stake.  We are not simply a democracy, we are a liberal 
democracy.   Because of this, the deep respect for the will of the majority that comes with 
democracy must be tempered by a deep respect for personal autonomy, including the 
autonomy of parents to raise their children according to their own view of the good.  How 
these two important goods should be balanced (as well as balanced against other important 
goods) raises difficult issues, but to conclude that democracies have no obligation to 
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safeguard parental interests at school, although it might be a matter of good policy to do so, 
evades the important job of helping to define the appropriate balance.186   
Put another way, Gutmann uses the prudential rationale that parents might otherwise 
pull their children out of public schools to reach the conclusion that schools should adopt 
opt-out policies for issues such as sex education, but the intuitive rationale against imposing 
such education over the objection of parents really stems from recognition of the strong 
parental interest in this issue.  There are other issues that might also cause conservative 
parents to leave the schools – for example, teaching evolution in schools – that we, including 
Gutmann, would not consider dropping from the curriculum as a result.  Should schools 
therefore allow parents to pull their children out of classes in which evolution is taught?  The 
reason we likely find evolution to be a less sympathetic case for allowing parents to opt out is 
not because we think that parents are less likely to pull their children out of schools, but 
because we think that some areas of sex education are less central to school’s appropriate 
mission than they are central to parents’ comprehensive beliefs, and therefore more of an 
area in which parental wishes should be respected than science education.   
Gutmann, it seems to me, also uses prudential reasons to reach a result that accords 
with liberal principles when she considers the issue of whether schools should teach children 
religious standards.  She argues that it would be unwise for schools to teach such religious 
standards because “secular standards constitute a better basis upon which to build a common 
education for citizenship than any set of sectarian religious beliefs – better because secular 
standards are both a fairer and a firmer basis for peacefully reconciling our differences.”187  
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Although Gutmann’s conclusion ultimately accords with liberalism’s reticence for the state 
to teach comprehensive philosophies, her rationale would presumably permit such lessons if 
inculcating children with religious ideas would serve a firmer basis for reconciling citizens’ 
differences.  Yet even if it could be shown that the government could settle differences better 
through teaching children particular religious concepts, surely that would still violate our 
notions that it is the function of parents, rather than the state, to teach children to religion.  
Thus, although Gutmann reaches conclusions that ultimately accord with liberal intuitions, 
this should not obscure the fact that her theory contains no principled limitations on schools’ 
education students in ways that deeply violate these intuitions.  
In sum, Gutmann’s theory does not pay sufficient attention to how to integrate the 
liberal ideals that, along with democratic ideals, are fundamental to our political system.  
Since significant tensions exist between democracy and liberalism – the former focusing on 
group decisionmaking, the latter focusing on individual rights –  Gutmann’s valuing one and 
ignoring the other makes for inadequate reconciliation of the principles guiding liberal 
democracy.  We generally assume that under a liberal democratic form of government some 
issues and decisions should remain immune from direct government intervention, even the 
relatively gentle persuasion of education.  Gutmann, however, doesn’t help us to think 
through the location of these limits.  Neither does she give sufficient weight to our intuition 
that, at least in many areas, we have some greater interest in passing our beliefs along to our 
own children than we do generally as a polity in determining the course of the next 
generation at large.  In this respect, Gutmann’s answer that our children should submit to 
civic education because we, as citizens, have had the opportunity to participate in the 
democratic process seems less than satisfactory. 
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William Galston - Civic Liberalism 
Galston’s Theory -- Last but not least, I turn to William Galston’s proposal for civic 
education.  In contrast to the theorists I have discussed thus far, Galston specifically seeks to 
balance the competing interests at stake in civic education.  He notes that “the most poignant 
problems raised by liberal civic education is the clash between the content of that education 
and the desire of parents to pass on their way of life to their children.”188  According to 
Galston, liberal polities can legitimately require their citizens to accede to a “basic civic 
education” that gives them “the beliefs and habits that support the polity and enable 
individuals to function competently in public affairs.”189   In Galston’s view, this means that 
even if it conflicts with parents’ basic beliefs, the state may require children to participate in 
civic education that seeks to inculcate, among other qualities, “the disposition to respect the 
rights of others, the capacity to evaluate the talents, character, and performance of public 
officials, and the ability to moderate public desires in the face of public limits.”190   
However, in order to give parents’ liberty interests their due in our liberal system, 
Galston argues that the state may legitimately go no further than providing the basic 
education that this “civic minimalist” standard requires.191  In contrast to the more ambitious 
goals that Gutmann supports of teaching children to deliberate about different ways of life, in 
Galston’s view, the fact that the United States is a representative democracy rather than a 
participatory democracy limits the acceptable scope of civic education because it requires 
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less of citizens to function competently in the political system.192  Specifically, Galston 
argues that a representative democracy does not require citizens to engage in rational 
deliberation; therefore the state may not legitimately develop children’s ability to think about 
ways of life apart from their own.  In Galston’s words, “liberal freedom entails the right to 
live unexamined as well as examined lives – a right the effective exercise of which may 
require parental bulwarks against the corrosive influence of modernist skepticism.”193  He 
argues as well that liberal freedom means that schools do not have the right to expose 
children to a range of possible ways of life.   According to Galston,  
The state may act in loco parentis to overcome family-based obstacles to normal 
development.  And it may use public instrumentalities, including the system of 
education, to promote the attainment by all children of the basic requisites of 
citizenship.  These are legitimate intrusive powers.  But they are limited by their own 
inner logic.  In a liberal state, interventions that cannot be justified on this basis 
cannot be justified at all.  That is how liberal democracies must draw the line between 
parental and public authority over the education of children . . . .”194 
 
By the same token, Galston’s views on the manner in which civic education should be 
performed are influenced by the elementary level of understanding and participation he 
contends are required in a representative democracy.  He asserts that teaching children to 
support liberal democracy cannot be accomplished through teaching them rational inquiry 
since liberalism takes sides on disputed issues such as equality, freedom and human good 
that are not definitively settled from a philosophical point of view.  Instead, civic education 
should be taught on a more simplistic level in which loyalty to the realm is inculcated, not 
through a warts-and-all description of American history, but through a “nobler moralizing 
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history: a pantheon of heroes who confer legitimacy on central institutions.”195  In Galston’s 
view, “[i]t is unrealistic to believe that more than a few adult citizens of liberal societies will 
ever move beyond the kind of civic commitment engendered by such a pedagogy.”196   
On these grounds, Galston disputes Gutmann’s argument that the Amish parents in 
Yoder should have been required to send their children to high school in order to expose them 
to other ways of life, and to teach them to deliberate about their collective lives.  In Galston’s 
words,  
In a liberal-democratic polity, to be sure, the fact of social diversity means that the 
willingness to coexist peacefully with ways of life very different from one’s own is 
essential.  Furthermore, the need for public evaluation of leaders and policies means 
that the state has an interest in developing citizens with at least the minimal 
conditions of reasonable public judgment.  But neither of these civic requirements 
entails a need for public authority to take an interest in how children think about 
different ways of life. . . . In short, the civic standpoint does not warrant the state’s 
conclusion that the state must (or may) structure public education to foster in children 
skeptical reflection on ways of life inherited from parents or local communities.197 
 
Analysis -- In my view, Galston gets the task right when he seeks to carve out a 
workable balance between the civic and liberal interests in determining the permissible 
breadth of civic education (although I would include democratic interests, as well).  Yet I 
believe that he still does not arrive at a workable accommodation among them in several 
respects.   
First, in seeking to give so much deference to the diverse beliefs held by citizens, 
Galston defines citizens’ necessary competencies too narrowly to support a vigorous liberal 
democracy, even a representative one.  The education that Galston prescribes for future 
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citizens risks forfeiting the check on government power that a healthy democracy demands.  
A vigorous representative democracy requires that representatives be constrained at least to 
some significant extent by the interests of the people, rather than be dictated by the will of 
only some small portion of the population. While this doesn’t require that each citizen be 
able to act independently as a watchdog against government corruption, it at least requires 
that some significant portion of the population be able to weigh and heed the claims of the 
press and others who act as watchdogs. Galston’s willingness to allow future citizens to learn 
little about politics, to leave their own beliefs about the world unexamined and their critical 
faculties unhoned, and, indeed, his advocating that the state teach support for the realm in an 
uncritical manner, run the risk of producing citizens who are too easily led by the 
government, and too quick to believe inadequate justifications and explanations.    
Galston’s theory also does not contain the safeguards necessary to insure the 
preservation of individual rights and the commitment to allowing diversity that a liberal 
polity requires.   In this regard, Galston draws an overly-clear demarcation between children 
accepting that others should coexist peacefully and children respecting other ways of life.  
The former, he argues, is required of liberalism; the latter is not.  The fact of the matter, 
though, is that the line between the two is a murky one.  The political events of the past few 
years regarding same-sex marriage show that even when certain sectors of society, in this 
instance fundamentalist Christians, learn to coexist peacefully with others in the sense that 
they can agree not to deprive them of their citizenship (although many would still like at least 
to imprison them for sodomy), this does not stop repeated efforts to deny them, for reasons 
that cannot be justified without resort to their own comprehensive philosophies, the same 
privileges that are accorded to others.  A commitment to coexist peacefully in some very 
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narrow sense, then, is not enough to fulfill liberalism’s commitment to equality under the 
laws.  More fundamentally, despite Galston’s stated support for teaching children to coexist 
peacefully, by allowing parents to overrule schools’ decisions to expose children to diversity, 
Galston would deny children the tools to understand what peaceful coexistence in a society 
marked by profound differences really means.  It is easy to make students understand 
coexisting peacefully with those who have similar beliefs; the challenge of liberal democracy 
is coexisting with others with very different beliefs.  Without this exposure, lessons about 
peaceful coexistence mean little.   
More than that, Galston’s narrow vision for civic education, far from the recipe to 
appease different groups that Galston perceives it to be, is a recipe for civic disharmony.  A 
polity composed of citizens untrained to deliberate rationally about collective concerns yields 
a polity likely to devolve into partisan bickering rather than reasoned attempts to bridge 
differences and to find a common path that those from diverse walks of life can choose 
together.  Further, citizens who cannot rationally deliberate about their common future and 
who have not been made to confront what the later John Rawls called the “fact of 
pluralism,”198 are likely to choose leaders whose beliefs not only match their own, but who 
see no difficulty with imposing these beliefs on others.  Such a polity cannot safeguard the 
autonomy and protection of individual rights and liberty that a liberal polity must guarantee 
its citizens.    
This is not to deny that, as Galston points out, significant attention must be paid to the 
extent to which requiring particular types of civic education alienates particular societal 
groups. Yet, as Galston recognizes, there is a delicate balance to be struck between 
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attempting to accommodate as many viewpoints as possible and furthering the core 
commitments of liberal democracy.  Galston’s fundamental impulse, in seeking to promote 
diverse sets of beliefs as well as the moral backbone that strong, committed belief systems 
can promote, tilts him too far toward accommodation.  For Galston,  
The greatest threat to children in modern liberal societies is not that they will believe 
in something too deeply, but that they will believe in nothing very deeply at all.  Even 
to achieve the kind of free self-reflection that many liberals prize, it is better to begin 
by believing something.  Rational deliberation among ways of life is far more 
meaningful if (and I am tempted to say only if) the stakes are meaningful, that is, if 
the deliberator has strong convictions against which competing claims can be 
weighed.   The role of parents in fostering such convictions should be welcomed not 
feared.199 
 
At base for Galston, a moral culture of strong individual beliefs is necessary in a good liberal 
democratic system; the capacity for strong and informed political participation is less 
important. 
The exact contours of the line of demarcation between the prerogatives of the state 
and the rights of individual citizens in a liberal system cannot be determined as if it were an 
abstract math problem, unaffected by the particular political context and community at issue.  
Where exactly the line should be drawn instead depends in some large part on the 
characteristics of the particular polity at issue – including such considerations as how diverse 
the populace is, how polarized it is in its beliefs, and how likely citizens are to learn 
important civic virtues without the assistance of the state.  Measured in light of current 
conditions, Galston in my view gets this balance terribly wrong. The events of the past few 
years have shown us that the contemporary threat to liberal democracy in the United States is 
not that citizens will believe too little, but rather that an uninformed and illiberal citizenry 
will erode individual rights and fail to call the undemocratic impulses of the government to 
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account.  Indeed, the events of the past few years represent in many respects the unhappy 
realization of Galston’s straitened vision of civic education.    
We possess a citizenry that, by and large, has strong but unexamined views, is 
exceedingly loyal to its country, and tends to pick its leaders based on vague notions of 
character rather than on considered opinions about its leaders’ platforms.   To the extent that 
voters do seek candidates who match their views with respect to particular policies, these 
views are not the product of rational deliberation about different ways that diverse citizens 
can best live together, but instead tend to be gut level choices that favor those who have the 
same comprehensive beliefs as the voter.  Galston’s calls to ensure that the state develops 
citizens’ loyalty to the realm seems to have been answered in spades by citizens who have 
remained credulously loyal to a government that repeatedly undercut liberal rights and 
values200 and disregarded their interests in favor of special interests.201  
These are not citizens who have the weakness of lacking strong beliefs.  Rather, their 
weakness from the point of view of liberal democracy is that these strong beliefs have little to 
do with support for liberal democratic principles and institutions, including the separation of 
church and state, a free press, and the rule of law – all of which are on increasingly shaky 
foundations of citizens’ support.  At a time in which only about half of America's high school 
students think newspapers should be allowed to publish freely, without government approval 
                                                 
200For example, the administration has sought to deny U.S. citizens arrested on U.S. territory attorneys and the 
right to be charged to (see, e.g., Harper 2005); has disregarded citizens’ rights to information through secretly 
paying news commentators to promote its policies (see, e.g., Kurtz 2005; Toppo 2005); has used wiretaps on 
U.S. citizens without following warrant requirements (see, e.g., Lichtblau 2005). 
 
201News accounts of federal agencies giving away contracts to administration favorites in the reconstruction of 
New Orleans and Iraq are legion (see, for example, Holmes 2005; McClure 2005; AP 2005).  So are accounts of 
the administration and government agencies altering proposed legislation, rules, and regulations to favor 
particular agencies at taxpayer expense (see, for example, Lieberman 2005 (energy bill); New York Times 
editorial, 2005, “Protecting Public Lands” (attempted give-away of public lands to mining industry).  This all 
may pale next to recent changes in tax policy that favor wealthy citizens in favor of all other taxpayers (see, for 
example, Paul Krugman 2004a; b).   
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of their stories, and a third say the free speech guarantees of the First Amendment go "too 
far", this is no mere academic debate.202  And at a time in which the great majority of citizens 
are more religious than in other industrialized countries, and higher percentages believe that 
religious leaders should assume a strong political role than in other countries, the strength of 
this liberal democracy does not depend on strengthening citizens’ comprehensive 
commitments, but on strengthening their commitment to liberal democratic principles.203  In 
an important presidential election in which a majority of likely voters for the winning 
candidate were, as an objective matter, wrong about a number of important facts,204 being 
able to think critically and evaluate are crucial skills necessary for the perpetuation of a 
democracy that truly serves the interests of the people.    
                                                 
202A recent study by the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation's High School Initiative, available at 
http://firstamendment.jideas.org/findings/findings.php, found startlingly little support for, and even less 
appreciation of, basic First Amendment guarantees.  The study found that nearly three-quarters of high school 
students said either that they don’t know how they feel about the First Amendment, or that they take it for 
granted.  Students lack knowledge about fundamental aspects of the First Amendment: seventy-five percent 
believe that flag burning is illegal; almost half believe that the government can restrict indecent material on the 
Internet.   See also Herbert 2005 (summarizing results of John S. and James L. Knight Foundation's High 
School Initiative). 
 
203A recent survey across several nations found that nearly all U.S. respondents said faith is important to them, a 
far higher percentage than in other countries.  Only 2 percent of Americans said they do not believe in God. 
Almost 40 percent said religious leaders should try to sway policymakers, notably higher than in other 
countries.  "Our nation was founded on Judeo-Christian policies and religious leaders have an obligation to 
speak out on public policy, otherwise they're wimps," said David Black, a retiree from Osborne, Pa., who 
agreed to be interviewed after he was polled. (Deseret News 2005).  See also Zoll 2005. 
 
204Several weeks before the 2004 presidential election, a study conducted by the Program on International 
Policy Attitudes and Knowledge, a joint program of the Center on Policy Attitudes and the Center for 
International and Security Studies at University of Maryland, found that a significant majority of supporters of 
George W. Bush had incorrect beliefs about a number of objectively verifiable facts.  Seventy percent believed 
that Iraq had actual weapons of mass destruction or a major program for developing them.  Fifty-six percent 
assume that most experts believed Iraq had actual weapons of mass destruction.  Similarly, 75% of Bush 
supporters continued to believe that Iraq was providing substantial support to al Qaeda, and 63% believed that 
clear evidence of this support had been found.  Sixty percent of Bush supporters also assumed that this was the 
conclusion of most experts, and 55% assumed that this was the conclusion of the 9/11 Commission.  Despite the 
overwhelming results of polls from other countries showing disapproval of the war, only 31% of Bush 
supporters recognized that the majority of people in the world opposed the U.S. having gone to war with Iraq.  
Program on International Policy Attitudes (2004). 
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 Galston is certainly right that we should seek to guard against the risk of becoming a 
nation of citizens with few morals and fewer ideals.  We must also, however, guard against 
becoming a nation in which few have the interest or capacity to actively engage in public 
affairs and to help determine collectively the future of the polity.  In the United States, where 
belief in God and association with organized religion is higher than in any other 
industrialized country,205 but in which voting participation and voter’s knowledge is 
extremely low, the risk of disinterest and inability to engage competently in public affairs 
seems significantly higher than the risk of having few strong comprehensive views.  While 
Galston seeks to mediate between an inclusive liberalism that can support strong moral views 
and a liberalism that ensures a vigorous democratic polity, the elements of his theory 
ultimately risk the vibrant liberal democracy for which he strives. 
 
Civic Liberalism -- Reconciling the Interests 
 
 Can we have a theory of civic education that reaches a more workable 
accommodation among the complex values at stake in a liberal democracy than current 
theories of civic education?  In this section, I contend that we can, and present the outlines of 
such an approach.  To do so, I first lay out a rough sketch of how these complex interests 
should be accommodated.  I then refine that sketch by considering how this approach would 
deal with the programs challenged in recent case law. 
 
A Proposal 
 Let me begin with a few points that help to clarify the scope of the more difficult 
issues.  At a minimum, there are two interests attached to civic education that must, whatever 
                                                 
205See supra note 203. 
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else occurs, be respected by both the state and parents.  First, children must be provided with 
the resources necessary to achieve at least a basic level of autonomy, in the sense that they 
are (or will be) capable of being self-directing.  The fundamental importance that liberal 
democracy attaches to self-determination would be meaningless in the absence of children 
achieving a capacity for autonomy in which they possess sufficient information and skills to 
make basic decisions about the conduct of their own lives.  It is true, as William Galston 
points out, that liberalism’s respect for the life plans of others means that unexamined life 
plans need to be respected as much as plans that are arrived at rationally.  However, this does 
not lead to parents being able to deprive children of developing the capacity for self-
determination.  The concept of moral personhood on which liberal democracy rests does not 
allow one person to serve simply as a pawn to satisfy another person’s life plan, even when 
the other person is a parent.  This interest in acquiring the basic skills needed to develop a 
life plan is so fundamental to liberalism’s respect for individuals that it may not be sacrificed 
to other interests.   
 The other insuperable interest, the polity’s interest in insuring adequate civic 
education to ensure the survival of the polity, is grounded in a combination of liberal and 
democratic rationales with a fair dose of realpolitik thrown in.  Insofar as a liberal democratic 
government is a minimally-objectionable form of government as a moral matter, both 
because it allows individuals a considerable amount of individual freedom as well as the 
freedom to collectively determine one’s future, citizens must consent to surrendering 
sufficient liberty to ensure the continuation of the polity. 
 The difficult questions come with respect to how to balance the various interests over 
and above these threshold preconditions.  Should the remainder of this authority be given to 
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parents, as Stephen Gilles would have it?  To the democracy, as Amy Gutmann proposes?  
To children’s interest in autonomy, as Ackerman suggests?  Or to some more even 
distribution of authority – and in which case where should the lines be drawn? 
In my view, the tension among these values can be dispersed to at least some extent 
by a more nuanced account of the legitimate interests at stake.206  Beginning with the liberal 
corner of the triangle, two specific wrinkles relating to children’s autonomy are worthy of 
attention in this context.  First, as Thomas Spragens points out, autonomy is not a good that a 
liberal democracy should seek to maximize.  We value autonomy as an intrinsic element in a 
fully human life, yet a life spent pursuing as much autonomy as possible would be 
destructive because it would erase our ties with others and our situatedness207.  Instead, 
autonomy is better conceptualized as a good for which there exists some (as yet undiscussed) 
optimal level, presumably higher than the threshold level of autonomy below which a state 
may not go.  Over and above the capacity necessary to achieve this optimal level of 
autonomy, more autonomy is not better.  Second, children’s capacity for developing and 
exercising autonomy increases as they grow toward adulthood; we would therefore expect a 
toddler to have far less of a capacity for autonomy than a teenager.   
A nuanced account of parents’ legitimate interest in passing on their way of life to 
their children should also recognize several different facets of this interest.  First, it can never 
be given absolute sway:  as I argued before, parents’ complete control of children’s education 
is abhorrent to the notion that children, themselves, must develop the capacity for self-
                                                 
206In making this argument, I am following in the footsteps of Spragens, supra note 149, who argues that a more 
nuanced conception of the goods at stake in liberal democratic theory generally permits a richer notion of 
liberalism capable of encompassing a broader range of goods.   
 
207Id. at 127. 
 
 167 
determination, and detrimental to the polity’s legitimate interest in survival.  Second, in a 
liberal polity in which the state seeks to allow citizens significant personal freedom, parents’ 
interest in passing along their ways of life is strongest when it comes to passing along to 
children what John Rawls called “comprehensive” conceptions of the good life – those 
beliefs that are part of an all-encompassing conception of the good life..  In contrast, parents’ 
interests are weaker when it comes to passing along political virtues, which liberalism has 
historically treated as at least partly the job of the public domain.  Third, and finally, parents’ 
legitimate interests in determining their children’s education diminish to some extent as their 
children approach maturity and become more of their own persons capable of exercising their 
own autonomy, as well as closer to assuming the mantle of citizenship and their own place as 
citizens in the polity. 
The state’s civic interests associated with public education are in certain respects the 
inverse of parents’ interests.  In contrast to parents, the state has little legitimate interest in 
citizens’ comprehensive conceptions of the good, in themselves, unless these conceptions 
impact the political health of the polity.  Rather, the state’s legitimate concern is the 
development of citizens’ political virtues.  And also in contrast with parents, the polity’s 
legitimate interests in preparing children for citizenship increases as children mature and are 
both more capable of dealing with a diverse range of opinions, as well as closer to joining the 
larger public world.   
The legitimate scope of a democracy’s interest is far less settled in our tradition, 
which has, as Sheldon Wolin writes of Rawls’ work, demoted democracy to the subaltern 
position relative to liberalism (Wolin 1996).  Yet we can discern several things about 
democracy’s position relative to liberalism that help to define its role.  First, if children truly 
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are to be seen as members of the political community as well as the family, the political 
community should have some say over children’s education.  Second, that interest, like the 
state’s civic interest, should increase as children mature and prepare to enter the political 
community.  Third, a democracy’s legitimate interest in children’s education in a liberal 
system are properly confined, at least in the ordinary course of affairs, to children’s political 
rather than comprehensive beliefs.   
So where does this leave us in terms of delineating a framework for assessing the 
legitimacy of educational programs?  It means that the state should be confined to teaching 
political virtues rather than comprehensive virtues.  Regardless of what the majority of a 
democracy desires with respect to children’s acculturation, this is, after all, a liberal 
democracy, which must therefore reserve a wide swath of freedom from the state.   
Moreover, even with regard to teaching political virtues, the state’s power should not be used 
in the delicate area of shaping citizens’ preferences and characters without significant reasons 
for doing so, particularly when they conflict with parents’ comprehensive beliefs.   This does 
not mean, however, that the state should adopt the posture sometimes called “civic 
minimalism,” which theorists like Galston advocate, in which it can use civic education only 
to develop basic virtues necessary for the polity to function. Instead, the recognition of the 
importance of a healthy democratic polity that balances both the importance of a vibrant civic 
realm against values of individual liberty, as well as the recognition that children are not only 
members of their families but also of the larger society, should give the state at least 
somewhat more leeway with respect to children’s education that a minimalist standard would 
dictate, particularly as the children get older and more able to cope with a diversity of 
opinions.   
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 In other words, I am arguing that the best way to balance the liberal, democratic, and 
civic interests in a manner that conforms to both our considered intuitions and our aspirations 
for a robust liberal democracy is to confine the state generally to teaching political virtues, 
and to allow both parents and the democracy to exercise complementary levels of authority 
over students’ civic education as children mature.  Taking a leaf from Bruce Ackerman208 
and Thomas Spragens 209 in turn, parents should have declining, and democracy should have 
ascending, authority to educate students as they get older.  Both the interest that Ackerman 
calls attention to – the child’s interest in personal integrity – and the strong link between 
child and family that we as a society value in a child’s early years, suggest that although a 
democracy may institute the civic education necessary for a healthy liberal democratic polity, 
it may not go further than nurturing such core values and virtues during the child’s primary 
education.  At this time, parents’ control of children and their interest in inculcating their 
children into their way of life are sufficient to outweigh any other interest of a democracy in 
stamping its imprimatur on its youngest citizens.  This limit of civic minimalism also has the 
virtue of likely requiring the teaching of tenets that are less offensive to parents (although 
certainly some parents will still disagree), at a time when children are less likely to be able to 
sort out conflicts between their parents’ views and the views they learn at school.  At this 
stage, teaching children generally to respect others is appropriate.  And while care should be 
used, children may also be acquainted with the basic fact of difference, for example in 
religions and family forms. Yet the state should refrain at this age from going further than. 
Thus, it would be appropriate in elementary schools to expose children to the fact that 
                                                 
208Ackerman, supra note 157, 142-43. 
 
209Spragens, supra note 149, 242. 
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different people have different religious beliefs.  Exposing young children to significant 
difference in the content of these beliefs (as opposed to some basic differences in traditions 
or culture) would be inappropriate, however.  So would exposing children to anti-tobacco or 
anti-drug messages: at younger ages, schools should seek to limit the messages they convey 
to those central to the success of a liberal polity. 
However, the weight assigned parents’ interest in inculcating their way of life should 
decrease as children grows older.  At this point, children are coming closer to becoming their 
own citizens in the democracy.  At the same time, they are more capable of understanding 
controversial viewpoints regarding liberal democracy, as well as of making sense of the 
difference between parents’ and schools’ views.  For both these reasons, a civic liberal 
democracy has more freedom to move beyond civic minimalism and to institute a wider 
sphere of democratic civic education as children mature.  Thus, as students beyond the lower 
grades, the state may acquaint students with lessons that the polity believes is important for 
its particular ways of life and necessary for a healthy liberal democratic polity.   
In contrast to the civic minimalist position appropriate when children are younger, 
this might be called the “civic medium” position.  Under it, in deciding what civic education 
older children should receive, the democracy should focus on those values at stake in the 
civic/liberal/democratic triangle, but should pay careful attention to those liberal values that 
traditionally have served as a check on the power of democracy.  Because of the weight that 
must be paid to these liberal virtues, including individual autonomy and diversity, the state 
should never adopt a “civic maximalist” position with regard to civic education, of the type 
that Gutmann would allow.  Further, because of the increasing autonomy and intellectual 
capacity of older children, the civic education provided to them is appropriately taught with 
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more complexity; in teaching more controversial proposals, a school should present the 
issues in a way that allows students themselves to work through the issues. This means that 
schools can go appreciably further in communicating virtues and values to students in high 
school than they might when students are younger.  For example, while purely private 
morality should never be taught in public schools, a school might seek to convey to older 
students information about birth control, sexuality, and disease prevention, in order to foster 
legitimate public health goals, even if such material would not be appropriate for younger 
children, both because of their majority and because this information is not so connected to 
core public purposes.  Education regarding the morality of particular sexual practices, 
however, such as premarital sex, masturbation, and birth control would be left to parents. 
Under this proposal, some parents’ efforts to pass along their beliefs and ways of life 
will be disadvantaged by their children’s exposure to other ways of life, to lessons of political 
tolerance of groups disapproved of by parents, or by teaching children to reason about their 
future.  As Stephen Macedo notes, however, liberal democracy promises that it will not 
prohibit citizens from holding or communicating a wide variety of beliefs, including illiberal 
and undemocratic beliefs.  It does not promise, however, that all such beliefs will be given a 
level playing field by the state210.  To promise otherwise takes inadequate account “of the 
degree of moral convergence it takes to sustain a constitutional order that is liberal, 
democratic, and characterized by widespread bonds of civic friendship and cooperation” (2).  
 
Difficult Issues: Equality 
I have thus far considered the way in which the liberal good of autonomy intersects 
with the civic and democratic goods at stake in civic education.  Yet, as I have noted before, 
                                                 
210Macedo, supra note 149, 219. 
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autonomy is not the only good central to liberalism, even if it is the good that gets the most 
attention.  Equality, too, is central to the core aspirations of liberalism.  Chief among the 
other goods is that of equality.  Yet determining how to square the commitment to equality 
with parents’ autonomy when it comes to civic education is a difficult issue.  Consider, for 
example, whether public schools may teach the principle of sex equality.   Doing so will no 
doubt violate the beliefs of many parents—for some of these parents, their firmly held 
religious beliefs.  Should schools be able to teach such doctrines over these parents’ 
objections?  And, if so, what kind of equality should schools be allowed to teach?  Must the 
equality taught be confined to the political realm, so that schools may only teach that women 
should have the same legal and political rights as men?  Or may the lessons be broader, 
teaching children that women and men should be equal in families and in society, as well?  
To teach the latter would violate the fundamental tenets of a number of religions, including 
Southern Baptists, whose governing body in 1998 encouraged wives to submit graciously to 
the leadership of their husbands.   
In my view, there are two reasons that liberal democracy’s commitment to equality 
requires that schools not only teach sex equality in political life, but also teach that this 
doctrine applies to citizens’ private lives.  First, equality is one of those few core liberal 
democratic values which, to use Thomas Spragens’ terms, is “semi-comprehensive,” in the 
sense that it applies beyond the political domain, strictly defined211.  This is because it is 
premised on liberalism’s commitment to human dignity, which goes beyond just the political 
realm.  As a consequence, although the liberal state should not force this ideal on those who 
reject it by, for example, requiring adult men and women to share washing the dishes, the 
state should have the power to persuade citizens of its validity, and this persuasion should be 
                                                 
211Spragens, supra note 149, 129. 
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an important part of civic education.  Just as parents do not have unlimited authority to 
discipline their children in any way they see fit, they may not maintain a monopoly on 
inculcating views in children that would contradict these basic liberal tenets.  
Second, the interrelatedness between political and social equality means that the first 
cannot be achieved without the second.  Since the 1970s we have seen repeatedly that 
women’s unequal participation in the public realm is inherently tied to their disparate roles in 
the private realm.  The centrality of political equality to the moral justifications of liberal 
democracy means that schools must teach social equality to children, even over parents’ 
objections, and that such lessons pass the test of civic minimalism applicable to younger 
children. 
 
Revisiting Challenged School Programs 
How do the requirements challenged in Yoder and Mozert and the cases that followed 
them fare under this standard?  In Yoder, the contested requirement sought to keep children 
in high school until age 16 in order to prepare them to participate effectively in the liberal 
democratic system, as well as to be self-sufficient participants in society.  Under my 
framework, the fact that the challenged requirement was directed at political rather than 
comprehensive virtues weighs in its favor.  So does its application to older children. In this 
context, the parents’ argument that contact with other children is more hazardous to older 
children rather than those who are younger because older children are more cognizant of 
differences and different ways of life should weigh in favor of, rather than against, the law’s 
permissibility: the fact that these children are becoming capable of a more complex 
understanding of differences and of autonomy lessens parents’ legitimate realm of control 
over their children.  Further, the challenged requirement occurs at the period in which the 
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state’s interests in children’s civic education is at its highest since the children at issue will 
soon be voting citizens entrusted with shaping the future of the polity.   
Moreover, the relationship between school attendance and the health of the polity is 
justified even under a civic minimalist rationale, which I have argued is a harder test for 
schools to meet than the standard that should apply to older children.  Citizens who have 
little understanding of diversity because they have had little exposure to it, and indeed, little 
understanding of ways of life apart from their own, are ill-equipped to elect representatives 
charged with forging a common path among citizens.  The fact that the parents do not choose 
that their children take any kind of active place in the polity does not give these parents the 
right to exempt these children from these requirements.  To deprive children of the basic 
tools needed to participate in society beyond the role that their parents have chosen for them 
violates both the absolute requirement that children should be able to develop the basic 
preconditions for autonomy and the state’s responsibility to ensure that children have the 
capacity to become responsible citizens who are up to the difficult task of collective self-
government.   
Mozert, the case that challenged the series of readers used in primary school, is a 
slightly harder case under my framework, since the students involved in that case were 
younger, and therefore subject to the civic minimalist requirement.  With that said, simple 
exposure of students to other ways of life to which the parents objected is certainly a 
prerequisite to the training in citizenship needed to prepare children to live in a diverse 
liberal democracy.  Absent a clearer message that the readers communicated approval of 
these various ways of life, rather than simply acknowledged their existence, the challenged 
readers should be deemed as consistent with liberal democratic principles.   
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Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Productions, by contrast, is a relatively easy case in the 
other direction.  While the state has an interest in teaching students AIDS-awareness and 
alternatives to unprotected sex (given the link between children’s sexual behavior and the 
state’s legitimate public health goals), it has no business making light of premarital sex.  
Given the central role that sexual behavior plays in many systems of comprehensive beliefs, 
the state should tread especially carefully in this area to ensure that the information 
communicated is closely tied to political rather than comprehensive justifications.  The 
challenged regulation fails this test. 
The community service requirement challenged in Immediato falls at the opposite end 
of the spectrum.  Teaching its future citizens the importance of civic contributions falls 
squarely into the political mission of the state.  It would be permissible under the civic 
minimalist standard applicable to younger children, and would therefore certainly be 
acceptable under the more lenient standard to justify educational programs for older children.      
This leaves only the health education classes challenged in Leebaert, which in my 
view is the most difficult of all these cases.  In that case, under my analysis, the some of the 
contentious issues that the public school sought to teach the children, such as drug and 
alcohol education, were important, but probably didn’t rise to the level of the core public 
values that the state should teach younger children.  As such, in my view, the program, even 
with the opt-out alternative, should have appropriately been saved until high school.  And 
even then it remains necessary for the school to justify teaching each of the subjects with 
respect to an important public purpose.  While it seems to me that all of the challenged 
subjects -- health, character, citizenship, family planning, human sexuality, AIDS awareness, 
and social aspects of family life – can be articulated in ways that meet this bar, the curricula 
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of some, such as health, character, family planning, and social aspects of family life, might 
need to be tailored fairly narrowly to comport with this requirement.   
   
Conclusion 
 I have argued that, when it comes to civic education, a healthy liberal democracy 
must do the delicate work of balancing a number of different goods and purposes that stand 
in tension with one another.  In the remaining two chapters, I consider the extent to which the 
state effectively balances these relevant purposes in two other areas of law: work and foster 
care.  I turn to these now. 
  
CHAPTER 7 
 
PARENTING POLICIES, WORK, AND THE FAMILY-STATE RELATIONSHIP 
 
Newspapers, public opinion polls, and political speeches all proclaim that Americans 
strongly support children and believe in the importance of good parenting. However, 
Americans are, in overwhelming numbers, concerned that they are failing their children.212  
They are particularly concerned that they have too little time to spend with their children.213  
It is therefore surprising that where parenting responsibilities conflict with work—
unquestionably the activity that most limits parenting activities214—this groundswell of 
support for children and parenting has resulted in very little legal support for working 
parents.  There is, in fact, less support for working parents in this country than in any other 
                                                 
212According to a U.S. News and World Report poll, 83% of Americans said they thought it harder in general to 
be a child today than a generation ago (Whitman and Chetwynd 1997). According to a Knight-Ridder poll of 
voters, nearly three-fourths worry about how children are being raised at home. Blacks and whites, young and 
old, ranked lack of attention for children as the second most important problem facing this country, following 
only crime (Cannon 1996). 
 
213The 1996 "What Families Really Value" poll conducted by the National Parenting Association of New York 
found unexpected unity among parents across race, gender, and income lines on naming the "family time 
famine" as a major concern. According to the president of the association, "[w]hat does fall out of this survey is 
the enormous and, I think, desperate search for more time with their children" (Cummins 1996; see also Galston 
1997, 293-94). Popular opinion that parents are spending less time with their children appears justified by the 
facts. According to a 1985 study by a University of Maryland sociologist, parents spent an average of only 
seventeen hours per week with their children as compared to thirty hours in 1965 (Etzioni 1993; see also 
Thomas 1995 (citing study showing that parents in the United States spend less time with their children than 
parents in any other nation in the world – 40% less time than even a generation ago)).   Recent studies show that 
this gap may be closing, at least to some small extent, by fathers spending more time on workdays with their 
children than they did a generation ago (Families and Work Institute 2002). 
 
214The current workforce includes roughly 94% of fathers and 70 of mothers with children under 18 (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2005, based on 2004 statistics).  This includes 62% of mothers with children under 6, and 77% 
of mothers whose youngest child was 6 through 17.  More than half of the parents polled who said that they 
spent too little time with their children reported that they did so because they had to spend time working in 
order to support themselves and their families (Galston 1997, 294). 
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industrialized country.215  This chapter seeks to explore this apparent paradox.  It asks why 
the United States, a well-off country whose political rhetoric trumpets the value of parenting, 
has provided so little legal support for working parents.  A major part of this answer, I 
contend, derives from the same misguided assumptions about the family-state relationship 
that I critiqued in earlier chapters, here cropping up in the dominant public philosophy shared 
by members of Congress responsible for passing laws, by judges who interpret them, and by 
citizens who hold such beliefs even while they proclaim support for broader parenting 
protections.  These views bear a strong similarity, although they are not identical to, their 
liberal academic counterparts.  These assumptions, I argue, prevent formulation of a coherent 
legal framework able to cognize and support parenting and the goods associated with it. 
Part I of this chapter explores the limits of the law's current approach to work-and-
parenting issues.  In it, I argue that the two legal frameworks used to evaluate parenting 
issues—sex discrimination analysis under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(hereinafter “Title VII”), and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (hereinafter 
“FMLA”) – are poor fits to deal with the complex of interests and goods at stake in this area. 
216  In Part II, I discuss the assumptions underlying this area of law that lead to this poor fit.  
                                                 
215According to a 1997 report by a United Nations agency, of 152 industrialized countries, the United States 
ranks dead last in benefits and protections it offered to parenting. The report found that paid maternity leave is 
required by law in about 80% of countries surveyed, and about a third of the countries permit these leaves to 
last more than 14 weeks. Breaks for nursing mothers are required in more than 80 countries (Grimsley 1998). In 
contrast, until the passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, the United States did not guarantee 
any job protection at all (Kamerman and Kahn 1991: 10). Even after passage of the FMLA, the United States 
permits parental leave for only up to 12 weeks and continues to provide no income replacement. 
 
216Two insightful comparative scholars, Paolo Wright-Carozza (1993) and Mary Ann Glendon (1987), have 
performed some of the intellectual spadework for this first section by pointing out that Western European 
countries provide greater protection to working parents, emphasize broader notions of social equality, and have 
laws supporting parenting that evidence far more complex normative concerns than the United States.  
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Finally, in Part III, I propose a revision of work-and-family law that better cognizes and 
protects the important interests at stake in this area of the law.  
 
Parenting and the Law 
 
Employees whose work and parenting responsibilities conflict generally have two 
different avenues of legal protection available to them: Title VII and the Family and Medical 
Leave Act.  On their face, these two statutes are very different: Title VII is concerned with 
eliminating employment discrimination from the workplace, while the FMLA provides 
protection for employees requiring time off work to attend to serious family needs. Yet both 
share certain features:  They are extremely limited in the protection they provide working 
parents.  They selectively focus on particular interests at stake in the intersection between 
work and family at the same time as they obscure others.  And they share a particular, narrow 
interpretation of what is required, and what is at stake, in parenting. 
 
Antidiscrimination Law As A Framework 
 
In a society whose rhetoric is steeped in the value of families but which remains 
ambivalent about the value of sexual equality, it is paradoxical that the dominant legal 
framework through which the relationship between parenting and the workplace has been 
negotiated is sex discrimination law. Yet because until passage of the FMLA in 1993 no 
other law provided protection for working parents, and because of the limited scope of the 
FMLA since that time, those seeking protection for parenting activities have generally 
litigated their claims under Title VII. That Act encompasses both a general prohibition on sex 
discrimination in employment and an amendment, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 
(hereinafter “PDA”), which declares discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or childbirth-
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related conditions to be sex discrimination. The result of trying to fit work-and-family issues 
into the antidiscrimination framework constructed by Title VII and the PDA is like the 
proverbial act of trying to fit a square peg into a round hole: in order to make it fit, such a 
large portion of the peg needs to be pared away that it becomes virtually unrecognizable. 
  Title VII 
 
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of . . . sex” 
(42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)).  In order to fit parenting and work conflicts into a form cognizable 
by this antidiscrimination statute, the relevant interests at stake in parenting are pared down 
to two:  those of the employer and those of the employee as an employee. In this regard, Title 
VII protects the employee only when their work has been or will be affected by parenting 
responsibilities, and then only if this conflict can be linked to sex discrimination. The law is 
not triggered when the employee/parent's parenting has been or will be affected by work 
responsibilities. Hence, Title VII excludes from consideration the needs of the child in 
receiving adequate parenting, the interests of communities and the state in ensuring that their 
future citizens are raised adequately, and the importance to the parent-employee of fulfilling 
child rearing responsibilities (Wright-Carozza 1993, 576-78). 
Moreover, by virtue of its limited goal of eliminating discrimination in the workplace, 
Title VII promises no substantive protection for parenting: it provides only the same level of 
protection to the act of parenting that it provides to other ways in which women may be 
disadvantaged relative to men: if all women were miserable parents and simply attended to 
work responsibilities while leaving their children unsupervised, the conditions of the sex 
discrimination framework would be satisfied. In other words, treating parenting within an 
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antidiscrimination framework protects parenting only insofar as it is necessary to avoid 
discrimination. It does not support parenting because of its importance to children, parents, or 
the polity. The problem is not chiefly that antidiscrimination law is failing to fulfill the 
function intended by Congress, but that its function, by nature, is limited, and that no other 
framework exists within United States' law provides adequate protection to the broader 
spectrum of interests at stake in work-and-parenting conflicts. 
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
Despite the clear link between parenting and women's inequality (see, for example, 
Crittenden 2001), the only place in which Title VII provides any explicit protection for 
parenting is in the PDA, which forbids employers from discriminating based on 
pregnancy.217  Even here, however, the enactment takes a constricted view of the interests at 
issue.  First, in keeping with the broader antidiscrimination framework of which it is a part, 
the PDA considers only the employment interests of the pregnant employee by focusing on 
her ability or inability to work. It does not consider the broader range of goods furthered by 
caretaking, or cognize the harms that result from inadequate parenting.   
 Second, the PDA protects only the medical aspects of pregnancy. A pregnancy-related 
condition is limited to "incapacitating conditions for which medical care or treatment is usual 
and normal" (Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869; see also Cooper v. Drexel Chem. Co. at 1279-80 
(N.D. Miss. 1996)). All non-medical circumstances that accompany pregnancy and childbirth 
are excluded from consideration under the statute   So is childrearing.  As the House Report 
for the Pregnancy Discrimination Act states, “if a woman wants to stay home to take care of 
                                                 
217The PDA provides that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be 
treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their 
ability or inability to work” (42 U.S.C.  § 2000e(k)).   
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the child, no benefits must be paid because this is not a medically determined condition 
related to pregnancy."218 
Third, even when medical conditions for pregnancy are at issue, the PDA sets no 
substantive floor on an employer’s treatment of pregnant employees.  It requires 
accommodation for pregnancy and childbearing only insofar as such accommodations are 
made for other medical conditions. As the Supreme Court stated in Wimberly v. Labor and 
Industrial Relations Commission (1987), under the PDA, "the State cannot single out 
pregnancy for disadvantageous treatment, but it is not compelled to afford preferential 
treatment" (518). 219 
 
The limits of antidiscrimination law 
Limited focus: Johnson Controls and Maganuco 
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (U.S. 1991), highlights the 
limitations of the antidiscrimination approach to work-and-parenting issues. In that case, 
employees of defendant Johnson Controls, a battery manufacturer, challenged a company 
policy excluding all women from jobs involving actual or potential exposure to lead, except 
                                                 
218
See H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, at 5 (1978); see also Piantanida v. Wyman Center. (8th Cir. 1997, 342) ("[A]n 
individual's choice to care for a child is not a 'medical condition' related to childbirth or pregnancy. . . . An 
employer's discrimination against an employee who has accepted this parental role . . . is therefore not based on 
the gender-specific biological functions of pregnancy and childbearing . . . .");  Soreo-Yasher v. First Office 
Management (N.D. Oh. 1996) (“Yasher alleges that FOM and Huffner discriminated against her based upon her 
pregnancy. However, there is no evidence that Yasher was replaced because of her pregnancy. Due to the nature 
and duties of a property manager for an apartment complex, FOM believed that it needed an onsite manager. 
There is no evidence in the record that Yasher was treated any differently than nonpregnant employees who 
were on leave for a similar period of time.”). 
 
219See also Best v. Distribution and Auto Services (Tennessee Court of Appeals, 1999) (“Finally, we reject 
Best's contention that DAS's leave policy discriminated against her because it unfairly required her to exhaust 
all of her medical leave due to her pregnancy. Contrary to Best's suggestion, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
did not entitle her to any additional medical leave beyond that assured by DAS's general leave policy.  Rather, 
the PDA merely prohibited DAS from treating Best, for all employment-related purposes, any differently than it 
treated ‘nonpregnant employees who [were] similarly situated with respect to their ability to work.’"). 
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those whose infertility was medically documented. The company had instituted the policy to 
respond to the risks of fetal hazards caused by lead exposure. Plaintiffs claimed that the 
policy violated Title VII's prohibition on actions that discriminated based on sex. The 
employer, in response, argued that although its exclusionary policy treated women differently 
from men, the policy was lawful because it fell under Title VII's bona fide occupational 
qualification (“BFOQ”) exception. That exception permits employment practices that 
discriminate based on sex if they are "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that 
particular business or enterprise" (42 U.S.C.  § 2000e-2(e)(1)).  
In ruling for the plaintiffs, the United States Supreme Court declared that the BFOQ 
exception applied only to a worker's ability or inability to perform the job in question, and 
could therefore not cognize possible harm to the fetus from lead exposure. According to the 
Court: "[e]mployment late in pregnancy often imposes risks on the unborn child, . . . but 
Congress indicated that the employer may take into account only the woman's ability to get 
her job done" (499 U.S. at 205).  The “welfare of the next generation” could not be cognized 
within this framework: (206-07): "No one can disregard the possibility of injury to future 
children; the BFOQ, however, is not so broad that it transforms this deep social concern into 
an essential element of battery making" (203-04).  Having discarded the welfare of children, 
and the public’s own interest in children’s welfare from the statute's consideration, the Court 
cast the issue in terms of parental autonomy, declaring the employer's policy unlawful, 
because "[d]ecisions about the welfare of future children must be left to the parents who 
conceive, bear, support, and raise them" (207). 
The needs, aspirations, and goods at stake in the intersection between work and 
parenting are complex. They include, among others, the economic needs of workers and their 
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families, workers' interests in working in the job of their choosing, women's interest in sex 
equality, parents and the community's interest in healthy children, and the employer's interest 
in an efficient workplace. Of this number of interests, the Court ruled that only the 
employers' interest in efficiency, and women's interests in autonomy and sex equality were 
cognizable by Title VII.  In doing so, the statute’s and the Court’s blinkered perspective 
excluded consideration of alternatives that might accommodate this broader range of 
concerns.  Under the antidiscrimination framework applied here, employers are required to 
allow women to stay in jobs that pose fetal hazards so long as these jobs are open to men. 
Under a broader framework, consideration of the larger social concerns, in addition to sex 
equality interests, might have resulted in other solutions, such as requiring that the employer 
offer women and men seeking to bear children the opportunity to transfer into safer jobs with 
equal pay and at least equivalent working conditions. 
Furthermore, the Court framed even the two employees’ interests it deemed 
cognizable in contestable ways. First, in its refusal to consider harm to fetuses on the ground 
that this might violate parental autonomy, the Court construed parental autonomy as 
antithetical to state action, and therefore argued that supporting this interest disfavored legal 
involvement.  In doing so, it failed to recognize that allowing individuals to determine the 
welfare of their children and future children is not necessarily inconsistent with legal support: 
if individuals decide that it is not in their future children's interest to be exposed to lead, 
judicial insistence that employers accommodate such decisions would further rather than 
hinder parental autonomy.220  Instead, the Supreme Court's insistence that parents make and 
                                                 
220I do not address here the difficult issue of how the law should frame injuries to fetuses who later become born 
children. A burgeoning literature attempts to deal with and to reconceptualize the fetus's legal position in ways 
that do not infringe on women's autonomy.  See, for example,, Johnsen 1992; Note 1990; Jerdee 2000; Roberts 
1991; Rhoden 1986.   I note here only that, under Johnson Controls, whether this injury is conceived in terms of 
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act on determinations privately forces parents to make decisions from a range of employment 
options that all may be unacceptable to them precisely because these options are formulated 
without taking children's welfare into account.221 
In addition, in limiting the antidiscrimination inquiry to securing women equal terms 
and conditions of employment, the Court abstracted women's interests in equal employment 
from the rest of their lives. The exclusion of women's aspirations and responsibilities in 
bearing and rearing children requires women to deal with these factors by leaving their jobs, 
if these factors are to be considered at all. Thus, while Johnson Controls may in theory seem 
a victory for women,222 when conceived in terms of women's lived reality, which for many 
include aspirations and commitments involving childbearing and child rearing, the Court's 
blinkered definition of women's interest in equality ultimately perpetuates women's 
subordinate status in the workplace. 
My point here is not to argue that Johnson Controls was wrongly decided given the 
limited framework of inquiry provided by antidiscrimination law or that sex equality 
                                                                                                                                                       
harm to communities' interests in healthy children, the parents' interest in healthy children, the interests of the 
fetus that is later born, or any combination of the three, it cannot be cognized under employment discrimination 
law. In my view, insofar as the interests of the fetus are conceptualized separately from the interests of the 
woman, in almost all cases, the woman will be in the best position to determine the interests of the fetus and to 
balance these interests against other relevant interests.  
 
221The importance of the issues excluded by the antidiscrimination framework is driven home by the inane 
scope of the debate between the majority and the minority opinions in Johnson Controls. Neither side disputed 
that the statute did not cognize harm to employees in their roles of persons who might wish to bear children, to 
future children, or to communities of which these injured children might one day be a part. Instead, the debate 
centered only on whether the statute cognized financial harm to the employer from tort suits brought on behalf 
of children injured by fetal hazards. See Justice White, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment (208-
11); Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment (213-15, 223-24).  Severe economic harm to an employer caused 
by a tort suit, the Court tells us, may be cognizable under Title VII. Severe harm to fetuses, however 
conceptualized legally, that would later serve as the basis for such tort suits cannot be. 
 
222And, indeed, it has been hailed as a victory for women by a number of commentators. See, for example, 
Cleghorn 1995; Solomon 1991; Miller 1993; Dixon 2005 635.   
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concerns should not have weighed strongly – or even have been the determinative factor223 -- 
in assessing the permissibility of the company's policy.224  I argue here only that other 
important interests should have been taken into account in addition to the autonomy and sex 
equality interests that were considered by the Court.  Indeed, for the law to set up a 
framework in which to cognize pregnancy issues that does not consider the possibility of 
serious injury to the fetus demonstrates that something has gone seriously awry in this area of 
the law. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Maganuco v. Leyden Community 
High School District 212, also demonstrates the manner in which United States law pares 
down the issues at stake in the work-and-parenting context.  In that case, Rebecca Maganuco, 
a schoolteacher, presented a PDA challenge to a leave policy that would not allow her to 
combine a period of paid sick leave with a period of unpaid maternity leave in order to take a 
year off from work following the birth of her child. The collective bargaining agreement 
between the school and the teachers provided for both kinds of leave, but required her to 
choose between them. The Seventh Circuit rejected Maganuco's claim on the ground that the 
PDA "is limited to policies which impact or treat medical conditions relating to pregnancy 
and childbirth less favorably than other disabilities" (444).  Because Maganuco sought time 
off from work to parent, rather than solely as a result of a physical disability relating to 
pregnancy and childbirth, the court held that her claim was not cognizable under the PDA. 
                                                 
223Indeed, plaintiffs presented compelling evidence of sex discrimination by demonstrating that although the 
company excluded only women from positions involving lead exposure, that exposure also posed a risk to the 
fetus through the father's sperm, a risk against which the company's policy did not guard (198, 221-22). Because 
of its narrow framework of consideration, the Court used this evidence to justify allowing women in their 
childbearing years into jobs involving lead exposure, rather than to seek alternatives that would prevent 
exposing men, women, and their possible future children to lead exposure. 
 
224Neither do I contend that the company, rather than the government or women, themselves, was the 
appropriate decisionmaker in developing fetal protection policies. 
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Maganuco demonstrates the disadvantage that the narrow focus of antidiscrimination 
law can have not only for society and for children, but even for the very interest that the 
scheme would seem most likely to protect—sex equality.225   By requiring parents to choose 
between the welfare of their children and a job that is not required to take this welfare into 
account, in our gender-structured society it is usually women who leave the paid labor force 
in order to ensure their children's well-being.226  
Interpretive choices 
Protection for parenting is not only limited by the restricted range of goods cognized 
with sex discrimination law, but also by the manner in which courts interpret the act of 
parenting. Chief among these interpretations is the judicial construction of parenting 
activities as a "choice," which therefore relieves society of responsibility.   In Barrash v. 
Bowen (1988), the Fourth Circuit expressed this view through contrasting the (in its view, 
justifiable) medical leaves for those "suffering extended incapacity from illness or injury" to 
the (in its view, less justifiable) leaves for "young mothers wishing to nurse their babies for 
six months" (931-32).  Similarly, in Armstrong v. Flowers Hospital (1993), the court used the 
concept of choice to dismiss a challenge to the termination of a pregnant nurse for her refusal 
                                                 
225Indeed, as a number of feminist legal theorists have noted (for example, Joan Williams 1991), it is only 
because the law assumes a male standard for a worker that it could avoid requiring substantive protections for 
the accommodation of parenting responsibilities: the law clearly assumes that others besides workers (i.e., 
mothers) are taking care of children.  
 
226
Armstrong v. Flowers Hospital, (M.D. Ala. 1993), also illustrates the way in which the Johnson Controls 
approach redounds to the detriment of women. In that case, the court rejected a pregnant hospital employee's 
claim that she should not be required to care for an AIDS patient due to the increased exposure to infections that 
employees experienced in the treatment of AIDS patients. The plaintiff contended that such exposure posed a 
greater risk to pregnant employees than to non- pregnant employees. The court, relying on Johnson Controls, 
upheld the employer's right to apply the policy to pregnant employees. According to the Armstrong court, 
Johnson Controls required employees, not employers or the court, to respond to fetal hazards: "The Court held 
specifically that, in the context of action being taken by the employer, it is the woman's decision to make as to 
whether or not to subject the fetus to harm” (1191-92). In other words, the only option pregnant employees have 
to respond to fetal hazards is to quit their jobs. 
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to follow a policy requiring her to care for patients with AIDS. Plaintiff sought to challenge 
the policy based on the higher risks that such work might pose to pregnant women than to 
other employees. In the court's words, however, it was not the hospital's policy that caused 
the plaintiff's termination but rather the "conscious decision of the plaintiff to refuse to do her 
job" (1191).  By the same token, the court in Maganuco construed the plaintiff's challenge as 
"dependent not on the biological fact that pregnancy and childbirth cause some period of 
disability, but on a . . . schoolteacher's choice to forego returning to work in favor of 
spending time at home with her newborn child" (444).  Courts then use this interpretation of 
parenting to deny legal protection to women on the ground that they could have "chosen" not 
to parent or, alternatively, could have "chosen" to parent in a manner that did not hamper 
work responsibilities.  
Refusing to accommodate parenting activities on the ground that parenting is a 
"choice" begs a number of questions. In the first place, it does not consider how the range of 
available options affects choice. As Justice O'Connor recognized in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey (1992), the law orders both thinking and living through the choices it makes available 
to individuals (885).  In failing to require that such considerations be recognized by law, 
courts force parents to decide between two unpalatable outcomes:  on the one hand, they can 
choose their job and, therefore, economic security for their children, in which case they may 
not have and adequate opportunity to parent; on the other, they can choose to ensure their 
child is adequately parented, but may not be able to afford to rear them. 
Moreover, using the parenting-as-choice interpretation to deny legal support evades 
the question of whether society has some interest in and responsibility to children once 
parents have "chosen" to bear them. The accident that befell Jessica McClure, the toddler 
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who fell down an abandoned well when she was playing in her aunt's backyard in 1987 
springs to mind. Dozens of citizens participated in her rescue as the nation watched in 
concern. Failure to help because her parents "chose" to bear her would have been 
unthinkable. Once born, she was a human to whom the obligation to help was due. 
Employment law, however, considers the possibility of legal protection for parenting to be 
negated by the determination that parents have "chosen" to bear a child. 
 Again the consequence of such an approach for sexual equality issues is apparent. 
Joan Williams aptly summarizes the situation by stating that "[i]n the work/family context, 
the rhetoric of choice masks a gender system that defines childrearing and the accepted 
avenues of adult advancement as inconsistent and then allocates the resulting costs of child 
rearing to mothers" (Williams 1991, 1596).  In contrast to the past blanket exclusions of 
women from the work world, women are now allowed to take jobs in the labor market but are 
neither relieved of the domestic responsibilities assigned to them by social roles nor 
accommodated with regard to these responsibilities at work. When women leave work to 
accommodate these domestic responsibilities, they are deemed to have made a "choice" and 
to have only themselves to blame. The ideology of choice therefore privatizes and 
individualizes a system of subordination and then uses the notion of consent to justify it. 
 
The Family and Medical Leave Act 
The sole exception to the limited vision of parenting found in sex discrimination law 
derives from the Family and Medical Leave Act and its state counterparts. Unlike 
antidiscrimination law, the FMLA sets a solid floor beneath which positive protection for 
parenting may not fall: covered employees are entitled to up to twelve weeks of aggregated 
annual leave, after which their jobs are guaranteed back to them. Moreover, the prefatory 
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language to the Act seeks protection of a broader range of interests than are cognized under 
Title VII. The preamble to the FMLA recognizes the importance of the "development of 
children and the family unit"; the interests of "fathers and mothers [to] be able to participate 
in early child rearing" without being forced "to choose between job security and parenting;" 
the national interest in preserving "family integrity;" and the goal of equal opportunity for 
men and women (29 U.S.C. § 2601). 
Yet the support to parenting actually afforded by the FMLA is minor. The twelve 
weeks of leave that it allows constitutes only a fraction of the time necessary to raise sound 
children.  In addition, the statute applies only to employees who work for companies with 
fifty or more employees. This provision restricts coverage to only five percent of American 
businesses and under 50 percent of the workforce (Williams and Segal 2003, 148).  The 
majority of private sector employees – roughly forty-one million – are not protected (Swift 
1997: 70).   Moreover, the FMLA provides for no wage replacement during that time. As a 
result, the majority of covered employees – roughly 78% -- cannot afford to make use of the 
available leave (Center for Policy Alternatives 2005).227  
Finally, the FMLA confines the conditions of leave to care for children to 
circumstances involving the birth or adoption of a child, or to situations involving a severe 
medical emergency. Parents who need time for caregiving in other circumstances are left to 
fend for themselves. As pointedly stated by the district court in Kelley v. Crosfield Catalysts 
(N.D. Ill. 1997): 
                                                 
227Note, however, that California in 2004 passed a provision qualifying workers in the state up to six weeks of 
paid family leave to care for a seriously ill child, spouse, parent, domestic partner, or to bond with a minor child 
within one year of the birth or placement of the child in connection with foster care or adoption. (California 
Unemployment Insurance Code § 3301(a)(1) (2004).  Thus far it is the only state to make such paid leave 
available.  
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The Act clearly does not provide qualified leave for every family 
emergency. A call from a police station or from school authorities, a minor 
ailment that keeps a child home from school with no help immediately available, 
or a personal crisis in the life of a child or a parent may cause a severe conflict for 
an employee between work and family responsibilities. None is covered by the 
FMLA.  The legislative history makes it clear that the Act is intended to reach 
four situations: to provide leave relating to the birth of a child or to the adoption 
or initial foster care of a child by one not his or her parent, to care for a seriously 
ill child, spouse, or parent, or to attend to the employee's own serious health 
condition. The statute provides minimal protection in those circumstances 
(1048).228 
 
Ironically, the protections accorded under the FMLA largely ignore the broad interests 
discussed in the Act's preamble. In limiting the events eligible for leave to the birth or 
adoption of a child or the serious illness of dependents, and in confining its protection to a 
period of twelve weeks, the FMLA restricts protection for caretaking to periods involving the 
physical vulnerability of mother or child. At bottom, the FMLA, like the PDA, is premised 
on a medical model rather than on one that protects the broader interests at stake in parenting. 
The ease with which employment law cognizes medical needs stands in sharp contrast with 
its difficulty cognizing  other issues implicated in the parenting relationship. 
The law here does not simply create a hierarchy of interests in which medical needs 
are privileged over other interests; instead, it completely disregards other needs, deeming 
medical needs the only ones worthy of legal protection.  The FMLA takes no account of the 
fact that it requires far more than twelve weeks to raise a child, that children need substantial 
                                                 
228See also S. Rep. No. 103-3 (1993, 29) (stating that Congress sought to exempt "minor illnesses which last 
only a few days and surgical procedures which typically do not require hospitalization and require only a brief 
recovery period"); The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. 825.113 (1997) ("[L]eave to provide 
'child care' would not ordinarily qualify as FMLA leave if the child is not a newborn (in the first year of life 
after birth)."); Seidle v. Provident Mutual. Life Insurance Co. (1994) (holding that a child's ear infection is not a 
serious illness triggering mother's coverage by FMLA);  Perry  v. Jaguar of Troy, 353 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that caring for a child with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder does not qualify an employee for 
FMLA leave); Fioto v. Manhattan Woods Golf Enterprises, 270 F.Supp.2d 401 (S.D.N.Y., 2003) (holding that 
taking a day off of work to attend to a mother while she underwent brain surgery did not qualify an employee 
for FMLA leave absent evidence that he was needed to contribute in some concrete way to her care).   
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amounts of care, that most parents will be working during that time, and that the majority of 
parenting will be performed under conditions not triggered by the medical requirements of 
the FMLA.  
In summary, current protection for the act of parenting, insofar as parenting conflicts 
with work requirements, is confined to two different statutory enactments, neither of which 
adequately conceptualizes or supports the range of important interests at stake. Under Title 
VII, parenting protections are forced into a sex discrimination model that can cognize only 
the worker's interest in her job. This model is individualistic, premised on voluntarism, and 
ignores the broader implications of work-and-parenting issues. Under the FMLA, parenting 
protections are forced into a medical model that cognizes serious medical needs but not 
children’s broader needs for care and affords legal protection only in crisis situations. 
 
Public Philosophy and Parenting 
Given the importance in public discourse on children and parenting, what has 
prevented the development of a legal framework that adequately supports these interests?  
And why does the little support we have take such a straitened form?  In my view, particular 
presuppositions about the family-state relationship that are widely held are responsible for 
the inadequate, and inadequately conceptualized, legal framework.  These presuppositions 
are related to (although not exactly the same as), those underlying  Rawlsian-era liberal 
theory.   
   
The Autonomous Family 
As I argued in chapter 3, while public philosophy does not repeat academic 
liberalism’s ignorance of the fact of dependency, it substitutes for it, as Martha Fineman 
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(2004) points out, the myth of the autonomous family.  This view, in contrast to Rawlsian 
liberalism, recognizes the dependency of the human condition.  Yet it sees this dependency 
as properly confined to families, where the capable and autonomous adults who head these 
families can properly manage it.  Families perform their task correctly, according to this 
view, without aid from others – including the government and employers.  By conceiving of 
adults as autonomous, and therefore the families they head as autonomous, the popular view 
simply converts academic liberalism’s belief in the autonomous individual to the belief in the 
autonomous family.  From this view derives a conception of the state’s responsibility 
conceived in terms of protecting individuals and families from incursions by others rather 
than in terms of supporting the right to care or to positive assistance.  The end-product in 
public thought therefore bears a clear resemblance to Rawls’ concept of adults as the head of 
households; in both, all the state needs to do to provide for families and the fact of 
dependency is to distribute goods and resources in a just way to the household’s head.  In this 
framework, we have far less difficulty conceiving of children as falling within a parent's 
personal sphere of autonomy – and thus allowing parents the right to be free of interference 
in order to raise and school children as they see fit—than of recognizing how the state might 
actively support parents in caring for children. 
Current law comports with this framework in failing to recognize children’s needs for 
care, except in the most extreme instances.  Instead, what gets cognized are the adult’s 
interest, which are presumed to encompass children’s interests.  And of these adult interests, 
it is liberty and equality – the two that, to use Thomas Spragens’ words, often appear on the 
liberal “masthead” (1999: 110) that are comprehended within the law. 
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The view of parents as autonomous and as the sole proper providers for their families 
is linked to the case law’s conception of family as a “choice,” which therefore divests the 
public of any obligation.  This view obscures the way in which adequate caretaking of 
children is related to the health of the polity of which children will one day be citizens. It also 
obscures consideration of the possibility that the state has responsibilities to children who are 
“chosen.”  By conceptualizing parenting as a matter of individual choice, this case law and 
the public philosophy on which it is based conceive of parenting as a private issue that 
requires a private solution, rather than an issue appropriate for collective assistance. 
The tendency of various elements of public philosophy to privatize families is 
reinforced by a newer strand of public thought that counterposes the liberal adulation of 
family autonomy against the threat of dependence, which is conceived broadly in terms of 
receiving most types of public support.229  This threat of dependency justifies public support 
as a necessary evil only when the perceived "normal" state of familial autonomy has broken 
down, and then only until the crisis can be overcome.  The dichotomy drawn between 
autonomy and dependence (viewed in terms of public support) limits state support for 
parenting to conditions of. It therefore forecloses examination of the rationales for the state to 
support parenting in the ordinary course of the lives of parents and children. 
                                                 
229The debates regarding welfare reform are a case in point.  See, for example, “The 1998 Campaign,” New 
York Times, Oct. 17, 1998 (comments of New York governor George Pataki ) (welfare reform “has changed 
people's lives and replaced a system that encouraged dependency with one that requires responsibility.”);  David 
Brooks, “More Than Money,” New York Times, Mar. 2, 2004.  It should be noted, however, that support for the 
middle-class and wealthy, including homeowner mortgage interest deductions, social security, and support for 
particular industries are defined in the popular mind in a manner that does not raise the risk of dependency.  See 
Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon (1997, 121) for a discussion of changes in the concept of "dependence" in 
United States discourse. 
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The Public and Private Realms 
The demarcation drawn in the liberal tradition between the public and private realms 
also impedes legal support for parenting. Two distinct aspects of this dichotomy hinder 
protection of parenting in the employment context.  First, the realm of work is frequently 
seen as "public," in contrast to the "private" domestic realm.  The activities associated with 
each sphere are then considered properly confined to that sphere.  Activities such as child 
care that are associated with the private realm are in this view bracketed from consideration 
in the public realm of work. For this reason, while the workplace is considered an appropriate 
place for some social policies, including those that protect the welfare of workers by 
requiring employers to pay into the workers' compensation and unemployment compensation 
systems, laws providing for leave due to pregnancy, childbearing, or child rearing are seen as 
inappropriate "social engineering" (Kasindorf 1996 (quoting Jack Kemp on family leave); see 
also Fraser, 1997, 168).  This ideology forces parenting issues out of the workplace and the 
economic realm, and leaves many full-time jobs with structures inconsistent with parenting.  
Because care is considered a private activity, it is deemed inappropriate in the work world.  
 In this conceptualization, it is only in the private realm of the family that the activity 
of care is valorized.230  And insofar as parenting issues cannot be accommodated within the 
domestic realm, they are displaced not into the labor market, but into the social services 
realm, where such protections are considered to be "charity" rather than a matter of right, and 
the dangers of “dependency” are seen as properly limiting the public aid that families 
                                                 
230In Joan Tronto's words: "Care has little status in our society, except when it is honored in its emotional and 
private forms" (Tronto 1993, 122). Katharine Silbaugh (1996) makes the related point that housework's 
association with the domestic realm and that realm's perceived affectionate atmosphere causes housework to be 
perceived as not "really work" and therefore not accorded the benefits and protections accorded to wage labor.  
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receive.  All of this shares a closer relationship with Rawls’ belief that the family had some 
“natural” mode of functioning that made it best left as untouched as possibly by the public 
world. 
The implications for women's equality of this public/private dichotomy have been 
explored by a number of feminist writers (for example, Williams1991; Olsen 1983, 1985; 
Pateman 1988; Finley 1986; Smith 2004; Hasday 2000).  They note that not only are certain 
activities and qualities traditionally associated with women in the popular mind located 
within the private realm, but that women, themselves, have been and to a considerable extent 
continue to be associated with this sphere. Indeed, the maintenance of this dichotomy 
depends on a gendered structure of society – the public world can exclude the domestic and 
embrace the concept of freedom only because women are left in the private realm to focus on 
necessities such as rearing children.231  Because of this formulation, those women who do 
enter civil society must do so on socially "male" terms as liberal subjects who can separate 
themselves from the demands of the private realm (Brown 1995, 184).  The task is often an 
impossible one for women, insofar as these demands can be confined to the domestic realm 
only if women stay there in order to meet them. 
A second aspect of the liberal demarcation between "public" and "private" also 
undercuts support for working parents. In this conception, while the workplace is public 
when defined against the domestic realm, it is private when contrasted with the public realm 
of government. While the first aspect of the public/private dichotomy holds that the 
                                                 
231Carole Pateman (1988) argues that the very founding of the modern liberal state required the construction of a 
civil society in contradistinction to the private sphere. The creation of this dichotomy allowed construction of 
the liberal formulation of free and equal men in civil society at the same time as it relocated men's patriarchal 
right over women to the private domain and deemed it natural rather than political.  
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workplace should not accommodate parenting responsibilities because these responsibilities 
are private, the second view then allows workplace policies that fail to accommodate 
parenting to appear nonpolitical, as merely the private, individual decisions of employers. 
Nancy Fraser's analysis of this issue is persuasive: 
In male-dominated, capitalist societies, what is "political" is normally 
defined contrastively over against what is "economic" and what is 
"domestic" or "personal." Here, then, we can identify two principal sets of 
institutions that depoliticize social discourses: they are, first, domestic 
institutions, especially the normative domestic form, namely, the modern 
restricted male-headed nuclear family; and, second, official economic 
capitalist system institutions, especially paid workplaces, markets, credit 
mechanisms and "private" enterprises and corporations (Fraser 1997, 168; 
see also Olsen 1989b, 1501 (distinguishing market and family dichotomy 
from state and civil society dichotomy)). 
 
Thus, in the area in which work-and-parenting issues intersect, parenting issues are, first, 
bracketed as domestic and therefore inappropriate for intervention in the work sphere and, 
second, bracketed as altogether nonpolitical because they intersect with the economic system. 
 
The Neutral State 
The liberal conception of the state as neutral regarding individual life plans, which I 
discussed in chapter 1, is voiced less in public philosophy than in academic theorizing.  
Nevertheless, this theme is sometimes sounded in public thought, and likely bears some role 
in the failure to develop adequate parenting protections.232  The law, in this view, simply 
provides a neutral framework of rights, defined as fair procedures, in which individuals can 
                                                 
232Interestingly, the view that the government should be neutral on questions of the good life appears to weaken 
once one moves outside of the framework of legal rights, narrowly construed. Government encouragement of 
particular activities through U.S. tax policy, for example, is often considered far more acceptable than adoption 
of laws favoring these activities. Thus, in the 1996 vice-presidential debates, Jack Kemp opposed the Clinton 
administration's proposal to institute broader family protections on the ground that granting family leave rights 
to parents violated government neutrality: "That isn't America, that's social engineering" (Kasindorf 1996, A5). 
In its place, however, Kemp proposed a tax break to support families.  
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choose their own valued ends.   It neither imposes a substantive vision of the good life nor 
privileges some versions of the good life over others.  This conception therefore militates 
against a framework that provides support for parenting over and above other activities. 
 In this conception of neutrality, state protection for citizens’ rights is generally 
justified on the importance of preserving citizens’ liberty (which, as I discuss in chapter 2, 
communitarians have pointed out is actually not neutral at all).  Yet although liberty 
undoubtedly has pride of place in the hierarchy of liberal values, equality is the other highly 
esteemed value in this tradition, and the other recognized, albeit more controversial, ground 
for state protection (Spragens 1999, 42).  In public philosophy, the tension between these two 
values is expressed by the divide between two camps of liberals: libertarians, who emphasize 
liberty, and egalitarians, who stress equality. Both, however, share an individualistic, rights-
oriented approach that eschews normative complexity in favor of a focus on these two 
dominant values (Spragens 1999, 44).  Within this culture, state intervention is justified on 
liberty or equality grounds, or not at all. 
 This conception of the government simply as a neutral arbiter of rights makes it far 
easier to place parenting issues in a framework that pits women's rights to equality against 
the liberty of employers than to consider the broad range of interests at stake in parenting.  
Just as Rawl’s conceived of his theory of justice, bottomed on liberty and equality to be 
neutral, the popular view conceived these values to be somehow more acceptable and neutral 
for the state to further than ends such as promoting the welfare of children.  Within this 
liberal framework, the law then converts equality into a narrow guarantee of the right to fair 
procedures for individual women rather than to a particular end-state: freedom from 
discrimination is guaranteed, a workplace in which men and women share power equally is 
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not.233  Further, the right to equality in the sense of guaranteeing women the same procedures 
applied to men ultimately redounds to women’s detriment by abstracting the right to equality 
from the rest of women’s lives.  Giving women the formal access to jobs that do not 
accommodate childbearing or child-rearing is an empty gesture for the considerable numbers 
of women committed to such activities.   In addition, under this conception of government 
neutrality, the issue of how work could be structured to best realize public objectives besides 
liberty and equality, such as to promote workers who lead full lives as moral persons and 
parent healthy, well-adjusted children, is not open for consideration.  
In summary, several elements of contemporary public philosophy work together to 
hinder adequate work-and-family protections. The conception of adults and families as 
properly autonomous, and the conception of children as freely chosen obligations, 
misconceive the function of families and prevents recognition of the role that the state can 
play in supporting families.  The liberal demarcation between the public and private realms 
legitimizes the view that parenting responsibilities have no place in the realm of work and 
that government has no business instituting family policies in the employment realm. The 
conception of the state as simply a neutral arbiter of rights impedes the state from actively 
supporting parenting. Finally, the liberal tradition's emphasis on liberty and formal equality 
obscures the more complex range of goods associated with parenting. 
 The current legal treatment of the intersection between work and parenting mirrors this 
liberal philosophy. Title VII does so in framing work-and-parenting issues solely in terms of 
                                                 
233See Contreras v. City of Los Angeles (1982), 1275 n.5, 1279 (Title VII does not ultimately focus on ideal 
social distributions of persons of various races and both sexes. Instead it is concerned with combating culpable 
discrimination."); 1277 (Title VII "tolerates a disparate impact on racial minorities so long as that impact is only 
an incidental product of criteria that genuinely predict or significantly correlate with successful job 
performance, and does not result from criteria that make race a factor in employment decisions.").   
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the right of employers to conduct their business freely and the interests in equality of 
employees, conceived apart from relationships with children. In keeping with the view of the 
neutral state as enforcing the right to fair procedures, the law then construes the employee's 
interest in equality as the right to be free from sex discrimination at work, rather than the 
right to substantive equality. In doing so, it precludes consideration of ways in which the law 
might affirmatively support parenting responsibilities. The employee's moral commitment to 
fulfill parenting responsibilities remains uncomprehended and unprotected in this analysis. 
Similarly, the needs of children and the importance to the polity of caretaking go 
unrecognized. Child rearing, in this view, is conceived solely in voluntarist terms and is 
valued only as another lifestyle choice (see generally Sandel 1996, 108).  While employees 
are allowed the right to choose to bear and rear children, they are not supported in securing 
the conditions that will enable them to combine a productive work life with this “choice.”234    
Under the FMLA, liberal philosophy limits assistance of parenting to crisis situations. 
Its recognition of the government’s role in supporting caretaking is so grudging that it occurs 
only at the margins, in situations in which a concrete, tangible need can be verified by a 
health care professional. The less measurable needs of children – the need to feed them, 
supervise them, love them, teach them – are invisible under these standards. 
 
Toward a More Complete Vision of Legal Protection for Parenting 
 
Moving from the current framework of legal protections to one that does a better job of 
requires revision of the problematic assumptions now embodied in dominant public thought.  
                                                 
234Paolo Wright-Carozza (1993, 537) notes that Article 3 of Italy's Constitution contains a much broader 
conception of the ends furthered by law:  “It is the task of the Republic to remove the obstacles of an economic 
and social nature that, by substantively limiting citizens' liberty and equality, impede the full development of 
the human person and the effective participation of all workers in the political, economic and social 
organization of the country.” 
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In the first part of this section, I walk through how these assumptions might be reformulated 
in the work-and-family context.   In the second, I consider what a reformed system of 
workplace protections for parenting might look like.   
 
 Reconceiving the Relationship Between Work and Family 
 
 Developing adequate parenting protections requires eradicating family autonomy as an 
ideal (see Fineman 2004).  As I discussed in Chapter 3, it belies reality to suggest that 
families should be conceptualized autonomously from society or the state.  In the 
contemporary world, no family exists as an island that can completely provide for all of its 
members’ needs.  Instead, all families depend on a web of resources and social and legal 
infrastructure to meet their members’ needs.  Further, as I have discussed, the family is 
already pervasively regulated both directly and indirectly by the state, from the determination 
of which groups constitute a family to the ways in which divorce laws affect who remains 
married (see, for example, Brinig and Buckley 1998).   By the same token, work regulations, 
specifically, have a profound affect on how families operate.  The existence or non-existence 
of minimum wage laws, union rights to bargain, and overtime provisions affect parents’ 
ability to meet the financial needs of their children.   The stability and security of job 
protections affect stress levels in the household, not to mention income levels if jobs are lost, 
which also affects the quality of parenting.   The intricate interrelationship between families 
and the state means that, contrary to the dominant conception of the family as removed from 
the state, the state is always already a constant presence that affects the functioning of 
families.  The question is therefore whether the state will deliberately direct state power 
toward supporting caretaking and ameliorating conflicts between work and family, or 
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whether it will continue to regulate in ways that affect families without seeking to ease this 
tension. 
This means that the conception of the state as neutral with respect to citizens’ versions 
of the good must also be rethought.  Once dependency is recognized as a normal state of 
human affairs, and families are no longer considered to be autonomous, simply enforcing 
employee/parents’ right to fair procedures or ability to "choose" whether to stay in a job that 
does not accommodate parenting is no longer sufficient to respect human dignity. Instead, 
respecting dignity requires recognizing the importance of caretaking and structuring 
institutions to support this activity.  In the context of the work-and-parenting issue, it requires 
changing the perspective from enforcing the right to choose to parent to providing 
institutional support for caretaking.  
An adequate conceptual framework for work-and-parenting policies also requires 
reorienting the meaning of the conceptual divide between public and private.  The boundaries 
between these zones must be conceived as more permeable in the sense that the public 
sphere, defined here to include both the state and the market, should be structured in ways 
that insure that families can meet their caretaking responsibilities.   Thus this model 
conceives a more integral role for state support of parenting than simple crisis management.  
Likewise, in this reconceptualization, the boundaries between the “private-economic” and the 
“public-state” divide must be deemed more permeable.  In this more porous boundary, the 
fact that individual businesses are privately owned may not serve as a barrier to the state’s 
regulating this institution to ensure parents can perform the important responsibility of caring 
for children. 
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In moving away from a framework of supposed neutrality toward one that actively 
seeks to support caretaking, the state must adopt both a more nuanced and a broader account 
of the interests at stake in the intersection between work and parenting. Such an account 
should recognize the ways in which the needs and aspirations of parents, children, and 
communities are implicated in parenting. In this regard, the state should recognize that the 
relationship between caretaking and the fitness of its citizens means that supporting 
caretaking is not only necessary for human dignity, it is wise policy.  It should, moreover, 
recognize that valuing parenting solely for the way in which it furthers sex equality too 
narrowly not only the range of interests at issue, but sex equality itself, given that it seeks to 
abstract women’s interest in employment from their aspirations to parent.  At the same time, 
this account must recognize the complex ways in which women's historical assignment of 
primary parenting responsibilities relates to these other issues.  To do so, at the same time 
that it recognizes the social value of parenting and the necessity of parenting in any 
community that will sustain itself, it must also recognize that women more than men 
conceive of their identities as closely tied to their children because of the gender roles they 
have been assigned in their subordinate status. 
Recognition of the strong link between child rearing and the health of the polity accords 
with the longstanding counsel of democratic theorists that democracies depend on well-
reared citizens. Thus, Aristotle recognized that the upbringing of citizens crucially affects the 
character of the state, "at least if it is true that it makes a difference to the soundness of a state 
that its children should be sound. . . . And it must make a difference; for . . . from children 
come those who will participate in the constitution" (Aristotle, 97).  In the words of John 
Stuart Mill, "if we ask ourselves on what causes and conditions good government in all its 
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senses . .  . depends, we find that the principal of them, the one which transcends all others, is 
the quality of the human beings composing the society over which government is exercised" 
(Mill 1991a, 225).   
 
Toward a Revised Parenting and Work Policy 
 Such a “supportive state” approach to child rearing requires specific attention to 
questions that do not get asked within the current framework. It requires democratic 
deliberation over what conditions children within this society need to flourish and the ways 
that the state can support the instantiation of these conditions by ameliorating the tension 
between parenting and work.   As I argued in chapter 3, the goal of public policy should be to 
construct institutions that allow citizens to integrate both paid work and caretaking into their 
lives.   There are some number of proposals that would help further this goal through seeking 
to accommodate job structures to the demands of caretaking.  To the extent that particular 
jobs permit it, making flex-time available is one such means to this end. This goal also 
requires generous leave provisions for caretakers to deal with both the major and minor 
emergencies that arise in all caregiving relationships. And in order for this to really be 
available to caretakers, this leave needs to be paid.  Is it not as important to provide for a 
system of compensation when parents need time off from work to parent as it is to provide 
workers' and unemployment compensation?235    
                                                 
235Because such leave would be justified in part by the state's interest in ensuring the development of its future 
citizens, principles of fairness would suggest that the state bear at least some part of the economic burden for 
this leave.  California has begun moving in this direction in providing six weeks of paid leave in its new 
Unemployment Insurance Code (§ .3300(g) (2004) (“The family temporary disability insurance program shall 
be a component of the state's unemployment compensation disability insurance program, shall be funded 
through employee contributions, and shall be administered in accordance with the policies of the state disability 
insurance program created pursuant to this part. Initial and ongoing administrative costs associated with the 
family temporary disability insurance program shall be payable from the Disability Fund.”)   
 205 
Further, as several scholars have argued, harmonizing work with caretaking 
responsibilities also requires reducing the standard 40-hour workweek, which was developed 
when employees had wives at home to perform the caretaking (see McClain 2005, 169; 
Jacobs and Gerson 2005, 186).  Finally, the state should ensure that workers not only have 
the formal opportunity to participate in caretaking, but also the practical ability to do so.  
Doing so requires ensuring a high enough standard of living for low-wage workers, either 
through an increased minimum wage or through subsidization of their living standard 
through programs like paid child care and an enhanced earned income tax credit, so that they 
are not required to perform second and third jobs to make ends meet.   
The other side of the work-family equation requires ensuring that citizens have adequate 
caretaking that allows them to work.  This requires a far better network of childcare and 
elder-care arrangements than currently exists in the United States.  Such a system of care 
should include early care for those younger than school age, after-school care for school-aged 
children, and elder care for the elderly.  Different alternatives exist for the provision of this 
care.  The least radical would continue private provision of these services, but move to a 
system of public accreditation to ensure the quality of dependents care, in combination with a 
workable system for subsidizing low-income families child-care needs.  Alternatively, the 
United States could move toward a system of public provision of caregiving, such as 
France’s system, which includes a system of free public crèches and nursery schools and 
highly subsidized spaces in day care centers for children up to age three whose mothers are 
employed (Palley and Bowman 2002). 
 It might be contended that my proposal, in arguing that a broader range of interests 
should be included in work-and-family regulation, largely assumes that the relevant interests 
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that support parenting protections will coincide and therefore overlooks the way in which 
these interests may conflict. In this view, gender equality interests can often conflict with the 
needs of children, the needs of mothers can conflict with the needs of children, the interests 
of parents can diverge from one another, and the needs of communities can diverge from the 
needs of parents. By assuming the convergence of the interests of parents, children, and 
family, according to this objection, I am romanticizing family relationships in a manner that 
ignores the reality of relationships and the power disparities that operate within society. 
 In my view, while the legitimate interests of children, mothers, fathers, and the 
community are clearly not identical, and perhaps often in potential conflict, these interests 
are often sufficiently interrelated that they can and should be pursued simultaneously. Thus, 
while in an abstract situation, the needs of children can be considered separately from the 
needs of parents, in the real world, the interests of both parents and children are generally far 
more interrelated. For example, as an abstract matter, it might be argued that it is better for 
children to have a parent stay at home with them and devote the better part of his or her life 
to them. However, in the real world, children are parented by real people whose own needs 
and aspirations in employment are important to them, and are part of a family with economic 
needs that must be fulfilled. Even considering the issue only from the perspective of the 
child's welfare, a happy, fulfilled parent for some part of the day is far more in the interest of 
the child than a disgruntled, unfulfilled parent for all of it; moreover, food on the table is 
better than a parent home all day with no food to eat. By the same token, while it is possible 
to consider gender equality interests as independent from and, possibly, in conflict with the 
interests of children, in fact, these interests are also interrelated (see, for example, Okin 
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1989a).  Because mothers often take their children's interest into account in making career 
decisions, furthering interests in sex equality requires factoring in the well-being of children. 
 The goal should therefore be to construct arrangements that improve the position of all 
these parties rather than set up zero-sum situations in which satisfying some operates to the 
detriment of others. To do so, however, will require careful attention to the ways in which 
the aspirations and needs of affected parties may conflict. In this way, the situation is similar 
to the debate regarding fetal hazards. Although the prevailing view is to cast the issue in 
terms of conflict between the mother and fetus, as one commentator notes, this model "has 
undermined the development of effective policy by focusing on the competing rather than 
the common needs of the mother and the fetus" (Note 1990, 1336; Johnsen 1992; see also 
Cohen 2005).  A more productive approach is to craft policy in order to promote the needs 
of both mother and fetus. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that existing law regulating the intersection between work-and-family 
demonstrates an impoverished vision of the possibilities for the family-state relationship.  I 
have also argued for reenvisioning the state’s role from supposed neutralilty to a “supportive 
state” model in which the state seeks to ensure that parents have the necessary institutional 
support to ensure adequate caretaking for their children.  In the next chapter, I turn to 
consider law regarding welfare and foster children.  I argue that the same maladaptive 
assumptions that I have discussed in this chapter undermine that area of law, as well. 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
 
RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIPS IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 
 
 
Law regarding the intersection between work and family is not the only area in which 
the United States does a poor job supporting children and families.  The child welfare 
system, and specifically laws governing foster care, is another.  That system, which is 
designed to ensure the health and wellbeing of the nation’s children, is, in the words of the 
chair of the Pew Commission on Children in Foster Care “unquestionably broken.”236   
In this chapter, as in the last, I consider the source of the disconnect between the 
United States’ stated commitment to children’s welfare and the system that it implements, 
this time with respect to the child welfare system.  I argue that a fundamental source of the 
difficulties of the child welfare system in the United States are the same problematic 
assumptions regarding the family-state relationship that I have discussed in earlier chapters.  
According to these assumptions, child rearing is an activity that can and should be performed 
autonomously by parents, without aid from those outside the family.  Further, children’s 
welfare should be solely the parents’ responsibility in the normal course of events.  The 
conception of the family-state relationship bottomed on these assumptions unwisely 
                                                 
236These are the comments of Pew Commission Chairman Bill Frenzel (R-MN), a twenty-year veteran of 
Congress and former Ranking Minority Member of the House Budget Committee (Pew Commission 2004).  
According to Pew Commission Vice Chairman William H. Gray (D-PA), former Majority Whip and Chairman 
of the House Budget Committee, "The foster care system is in disrepair. Every state has now failed the federal 
foster care reviews and we've seen far too many news stories of children missing from the system or injured 
while in care.” (Pew Commission 2004). 
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conceives the state as needing to step in only in crisis situations.  Moreover, the fact that state 
assistance is required is seen to demonstrate that the parents have “failed.”  
In Part I of this chapter, I discuss the “crisis-intervention” model of child welfare 
built on these assumptions, and argue that it imposes significant costs on the state, parents, 
and, most particularly, children.  In Part II, I contend that this model of the state’s position 
with respect to children’s welfare is founded on incorrect and unproductive assumptions.  In 
its place, I advocate the model of the “supportive state,” in which the state actively seeks to 
foster children’s wellbeing both inside and outside of families.   In part III, I consider how a 
revised child welfare model premised on this revised model would be structured. 
 
The Family-State Relationship In the Dominant Model of Child Welfare  
 
In earlier chapters I discussed the conception of the family-state relationship that has 
dominated in law and popular culture in the United States.  That dominant conception is built 
on, in Martha Fineman’s (2004) words, the “myth of the autonomous family.”  According to 
this conception, families are the responsibility of parents, who are supposed to provide the 
resources and the environment that children need to thrive.   This view holds that, in the 
normal course of events, when all goes well, the state has no need to enter the picture.  To 
this point of my dissertation, I have not yet specifically addressed what happens when all 
does not go well and children fail to thrive under this approach.  In those circumstances, the 
child welfare system comes into play. 
 
The Current “Crisis-Intervention” Model of State Action – The Adoption and Safe  
Families Act of 1997 
In keeping with the dominant conception of the autonomous family, contemporary 
child welfare agencies generally do nothing to promote children’s welfare unless and until 
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they receive a report of inadequate care.  When that occurs, the child welfare system is in a 
somewhat precarious position conceptually given its ideological underpinnings: according 
the myth of family autonomy, it should not be needed at all.  Welfare law negotiates this 
tension by conceiving of families deemed to require state intervention as “failed” families, 
and of the parents as inadequate. 237  Conceived in this light, state intervention has two 
possible goals: On the one hand, it can try to “fix” the biological family through therapeutic 
services to parents that allow them to remedy their deficiencies and the state to withdraw.  
On the other hand, it can terminate the child’s relationship with the failed family and position 
the child with some other family that does not need state aid, so that the state can withdraw 
from the picture once again.238  In either case, the end goal is to ensure that when the state 
does become involved, its relationship with families will be both brief and finite.   
While child welfare laws have historically vacillated between these two alternative 
goals, recently the view that most “failed” families are irrevocably and permanently failed 
has gained ascendancy, and led to a push to break up rather than seek to reunify children with 
their biological families.  This view is the driving force behind Congress’s recent overhaul of 
the child welfare system in the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (“ASFA”).   ASFA 
represents Congress’ belief that previous child welfare laws focused too much on the 
possibility of keeping children with their biological families.  This earlier law, Congress 
believed, led to children languishing in foster care because too many biological families 
                                                 
237Duncan Lindsey (1991, 4-5) refers to the current approach to child welfare as the “residual approach,” 
because state support is available only after the family has exhausted its own resources.   
  
238Barbara Woodhouse dubs the now-prevailing view that, where one parent fails to meet the expectations of the 
child welfare system, that parent can and should be replaced by another parent, the belief in a “fungible mother” 
(Woodhouse 2002, 85, 86).    
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simply could not be repaired.239  ASFA therefore prompts the state to terminate the parental 
rights of those families who have not been deemed to parent adequately if the condition 
cannot be corrected within a relatively short amount of time –  according to the Act, if a child 
has been in foster care for fifteen of the previous twenty-two months.240   And, in keeping 
with the dominant conception’s dim view of families who need state aid, it requires states to 
pursue efforts to find adoptive homes for children in foster care concurrently with efforts to 
reunite these children with their family, on the view that such reunification efforts are often 
unsuccessful (42 U.S.C.  §71(a)(15)(F)).   
To be fair, ASFA does direct that states should generally seek to keep children in 
their home or, alternatively, to reunite them with their biological families before they turn to 
the adoption alternative.  The Act mandates that states make “reasonable efforts . . . to 
preserve and reunify families . . . prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or 
eliminate the need for removing the child from the child's home” (42 U.S.C. § 
671(a)(15)(B)).  Yet in keeping with the dominant conception’s recalcitrance toward state aid 
of families, only a minority of families in the system actually receive any assistance besides 
emergency services to keep children from being put in foster care.241   Moreover, when they 
                                                 
239See Hearing before the Senate Committee On Finance: Adoption and Support of Abused Children 105th 
Cong. (1997) (statement of Rep. Camp) (“there is no solid [scientific] evidence that family preservation leads to 
better outcomes for children”). 
 
240Where a child has been in care for fifteen out of twenty-two months, absent certain exceptions, ASFA shifts 
the burden to the state to show why a petition to terminate parental rights should not be filed (42 U.S.C.  § 
675(5)(E)); see also Statement of Rep. Kennelly) (“This legislation we can all agree on is putting children on a 
fast track from foster care to safe and loving permanent homes.”); Statement of Sen. Rockefeller (bill would 
“move [severely abused and abandoned] children out of foster care and into adoptive and other permanent 
homes more quickly and more safely than ever before”).   
 
Even this period of time is not required if a court determines that “reasonable efforts” to reunify a family are not 
warranted.  In this event, the state must hold a permanency hearing within 30 days, as well as must make 
“reasonable efforts” to find another permanent placement for the child (42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(E)).   
 
241Most family preservation programs limit services to 30, 60 or 90 days (Lindsey 1997).  See also Courtney 
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do receive anything besides emergency services, the services provided tend to be for short-
term periods and relatively token, as well as geared toward therapy designed to help parents 
correct their own supposed inadequacies rather than to provide structural and institutional 
supports to families.  Despite the close connection between children in the welfare system 
and poverty,242 only 26.2 percent of those who received services received financial 
assistance; 16.7 percent received help with transportation; and 7.5 percent received 
employment assistance (Lindsey 1991, 145; see also Barth and Berry 1994, 325).   In 
contrast, the service most often available to families was counseling, received by 42.7 
percent of families in this position – indicating the state’s view that the problem is not 
poverty, but parental dysfunction. 
The situation is similar once a child is taken into foster care.  The majority of families 
at this point receive no services to aid reunification. And, when services are provided at all, 
the service most often provided is counseling (to 35.2% of separated families), rather than 
more concrete institutional supports such as employment assistance (to 3.8% of separated 
families); financial  assistance (17.8% of separated families); and transportation assistance 
(8.1% of separated families) (Lindsey 1991, 145; Barth and Berry 1994, 325).   
The minimal efforts made toward reunification of families as against adoption into 
new families owes a considerable amount to the federal funding scheme for child welfare 
services.  This scheme makes it difficult for states to receive funding to prevent children from 
being mistreated in the first place, or to be returned to their parents following a period of 
                                                                                                                                                       
1994 (survey of children entering foster care between 1988 and 1991 found 70% received only emergency 
response services, 20% received no services, and only 10% received extensive services); Fein and Maluccio 
1992, 339 (family preservation programs are “short-term, crisis-oriented, and stopgap”).   
 
242Families with incomes of less than $15,000 annually are twenty-two times more likely to be involved in the 
child welfare system than families whose incomes exceed $30,000 (Children’s Defense Fund 1998, 66). 
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foster care, but relatively easy to be reimbursed for expenditures on foster care and for 
adoption after such mistreatment occurs. As one report concludes, “With a cap on federal 
funds for prevention, support, reunification, and an open-ended entitlement on placement 
expenses, researchers and advocates have noted that states have little financial incentive to 
reinforce the child welfare goal of keeping families together . . . .” (Scarcella 2004).  The 
resulting system of foster care reflects these incentives:  In 2002, the federal government 
spent at least nine dollars on foster care and three more dollars on adoption for every dollar 
spent to prevent foster care or speed reunification (Scarcella 2004). 
In sum, the end state that ASFA seeks, whether the children are eventually returned to 
their biological parents or placed with adoptive parents, is a family that, on its own, will 
ensure its children’s health and welfare.243  And while the Act at least pays lip service to the 
idea that the preferred outcome is reunification rather than termination, the strong view 
underlying that legislation is that families requiring state intervention are problems unlikely 
to be fixed.244  
 
The Price of the Crisis Intervention Model  
A number of commentators have debated the issue of whether Congress should have 
moved from an emphasis on family preservation in child welfare to an emphasis on family 
                                                 
243ASFA does, however, deviate from the dominant model’s conception that the state should have no long-term 
involvement with parents insofar as it makes available ongoing subsidies for adoptions where children have 
special needs, as well as guaranteeing that such children will remain eligible for government-subsidized health 
care after they are adopted.  42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(21).  
244In 1994, then-House Speaker Newt Gingrich exemplified the view that parents who require aid from the state 
have no business raising children when he proposed giving states money to place the children of families who 
have been terminated from welfare rolls in orphanages (Seeley 1994; Welch and Phillips 1994).  His plan called 
for financing these orphanages with money saved from denying benefits to unwed teens, and for promoting 
adoptions to parents who have the resources to care for their children (Brito 2000). 
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termination and adoption.245  In my view, both of these approaches are part of the “crisis 
intervention” model, in which the state involves itself in supporting families only in 
exceptional situations, and only when a family is deemed to have failed.  Both of the 
approaches – taking children into foster care while attempting short-term fixes to reunify 
biological families, or termination of parental rights – has such serious costs that they should 
require us to rethink the crisis-intervention model itself.  
Whether or not most children removed from their homes under the existing system 
would be better off than if they were allowed to remain with their biological families – and 
there is considerable evidence and debate on both sides of this issue246 – this model of the 
family-state relationship indisputably imposes its own heavy set of costs on children.   Under 
the current approach, a staggering number of children - approximately 303,000 annually247 - 
enter the foster care system.  The state’s failure to support children’s welfare until children 
enter the system means that most of these children will have been raised in poverty (Pelton 
1989, 38-42; Lindsey 1991, 139-55), and the overwhelming majority will have some sort of 
physical or mental abnormality on entering foster care that requires medical attention, 
including greatly elevated rates of suicidal and homicidal ideation, as well as high levels of 
abnormal results on developmental screening examinations (Garrison 2005).   
                                                 
245For example, compare Gelles and Schwartz 1999 (arguing that state expends too much effort to keep 
biological families together) with Guggenheim 1999, 147-48 (pointing out that no more than 10 percent of cases 
involve serious abuse, and commenting that “if the remaining ninety percent of children in foster care are there 
for reasons other than serious abuse, we now appear to have lost sight of our first principles.”).   
 
246For example, compare Garrison 2005 (“Reformers . . . alleged that out-of-home care was frequently imposed 
on parents who needed only day care or financial assistance.  They argued that the provision of intensive, in-
home services could frequently avert placement, at lower cost and with less harm.  . . .  There was little 
evidence to support any of these propositions, however.  Worse, there was evidence that contradicted them.”) 
and  Wexler 2001, 130 (“AFSA was the culmination of an assault on safe, effective programs to keep families 
together that began in the 1990s.  . . [I]n the name of child safety, it has made children less safe.”).      
 
247U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2004 (AFCARS Report for FY 2002).  In total, 532,000 
children were in the foster care system as of September 30, 2002.  Ibid.   
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Taking these children into foster care, regardless of whether it saves them from future 
harm, also causes them trauma.  It is difficult to overestimate the emotional anguish 
experienced by these children as a result of being separated, even temporarily, from their 
parents, their siblings, and their home.  As stated by an expert witness in Nicholson v. 
Scoppetta  (2002), “the attachment between parent and child forms the basis of who we are 
as humans and the continuity of that attachment is essential to a child’s natural 
development.”248   
And, because of the multitude of problems with state’s administration of the foster 
care system, some significant portion of these children will suffer more than the trauma of 
separation that must inevitably accompany foster care.  The difficulty that states have had 
administering and monitoring the foster care system means that children who enter it are far 
from assured a benign experience.  The state has a record, as Martin Guggenheim and 
Christine Gottlieb (2005) put it, “as an exceedingly poor parent of needy children.”  In this 
system, a significant number of children are shuffled from placement to placement.249   They 
are, moreover, at far greater risk for abuse than in the general population (Wexler 2001, 137-
38).  In fact, the problems with the foster care system have been so pervasive that, at the time 
AFSA was being considered in Congress, twenty-two states had been forced to enter into 
                                                 
248Nicholson v. Scoppetta (testimony of Dr. Peter Wolf); see also Goldstein 1977, 649-50 (“Although breaking 
or weakening the ties to the responsible and responsive adults may have different consequences for children of 
different ages, there is little doubt that such breach in the familial bond will be detrimental to the child’s well-
being.”).  
 
249As of September 30, 1998, nearly two thirds of the children then in foster care had experienced between one 
and two placements, 21% had experienced three or four placements, and 16% had experienced five or more 
(U.S. House of Representatives 2000, Table 11-27). 
 
A study of Washington State’s child welfare system found that children as young as age 3 are moved from 
placement to placement, sometimes several times in the same year.  It also found delays in responding to child 
abuse (Children’s Bureau 2004).  In that system, one-third of children in foster care experienced between four 
and nine placements; and one-third experienced ten or more placements (Washington Department of Social and 
Health Services 2003).    
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consent decrees as a result of badly managed child welfare systems (Woodhouse 2002 (citing 
143 Cong. Rec. 12211)).  Newspaper stories of foster care mismanagement and abuse that 
have emerged from state after state graphically illustrate how flawed this system is in actual 
operation.250 
Moreover, the model of episodic state involvement that marks the current child 
welfare system, in which the state offers limited crisis-oriented services to parents for 
relatively short periods of time, does not deal effectively with the deep-seated issues that 
generally prompt state intervention in the first place.  Indeed, research demonstrates that a 
large proportion of children whose families receive traditional services continue to be abused 
or neglected by those families.251   The first among these deep-seated issues rarely dealt with 
by the state is poverty.  And issues relating to poverty overlap and interconnect with other 
                                                 
250See, for example, Kaufman 2003 (“Review by two child welfare experts of hundreds of cases handles by 
New Jersey Youth and Family Services Division finds that  . . . more than half children in foster care in state are 
not checked on with the regularity that federal guidelines demand.); Polgreen and Worth 2003 (“The parents of 
four boys adopted from New Jersey's troubled foster care system were arrested Friday, two weeks after the 
police found that the children, ages 9 to 19, had been starved to the point that none of them weighed more than 
50 pounds, according to the Camden County prosecutor.”); Olinger 2004 (“All three were Colorado foster 
children placed in government custody to protect them from harm.  Yet the circumstances of all three deaths 
remained hidden from from public scrutiny despite internal investigations that faulted the foster parents and the 
agencies supervising them.”); Kresnak 2004 (“The beating death of an emotionally disturbed 4-year-old foster 
child in Detroit last year led to imprisonment for his foster mother, criminal charges against two foster-care 
workers and the departure of two employees of the Michigan Family Independence Agency.”); Goodnough 
2004 (“At 16, Yusimil Herrera won a suit against Florida's child welfare agency for churning her through foster 
homes where she said she was beaten, slapped, kicked and sexually abused from the time she was 2. . . .  On 
Sunday, Ms. Herrera, now 20, was arrested on charges of severely beating her own young daughter in their 
North Miami apartment. Eight months pregnant with her second baby, she stands accused of the same cruelty 
that plagued her own childhood and made her a compelling symbol of the system's deepest failings.”); 
Goodnough 2005 (“A caretaker for Rilya Wilson, the foster child whose disappearance four years ago exposed 
serious flaws in Florida's child-welfare system, was indicted Wednesday on charges of murdering the girl, who 
was 4 years old when she vanished.  The caretaker, Geralyn Graham, was also charged with kidnapping and 
aggravated child abuse. Rilya's body has never been found. Rilya, who was born to a cocaine addict whose 
parental rights were terminated when Rilya was an infant, went missing in January 2001. Ms. Graham has said 
that a representative of the Florida Department of Children and Families took the girl away from her Miami 
home that month, a claim the agency denies. The agency has said it failed to notice Rilya's disappearance for 15 
months because a caseworker lied about visiting her home.”).  
 
251See Wald 1988, 95-97 (two-thirds of children of families receiving in-home services were subject to 
continuing neglect or abuse).   
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issues that have no quick fix.252  As Marsha Garrison (2005) points out, problems leading to 
foster care are generally serious and multiple: one well-regarded study finds that 33 percent 
of caretakers with children in foster care suffered from severe mental or emotional problems; 
60 percent had alcohol abuse problems; 53 percent had a severe health problem; and 76 
percent of families had at least one child with a serious health problem.  In Dorothy Roberts’ 
words, “How can agencies expect to solve problems arising from any combination of 
deplorable conditions – chronic poverty, dangerous neighborhoods, shoddy housing, poor 
health, drug addiction, profound depression, lack of childcare – with a three month parenting 
course or ephemeral crisis intervention?” (Roberts 1999, 124; see also Lindsey 1997, 145).   
The complexity of these issues, in combination with the ineffectiveness of the short-
term services offered to them, means that a large proportion of children who are put in foster 
care will be returned to families that still have the same problems that prompted the 
children’s removal in the first place.  This, in turn, means that many of these children – 
roughly 25% – will eventually be returned to foster care yet again  (Hearing before the Senate 
Committee On Finance, Statement of Rep. Camp; Roberts 1999, 123 n.54).  Alternatively, 
these children will have their relationship with their biological parents legally terminated 
because the parents are unable to resolve their problems sufficiently.  In 2002 alone, this 
                                                 
252In contrast to the traditional, limited range of crisis-oriented services offered through most child welfare 
agencies, states have begun to experiment with more intensive family preservation services programs during the 
last few decades.  Evidence regarding the effectiveness of these programs has, at least until recently, been 
equivocal.  Several studies assessing these programs in the 1990s had failed to find significant effects of such 
programs.  See, for example, Littell and Schuerman (“There is little solid evidence that programs aimed at 
preventing out-of-home placements or reunifying families with children in foster care have the intended 
effects.”); Rossi 1994.  More recent examinations, though, criticize these previous assessments for their 
research design and methods, which, these critics argued, failed to detect treatment effects that did, in fact, 
occur.  See, for example, Heneghan 1996; Kirk 2000, 1-8 (discussing controversy regarding studies finding no 
effects of intensive research programs).  More recent research that uses more rigorous research methods has 
demonstrated the efficaciousness of at least some intensive family preservation services programs (Kirk 2000, 
48-51 (demonstrating effectiveness of intensive services programs in North Carolina). See also Wexler 2001, 
145.    
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occurred for roughly 62,000 children in foster care (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 2004).  In this latter group, over and above the wrenching emotional toll of having 
their homes, parents, and sometimes siblings taken from them, 253 many of these children will 
not be adopted because of the shortage of families seeking to adopt from this pool of 
children.  For example, in 2002, 53,000 were adopted from foster care. This left 126,000 
children in the foster care system waiting to be adopted (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services 2004).   
Martin Guggenheim’s (1995) empirical work on adoption in two states that 
aggressively sought adoption for foster children during a five- year period before the passage 
of AFSA anticipated the current problem of adoption overload.  He concluded: “Five years of 
aggressively terminating parents’ rights has produced a clear pattern: The number of children 
freed for adoption goes up every year; the number of children adopted fails to keep pace with 
the number of adoption-eligible children; and the total number of orphaned children not 
adopted continues to increase fastest of all” (131). 
Older children, African-American children, and children with disabilities suffer 
particularly under the existing model.   These children have a significantly lower chance of 
being adopted than other children whose parental relationships have been terminated.254 
                                                 
253This toll seems to have been almost completely overlooked by Congress in the passage of ASFA.  Indeed, 
some members of Congress exhibited a bizarre belief that children could and should trade up families, much the 
same way that a driver trades up cars.  See, for example, Hearing before the Senate Committee On Finance, 
Statement of Rep. Camp (“Adoption is good for children.  The reason is simple.  Nearly every adopted child is 
put in the midst of the best child-rearing machine ever invented – the family.  Children reared in families, 
especially two-parent families, grow up to do well on nearly every measure – marriage, employment, education, 
avoidance of crime, and independence from welfare.”); see also Woodhouse 2002 (criticizing belief in “fungible 
mother”). 
 
254See Schmidt-Tieszen and McDonald 1998, 15 (“A common theme is woven throughout these studies.  A 
child remains in foster care longer and is less likely to be adopted if he/she has minority status, particularly 
African-American; is older; or possesses social-emotional or physical handicaps.”); Freundlich 1998, 13, 28-43. 
(“Data show that the children in foster care who are adopted are primarily younger children.  In FY 1990, for 
example, almost 55 percent of all finalized adoptions were of children between birth and five years of age, with 
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Grade school children are almost four times as likely as preschool-aged children to be slated 
for long-term foster care rather than adoption; that goes up to 33 times as likely for 
adolescents (Schmidt-Tieszen & McDonald 1998, 23-24).  Non-Caucasian children, 
meanwhile, are roughly three times more likely to end up in long-term foster care than white 
children, when other factors are held constant (Ibid. 23).   
As a result, many older, minority, or disabled children will linger in foster care until 
they “age out” of the system, an upbringing that is devastating based on almost any measure 
of wellbeing.  For example, a University of Wisconsin study found that after aging out of 
foster care, 27 percent of males and 10 percent of females were incarcerated within twelve to 
eighteen months.  In addition, 50 percent of the former foster care children were 
unemployed, 37 percent did not graduate from high school, 33 percent were on public 
assistance, and 19 percent of the females had given birth to their own children within that 
twelve to eighteen month period (Vobejda 1998, A1; see also Moye and Rinker 2002, 
377).  A longer-range study by the General Accounting Office (1995, 14-15) showed that by 
two and a half to four years after youths left foster care, more than 60 percent of young 
women had given birth to a child.  In addition, 45% are homeless at some point in the year 
after aging out (Barriers to Adoption 1996, 79 (statement of Peter Digre)).  On top of that, 47 
percent of former foster children were receiving some form of counseling or medication for 
mental health problems before aging out, and that number only dropped to 21 percent after 
leaving the system (Vobejda 1998, A1).  
And even many of those older children who are fortunate enough to be adopted, 
because of their attachment to their biological parents, will never be able to build a bona fide 
                                                                                                                                                       
steadily declining percentages represented by each successive and older age group of children.”). 
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parental bond with their adoptive parents (Gibbs et al. 2004; Gordon 1999, 668-69).   The 
current, crisis-oriented model of the family-state relationship therefore underpins a system 
that, whether or not taking children into foster care protects them from more serious injury, 
leaves most, if not all, children who come into contact with it significantly damaged. 
This model also imposes heavy emotional costs on the roughly 51,000 parents who 
lose their children every year (Children’s Defense Fund 2004), sometimes permanently, 
because they cannot meet the responsibility assigned to them.  This toll falls 
disproportionately on the poor, who make up the vast majority of the parents involved in the 
foster care system.255  By the same token, African American children are removed from their 
families at a far greater rate than their white counterparts.256  Many of these parents cannot 
afford the conditions and services – decent housing, medical care, mental health care, 
adequate child care while they work – that the current system requires parents to provide 
their children (see Lindsey 1991, 127-35).257  That poor children are removed from their 
parents at such disproportionate rates, and that so many of these children are black, poses a 
                                                 
255While circumstances connected with poverty are the cause of a large proportion of removals of children from 
poor homes, biases against the poor and minorities also play a role (Cahn 1999, 1199 (discussing studies that 
show bias in assessment of abuse)).   
 
256As of September 30, 2002, African-American children comprised 37 percent of the children in foster care 
although they were only 15 percent of the general population under age 18 (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services 2004).  By contrast, white children comprised only 39 percent of the foster care population, 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2004), although they made up 64 percent of the country’s 
children (Annie E. Casey Foundation 2004).  Furthermore, African-American children are more likely to be 
place in residential or group care than foster care, and less likely to be reunified with their families (Annie E. 
Casey Foundation 2004). 
 
257Linda Gordon describes this same phenomenon at the turn of the last century:  
 
Only one variable other than single motherhood was a better predictor of child removal: poverty . . . 
The Society [protective services] was sensitive to allegations that it kidnapped poor people’s children, 
and its stated policy was that it never removed children from their homes for poverty alone.  But 
poverty was never alone.  The characteristic signs of child neglect in this period [1880-1920] – dirty 
clothing, soiled linen, lice and worms, crowded sleeping conditions, lack of attention and supervision, 
untreated infections and running sores, rickets and other malformations, truancy, malnutrition, 
overwork – were often the results of poverty (1988, 94-95). 
 
 221 
strong challenge to the foundational belief that basic rights, including the right to rear one’s 
own children, should not depend on a person’s wealth or race. 
Finally, the dominant model imposes heavy costs, both financial and non-financial, 
on the state.  At first glance this model seems relatively cost-effective for the state in that it 
assumes that parents rather than the state should generally assume responsibility for children.  
However, in operation, this model imposes an enormous financial burden on the state.  A 
recent study by the Urban Institute calculates that states spent upward of $22 billion on child 
welfare in 2002 from federal, state, and local sources, most of it for foster care (Scarcella 
2004, 6) –  and that is only what they paid directly.   The vast indirect financial costs 
resulting from the damage to children incurred in the prevailing system, in both biological 
families and in the foster care system, which take their toll in juvenile delinquency, loss of 
productivity, and adult criminality, are far higher – by one estimate an additional $94 billion 
annually (Fromm 2001).  Even more important are the vast non-financial costs to the polity 
from having hundreds of thousands of its most vulnerable citizens, each of whom should be 
developing their capabilities to become vigorous and active citizens and productive members 
of society, become physically, mentally, and emotionally damaged, many of them for life, by 
the current system. 
 
The Supportive State:  An Alternative Conception of the Family-State Relationship 
  
The current child welfare model possesses a number of conceptual and practical 
drawbacks. First, this model’s view that the state should intervene only in emergencies to 
deal with the underlying problems that plague vulnerable families, and then only on a short-
term basis, is problematic.   As I have described in earlier chapters, the view that the family 
can be seen as completely separate from the state is itself problematic as a conceptual matter: 
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the state defines families and influences their operations at every turn (see also Olsen 1985).  
This complicated interrelationship between families and the state means that, contrary to the 
dominant conception of the state’s role in the child welfare system, there can be no 
assessment of whether parents’ care is adequate “before” the state steps in, no neutral, 
isolated position into which the state can retreat to wait while families exhaust their 
responsibility to care for dependents.  As a consequence, insofar as the state has a 
responsibility to vulnerable children, state involvement with families to protect and support 
children’s welfare should, and must, be conceived as existing concurrently with parents’ 
responsibility to care for their children.   
 On a related note, the foster care system wrongfully focuses all responsibility for 
children’s welfare on their parents, and conceive it to be solely the parents’ failure when 
children fail to thrive.  Yet the care and wellbeing of children cannot simply be reduced to 
their relationship with their parents, as the crisis intervention model would have it.  As 
Barbara Woodhouse (2005) demonstrates, instead, children inhabit a variety of systems – 
family, neighborhood, faith community, school – that, in interconnected ways, profoundly 
affect children’s development.  And even those systems that children do not directly 
encounter can still pervasively affect their wellbeing.  For example, a parent’s work 
responsibilities and job benefits profoundly influences the care a parent can provide a child.  
In this way, neither the child nor the parent-child dyad operate in a vacuum, but in a 
community in which the character of other systems and the availability of particular 
resources and support profoundly affects both the child and the parents’ ability to provide 
care for the child. 
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Seen in this light, the way in which the standard model focuses on the success or 
failure of the particular caregiver, taken alone, is misleading.  Instead, we should be talking 
about the success or failure of the systems surrounding the child, systems in which the parent 
is an important, but not the only, part.  What is viewed in the standard model as a failure of 
parental care looks, in this reframing, more complicated.   Is a mother’s leaving her infant 
with a twelve-year old neighbor so that she can go to work the fault of the mother or a 
problem with the lack of affordable daycare?  Is a mother’s drug addiction an example of 
failed parental care or the result of a lack of appropriate drug treatment programs?  Is a 
family’s homelessness the fault of the parents, or the product of a larger crisis in affordable 
housing in this country? 
The current crisis-intervention model also fails on a practical level.  As Marsha 
Garrison (2005) points out using a wealth of empirical evidence, short-term therapeutic 
strategies to “cure” child abuse and neglect just do not work.  The problems that give rise to 
intervention are generally not short-term problems that can be dealt with using short-term 
solutions able to patch families up once and for all.  Instead, the solutions called for are 
longer-term and require continuous rather than episodic involvement from the state to 
support families. 
These insights suggest the need for a full-scale rethinking of the family-state 
relationship with respect to child welfare.  A better conception, in my view, is what I have 
referred to in early chapters as the “supportive state” model.  In this model, the state’s 
responsibility to children is conceived as both ongoing and concurrent with parents’ 
responsibilities.  The supportive state model, like the dominant model, conceives of parents 
as bearing primary responsibility for the day-to-day caring for (or arranging the care for) 
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children and other dependents, since they are ordinarily in the best position to do so and have 
the greatest motivation to know them and act in their best interests (see Buss 2004, 31).   The 
supportive state model recognizes, though, that how institutions are structured makes a huge 
difference in both parents’ ability to parent children, and in children’s wellbeing generally.  
Given the difficulty for parents of adjusting institutional rules on their own, and the unique 
capacity of the state to do so, the state’s responsibility to children’s welfare should be 
exercised through ensuring that societal institutions are structured in ways that support 
children’s wellbeing.  The state’s goal, in this regard, is to achieve a situation in which a 
parent who works hard and plays by the rules can raise sound children. 
My argument in favor of the supportive state model may, for some, raise the specter 
of a totalitarian state usurping parental control of children.  State involvement with families, 
it might be argued, will lead to the standardization of families and the weakening of parental 
authority.  Such an objection, however, misconceives the state’s role in this proposal.  The 
current approach to the child welfare system pits parents and the state in a zero-sum game: as 
the state becomes more involved, it increasingly wrests children away from the control of 
their parents.  In contrast, a major goal of the supportive state model is to align the interests 
of the state and parents; in it, the state assures parents the resources that they need to parent 
without taking control from them.  Were the state, for example, to pass laws that prohibited 
employers from requiring employees to work against their wishes more than 40 hours a 
week, the greater hours that these employees could spend with their children would 
strengthen, not weaken, parental authority.  
Another set of objections that might be raised to the supportive-state approach is 
based on the view that the state’s providing aid to parents will allow parents to shirk their 
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own responsibilities toward their children.  In this vein, it might be argued that state 
assistance to parents will redound to children’s detriment, since their wellbeing depends on 
their being raised by capable parents, rather than by the state.  On a related note, these 
policies might be claimed to promote a culture of dependency, in which citizens depend on 
the state rather than themselves to meet their and their families’ needs.  
These objections founder, however, on their assumption that parents and families 
properly should be autonomous and, thus, as a normative matter, capable of rearing children 
completely independently from the state.  As Martha Fineman has eloquently argued, 
children’s dependency is both natural and inevitable, and this dependency induces the 
“derivative dependency” experienced by caretakers who, as a result of caring for dependents, 
must depend on others for access to societal goods (see Fineman 2004, 35-37).258  Far from 
being stigmatized, dependency should be recognized as a necessary feature of the human 
condition, and responded to by the state in a humane manner rather than ignored (Fineman, 
37-38).  In addition, I would add that raising children is a sufficiently complex and difficult 
endeavor that there is more than enough responsibility to go around.  As a result, both parents 
and the state have difficult and important roles to play with respect to children. 
 
Toward a Revised Family-State Relationship In the Child Welfare System 
 
How would a supportive state structure its institutions to facilitate the wellbeing of 
children?   In contrast to the existing model, in which the government spends the vast bulk of 
its child welfare resources paying private companies and foster parents to care temporarily 
                                                 
258Linda Gordon and Nancy Fraser have reached a similar result by showing that what is now scorned as 
welfare dependency and seen as a moral failing was historically accepted as women’s status stemming from 
their caring for their children (Fraser & Gordon 1997, 121). 
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for children whom the government deems inadequately parented,259 the government would 
funnel its resources into creating structures that would support parents’ caretaking, as well as 
the well-being of children in systems beyond the family sphere, including day care centers, 
schools, and neighborhoods.   
With respect to families, a supportive state would seek to develop institutional 
structures that enable parents to care for their children physically, emotionally, and 
financially.   Despite the fact that a major institutional obstacle to parenting is the tension 
between labor market and parenting responsibilities,260 as I argued in chapter 6, the United 
States has until now done little to restructure labor market requirements to accommodate 
caretaking.  A supportive state approach would adopt the policies I suggested in chapter 6 to 
ensure that working parents had adequate opportunity to parent and adequate child care when 
they worked.  
The clear link, as Marsha Garrison (2005) discusses, between at least some children’s 
early education programs and significantly reduced levels of child maltreatment makes the 
provision of such programs all the more crucial to fulfilling the state’s responsibility to 
promote children’s welfare.261   So does the evidence linking these programs to higher levels 
                                                 
259In fact, officials from Los Angeles County feared that heavy opposition from what they called the “private 
child-abuse industry,” which had grown wealthy over the years from the $20 billion-a-year child welfare 
system, would squelch badly needed reforms that would keep more children with their families (Anderson 
2003, N1).  The local newspaper’s investigation “found widespread misuse of taxpayer funds and some of the 
highest salaries in the nation among the nonprofit foster family agencies and group homes responsible for most 
of the 30,000 children in foster homes. . . . In the private care agencies that oversee most of the children, some 
executives receive up to $310,000 a year in salaries and benefits and spend millions of taxpayer dollars for posh 
offices, expensive furniture and luxury cars. . .”  (Ibid.).   
 
260In a long-term study of the child welfare system in New York, R.C. Pryor observed that "child left 
unattended" was the major reason that children were reported for child abuse in New York (Lindsey 1991, 72, 
82) (citing R.C. Pryor). 
  
261Garrison cites Reynolds and Robertson 2003 and Reynolds 2003 for this proposition, who attribute some 
large part of these programs decrease in maltreatment to the parental involvement component of these programs 
(Reynolds and Roberson 2003, 17-18).   
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of education and employment for those exposed to it as children (Currie 2001, 217-20).262   
For older children, after-school programs that insure that children are cared for safely and 
constructively until their parents return home are a basic, much needed way for the state to 
secure children’s well-being.263 
A supportive state would also ensure the availability of adequate programs to deal 
with parental substance abuse.  Although studies implicate parental substance abuse in 
anywhere between one-third and two-thirds of existing cases in the foster care system 
(Garrison 2005,  n.74), there is currently a severe shortage of publicly-funded substance 
abuse programs available to parents. 264  And, in fact, during the same year in which Congress 
shortened the time frame for terminating parental rights if parents failed to meet state criteria 
for parenting, it considered and rejected proposals to expand drug treatment services for 
families involved with child protection agencies (Roberts 1999, 123 note 47).  Furthermore, 
most of the drug treatment programs that do exist were developed for men and are a poor fit 
for women with childrearing responsibilities.265  
Similarly, a responsive state would ensure access to mental health services for parents 
and children.  Seven and one-half million children in the U.S. have a mental disorder, half of 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
262The High/Scope Educational Research Foundation found in a long-term study that 40-year-olds, who as 
children had been in a preschool program for poor three-and-four year olds, were far more likely to be 
successful on a variety of measurements including education, employment, and probability of having a criminal 
record (Schweinhart 2002).  
 
263The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that 2.1 million children under thirteen are without adult supervision 
before and after school (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1997).  
 
264The shortage of such programs for women has been called a “serious national problem”  (Magura and Laudet 
1996, 202).   
  
265Most substance-abuse programs emphasize strict, structured routines, often in residential settings, and clients 
are directed to focus time and energy on themselves and their recovery.  These programs, most of which don’t 
even offer childcare during program sessions, are ill-suited to mothers who are the primary caretakers of their 
children (Magura and Laudet 1996, 264). 
 
 228 
these a condition that causes serious disability (The National Alliance for the Mentally Ill 
2005).  The Surgeon General estimates that 80 percent of those children with mental 
disorders do not receive necessary treatment (Goldberg 2001).  In the foster care system, 
specifically, roughly 33 percent of parents who maltreat their children have mental health 
problems, and between 35 and 85 percent of children entering foster care need mental health 
treatment (Leslie 2000, 466-67).  Many of these children enter the system because their 
parents cannot afford the mental health treatment that they require (Jenkins 2004, B1).266   
Given that the largest barrier to obtaining mental health services is the cost, 267 a 
responsive state would ensure the provision of affordable mental health treatment for those 
who are uninsured, particularly for the working poor who do not qualify for public benefits, 
as well as require employers to give mental health treatment parity with benefits for other 
medical treatment in employee insurance plans.  The state must also insure the availability of 
community mental health services in poor areas, which frequently do not have the resources 
to sustain them (Chow 2003, 792).  This is a particular problem for minorities, who have 
poorer access to these services, are less likely to receive services at all, and, when they do 
receive such services, often receive lower quality care (Surgeon General 2001; Chow 2003, 
792).  Finally, states must begin to coordinate child welfare preventive services with mental 
health services, rather than treat them as two separate systems (Blanche 1994).  As one 
                                                 
266“Almost one of every four children in Virginia's foster care system is there because parents want the child to 
have mental health treatment, a report commissioned by the General Assembly states.  The study – the result of 
a months-long examination of the state's foster care and mental health services – chronicles the difficult 
decisions that thousands of Virginia parents have made to relinquish custody of their children to the foster care 
system so they can get mental health services that are otherwise unavailable or unaffordable” (Jenkins 2004, 
B1).  
 
267The Surgeon General (1999) notes that a national telephone survey revealed that 11 percent of the population 
perceived a need for mental or addictive services, with about 25 percent of these reporting difficulties in 
obtaining needed care. Worry about costs was listed as the highest reason for not receiving care, with 83 percent 
of the uninsured and 55 percent of the privately insured listing this reason.  See also Harrison 2002.   
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expert stated, parents with mental illness “are caught in the gap between child welfare and 
mental health systems.  Their mental illness is viewed as an individual problem that is the 
responsibility of the local mental health system, whereas the safety and welfare of their 
children is the responsibility of the child welfare system” (Ackerson 2003, 190; see also 
Sands 2004, 317).  
Given the strong link between not only poverty and child maltreatment,268 but also 
between poverty and children’s welfare generally (Children’s Defense Fund 2005), a 
responsive state would pay special attention to the welfare of children in poor families.  
Because commentators have already done an excellent job laying out the programs needed by 
children in low-income families (see, for example, Roberts 2002a, 2002b; Guggenheim 1999, 
147), I won’t belabor the issue.  Briefly, in addition to the state action already discussed, a 
responsive state would ensure the development of an adequate amount of low-income 
housing so that these parents would have a decent home in which to raise their children.269  
At least four separate studies since 1996 have found that 30% of foster children could remain 
safely in their own homes if their parents had access to decent housing (Harburger and White 
2004, 500-01).  Securing poor children’s welfare also requires raising the minimum wage for 
                                                 
268Marsha Garrison (2005) points out the complexity of the link between poverty and foster care placement.  It 
is not clear how much of poor families’ placement rate is directly caused by poverty, and could therefore be 
reduced by reducing poverty, how much is caused by bias against poor families so that the state is more willing 
to remove poor children from their families, and how much of this link results from parental difficulties that 
lead to the family’s poverty, and for which a poverty-prevention strategy would therefore not cure.  Garrison 
2005.  Garrison ultimately concludes that the data show “that poverty reduction might play a useful role in an 
effective prevention campaign, but do not demonstrate that poverty reduction offers the ‘silver bullet’ that we 
would like to find.”   
 
269In a 2001 study, researchers found that “all the major metropolitan areas . . . visited mentioned severe 
shortages of affordable housing” (Malm et al. 2001, 14). Between 1973 and 1993, the number of low cost 
apartments ($300 a month in 1993 dollars) fell from 5.1 million to 2.1 million.  At the same time, the numbers 
of families in poverty increased considerably (Dreier 1997, 8). In the District of Columbia in 1999, "the fair 
market rent for a two-bedroom apartment . . . was $ 820, 77 percent of the average monthly income for a worker 
earning the State minimum wage, and 115 percent of the maximum monthly TANF cash assistance grant plus 
Food Stamps for a family of three" (Moye and Rinker 2002, 389).    
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workers to insure that workers with children can make ends meet.270  In addition, it requires a 
special effort to ensure the provision of day care (the necessity of which I have already 
discussed for children generally) to children of the working poor.271   
Finally, children’s welfare is powerfully influenced by other spheres outside the 
family, including schools and neighborhoods.  A supportive state would ensure that these 
systems, too, facilitate children’s well-being.  This means that the state should give priority 
to transforming blighted neighborhoods and schools.272   Projects like New York’s Ten Year 
Plan can serve as models for transforming the poorest neighborhoods (see, for example, Ellen 
2003, 71).   Such projects would not only reduce the risk factors for child maltreatment, they 
would increase the well-being of children and all of the community’s citizens. 
While there is little doubt that the implementation of these programs would require a 
significant financial investment, redirecting a significant portion of the more than $22 billion 
dollars that the government spends each year on the foster care system (Scarcella 2004, 6 (for 
the year 2002)) would go far toward paying this bill.273  And money spent by the state to 
                                                 
270A mother of two who works full-time at the current minimum wage of $5.15 an hour now earns wages that 
place her family 24 percent below the poverty line (AFL-CIO Factsheet 2005).   
 
271The Child Care and Development Fund (2001), which is the child care subsidy program created by Congress 
as part of the welfare reform package in 1996, was intended to facilitate participation in employment and 
employment-related activities such as education and training.  However, the Joint Center for Poverty Research 
concluded in 2003 that only 10.4 percent of eligible single mothers with young children received any 
subsidization of child care costs (Blau and Tekin 2001).  Currently, in North Carolina alone, 31,000 children are 
on the waiting list for day care subsidies, so their mothers can work or go to school to lift themselves out of 
poverty (Fitzsimon 2004).   
 
272Beginning with the work of William Julius Wilson, researchers have documented the impact of living in 
neighborhoods with high concentrations of poor people, which generally have high rates of unemployment, 
homelessness, crime, substance abuse, and mental health problems (Wilson 1987; Sampson, et al. 1997).  Since 
then, a number of studies have demonstrated the negative effects of such poverty areas on the children who live 
in them.  These include vulnerability to mental health problems, behavioral problems, and signs of chronic 
stress caused by the poor living conditions and levels of violence in their neighborhoods.  See, for example, 
Aneshensel and Sucoff 1996; Bell and Jenkins 1993.  Such children often experience chronic distress symptoms 
and behavioral problems (Hill and Madhere 1996).   
 
273Marsha Garrison (2005) notes that the cost of foster care may rise as high as $50,000 per child per year.  In 
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support these children’s wellbeing while they are young avoids the far greater costs imposed 
on the polity later on as these damaged children become adults.274  Even more important, 
adopting a truly effective program to safeguard children’s wellbeing would move this money 
from a stop-gap system that, even when it keeps children from more serious harm, still 
causes them significant damage, to a system that actively contributes to their wellbeing.  
Would the state’s support of parenting and restructuring of institutions mean that the 
state would then be able to shut down foster care programs?  Of course not.  Even with all the 
institutional prerequisites in place, there will still be parents who either cannot or will not 
rear their children in ways that adequately support their welfare.  Based on the evidence we 
have available, though, far fewer children would be removed from their homes than in the 
current system, and far fewer children would be maltreated.     
 
Conclusion 
 
 Our current foster care system is premised on a flawed conception of the relationship 
between families and the state.  In it, the state sees children’s welfare solely as their parents’ 
responsibility in the normal course of events, safeguards children’s welfare only in the 
abnormal situation after parental safeguards fail, and then acts only for limited periods of 
time to “fix” the family’s situation.  The consequence of this conception is a system that is 
                                                                                                                                                       
comparison, an intensive preschool program shown to reduce abuse costs $5,000 per year, including outreach 
services, and $1,574 per year for the follow-up program.  Subsidizing housing would cost $8,260 per family 
(rather than per individual child) per year (Child Welfare League of America 2005).   
 
274For example, the High/Scope Educational Research Foundation found the provision of early education to be 
cost-effective for the state: researchers determined that society gained more than $17 for every tax dollar 
invested in preschool programs for at-risk kids as a result, for example, of greater tax receipts and less money in 
costs for welfare and prisons (Schweinhart 2002).  The Economic Policy Institute’s report, “Exceptional 
Returns,” found similar results looking at a broader range of early childhood programs, and concluded that a 
comprehensive program for all poor children in the country would save billions of dollars within 25 years, not 
to mention have a tremendous effect on the lives of children involved (Lynch 2004, viii, 9-17; see also Garrison 
2005, notes 110-11 and accompanying text). 
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costly to the polity, to parents, and, most importantly, devastating to children.  In its place, 
we should move toward the model of a state that is truly supportive to children’s welfare.  In 
such a model, the state would be seen as integrally involved and supportive of children’s 
welfare on a continual basis; further, it would ensure that parents have the societal resources 
necessary to rear their children adequately, and that other societal institutions support 
children’s wellbeing.  Our responsibility to children, their parents, and the polity requires that 
we do no less. 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 9 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
I have argued through much of this dissertation against the view that the state can and 
should be neutral to families.  In its place, I have contended that the state should actively 
seek to support families’ capability to engage in caretaking.  In this regard, I have asserted 
that the state must be conceived to have a continual responsibility to structure societal 
institutions to foster caretaking in the ordinary course of events, rather than simply to step in 
when families are deemed to fail.   And I have contended that such a posture on the part of 
the state can be pursued consistently with (or, at least not in irreparable contradiction to) the 
other goods that a liberal democratic state should and must pursue, including autonomy, 
equality, and justice.  
To make this argument, I have pointed out that once we accept the (in retrospect, 
rather obvious) insight of feminist theorists that dependency is a normal condition 
experienced by all humans at various points in their lives, liberalism’s respect for human 
dignity, which drives its support of autonomy and equality, requires more than that the state 
protect the right to be left alone by either individuals or families.  Because families can 
respond adequately to dependency needs only in a network of institutions that are supportive 
of caretaking, liberalism’s core postulate of human dignity requires that the state structure 
institutions in ways that allow these dependency needs to be met with dignity.   I have spent 
the bulk of this dissertation trying to sort out how a more capacious liberalism that 
 234 
recognizes the importance of caretaking would incorporate this good along with the more 
traditionally recognized liberal goods and virtues in a variety of areas involving the family-
state relationship for which liberal theory now gives us few answers – the state’s 
responsibility with respect to care for dependents, relationships between adults, civic 
education, work-and-family issues, and the child welfare system. 
My argument in favor of the supportive state model may, for some, raise the specter 
of a totalitarian state that will lead to the standardization of families and the weakening of 
citizens’ autonomy and wholesale invasion into their private lives.  Such an objection, 
however, misconceives the state’s role in this proposal.  The current dominant approach 
leaves families to their own devices regarding dependency matters.   In doing so, it forces 
them to choose from a range of options that all may be unacceptable because they don’t 
consider the need for caretaking.  By requiring societal institutions to take caretaking into 
account along with other legitimate goods, the supportive state model gives citizens the 
resources to pursue their responsibilities with dignity.   This bolsters rather than retards their 
autonomy.  For example, laws that prohibit an employer from requiring overtime by 
employees with younger children would strengthen, not weaken, parents’ ability to fulfill 
their goals. 
The supportive state proposal therefore requires recognizing the complexity of the 
autonomy to which liberalism gives pride of place in two particular ways.  First, it requires 
recognition that citizens’ ability to further their own life plans is not always best promoted by 
the state simply staying out of citizens’ business and enforcing the right to be left alone.  
Citizens still require the basic resources and institutional framework to accomplish their 
purposes.   This is particularly the case with respect to caretaking, which requires positive 
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action to assure the framework in which caretaking can occur. 
Second, autonomy, itself, must be seen as an accomplishment rather than an 
ontological fact of the human condition.  This means, in the case of children, that the state 
must pay attention to the formative process for developing citizens capable of being self-
directing.   In Thomas Spragens words, citizens must be seen as “separate individuals whose 
integrity and particularity must be respected.  But they are people whose lives and identities 
and aspirations and activities are all generated via their association with others. . . .  [T]hey 
are not born autonomous but become so through a complex and sometimes arduous process 
of socialization, acculturation, and education.” (1999, 260). The liberal democratic state, as 
many have argued before me, must pay considerable attention to the process by which 
citizens become autonomous, including receiving good family care and a strong civic 
education.  I would add that it must also pay attention to and seek to support the institutions 
that have a role in this process through positive action by a respectful yet supportive state. 
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